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IN TRODUCTION
On Friday, October 19, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon took
a risky step to de-fang the Watergate investigation that had become
a "viper in the bosom" of his Presidency.1

The U.S. Court of

Appeals had just directed him to tum over tape-recordings subpoe
naed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; these tape
recordings might prove or disprove White House involvement in
the Watergate cover-up. Rather than challenge this ruling, the
President conceived

a

new plan. The White House would prepare

summaries of the nine tape-recordings in question, which would be
verified by Senator John Stennis, a seventy-two-year-old Democrat
from Mississippi, working alone with the assistance of a single
White House lawyer. Cox would be entitled to the verified tran
scripts, but nothing else. It was a generous offer, in the President's
mind; there would be no further negotiations.
The following day, October 20th, Cox held a dramatic press con
ference, spelling out for the American public why he could not
1. RICHARD NIXON, RN:

THE

MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 929 (1978).
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agree to the Stennis proposal. President Nixon turned off his televi
sion set and summoned Attorney General Elliot Richardson to the
Oval Office: Cox had to be fired - immediately. Richardson re
fused the Presidential directive and resigned. Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus attempted to resign and was "fired"
by the President. Finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork carried
out the President's order, terminating Cox. "In the shock of that
moment," one commentator later recounted, "the American public
got a taste of what it would be like to live in a country where their
ruler is above the law."2 A firestorm of public protest erupted that
led to the appointment of a new special prosecutor - Leon
Jaworski - and the slow unraveling of the Nixon presidency.3
Nine days after the infamous "Saturday Night Massacre,"
Congress began hearings to consider legislation that would create a
statutory special prosecutor. The purpose: allow the Watergate in
vestigation to resume and prevent future crises such as Nixon's fir
ing of Cox.4 A lineup of distinguished witnesses filed through the
House and Senate to testify during those stormy days of October
and November. Archibald Cox himself was one of the chief spokes
men in favor of a statutorily-created special prosecutor. Before
packing up his boxes and driving with his wife to their secluded
farmhouse in Maine, the ousted Watergate Special Prosecutor told
a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee that an investi
gation by an outside, neutral prosecutor was almost essential if the
2. Simon Lazarus & Jane E. Larson, The Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel
Statute, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 187, 187 (1987). Lazarus participated in drafting, and lobbying

in favor of, the final independent counsel statute as a White House advisor to President
Jimmy Carter. Id.

3. For a more detailed examination of these events, see KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD
Cox: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 318-58 (1997). The White House lawyer who was intended
to assist Senator Stennis in verifying the tapes was J. Fred Buzhardt, a friend of Stennis. Id.
at 332.
4. See Katy J. Harriger, Damned If She Does and Damned If She Doesn't: The Attorney
General and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEo. L.J. 2097, 2101-02 (1998). Cox had

been appointed Special Prosecutor by Attorney General Elliot Richardson, as part of a pack
age by which the Senate insisted upon the selection of a neutral prosecutor for the Watergate
case, before it approved the President's choice (Richardson) to replace Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst, who had resigned due to allegations of impropriety in handling the
Watergate prosecution. Cox was governed by a hastily-made charter that was drafted by
Richardson's office and refined by Cox and Richardson even before Cox accepted the posi
tion. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 232-51. The charter was formalized pursuant to a regu
lation adopted by the Attorney General. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973). For a copy of Cox's
charter, designated "Duties and Responsibilities of the Special Prosecutor," see also Hear
ings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 110 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings Before the Sub
comm. on Criminal Justice], and WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT app. I,
at 250-51 (1975) [hereinafter WATERGATE REPORT].
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country was to survive1future crises like Watergate.5 As Cox reiter
ated in a second round of congressional testimony: "The pressures,
the tensions of divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as
honorable and conscientious as any individual might be, the public
could never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thoroughness
with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is
absolutely essential: "6
Even as he testified, however, Cox was keenly aware that the
concept of a special prosecutor divorced from the executive branch
raised serious constitutional concerns, particularly relating to sepa
ration of powers. But he felt strongly that an office could be crafted
to surmount these constitutional obstacles. "[I]t is a doubt which I
have satisfied myself that I would be willing to run,'' he told the
Representatives,

"if

I were in the position of the members of the

committee."7
Five years later, in 1978, the Ethics in Government Act was
adopted by Congress after much haggling.8 It was signed into law
on October 26, 1978, by an ebullient President Jimmy Carter.9
Recent events in Washington have spawned an increasingly pub
lic debate as to the effectiveness, constitutionality, and sanity of
that nobly conceived Watergate-era statute. With the expansions in
1998 of the Whitewater investigation by independent counsel
Kenneth Starr, moving into the Monica Lewinsky affair10 and other
matters only remotely connected to his original charter, the public
questions about the independent counsel law have become intense
and vocal. Twenty years after its adoption, the statute teeters on
the verge of collapse..
Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr - a distin
guished lawyer, former Solicitor General, and former federal ap
peals court judge - has tested the independent counsel law as no
other prior special prosecutor, and has revealed serious design de5. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 295.
6. Removing Politics From the Administration ofJustice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 200 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics From the Administration ofJustice].
7. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 307.
8. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824,
1867-73 (independent counsel provisions are codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99
(1994)).
9. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S. 555 Into Law, II Pun.
PAPERS 1854-55 (Oct. 26, 1978).
10. See Francis X. Clines & Jeff Gerth, Subpoenas Sent as Clinton Denies Reports of an
Affair with Aide at White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al; Jodi A. Enda & Angie
Cannon, New Sex, Coverup Scandal Engulfs Clinton, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al.
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fects in the statute. At the time he was appointed in 1994, Starr's
jurisdictional charter was a narrow one authorizing him to investi
gate an Arkansas land deal involving Bill and Hillary Clinton that
took place in the 1980s.11 From that launch pad he has gone on to
investigate the suicide of Clinton friend and deputy White House
Counsel Vince Foster (1994);12 irregularities in firings within the
White House Travel Office (1996);13 alleged false statements to the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight by White
House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum;14 the improper request for FBI
background files on prominent Republicans by White House offi
cials (1996);15 and alleged perjury and subornation of perjury by
President Clinton, in denying a sexual affair with White House in
tern Monica Lewinsky, during his civil deposition in the Paula Jones
case (1998).16
In the course of the Lewinsky investigation, and his subsequent
referral of impeachment material to Congress, Starr has further
tested the limits of the statute's boundaries by making prosecutorial
11. See In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Assn., No. 94-1, 1994 WL 913274 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 5, 1994) (order appointing Kenneth W. Starr as Independent Counsel).
·

12. See Starr's Galaxy ofInvestigations, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 52. Robert Fiske had
originally expanded his investigation into the Vmce Foster suicide, but uncovered no impro
priety. See Peter Baker, One Death Altered Path of Presidency: Five Years Later, Clinton
White House Still Facing Aftermath of Foster Suicide, WASH. PosT, July 20, 1998, at Al.
Kenneth Starr later revisited the Foster matter and issued a report that found no wrongdoing
but left many mysteries. See In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Oct. 10, 1997), (re
port on the Death of Vmcent Foster, Jr., by the Office of the Independent Counsel). For a
lively discussion of the Foster matter, and some of its puzzles, see Richard Brookhiser, Body
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, § 7, at 13 (reviewing CmuSTOPHE R RUDDY, THE
STRANGE DEATH OF VINCENT FOSTER: AN lNvEsTIGATION (1997)).
13. The court's order expanding Starr's jurisdiction into the Travel Office matter can be
found inIn re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Mar. 22, 1996) (order expanding author
ity of the Independent Counsel to the matter of William David Watkins).
14. The court's order expanding Starr's investigation into the Nussbaum matter can be
found in In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Oct. 26, 1997) (order expanding author
ity of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Bernard Nussbaum).
15. The court's order expanding Starr's jurisdiction into the FBI files matter can be found
in In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (June 21, 1996) (order expanding authority of
the Independent Counsel to the matter of Anthony Marceca).
16. The court's order expanding jurisdiction in the Monica Lewinsky matter can be found
in In re Madison Guaranty, No. 94-1, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (order ex
panding authority of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Monica Lewinsky). Starr also
received permission, pursuant to the Attorney General's referral powers under 28 U.S.C.
§ 594(e) (1994), to explore whether former Deputy Attorney General (and Clinton friend)
Webster Hubbell violated federal law in connection with his billing and expense practices
while a member of the Rose Law Firm, of which Hillary Clinton was also a partner. See In re
Madison Guar. Sav. and Loan Assn., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34673, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept 1,
1994) (order expanding authority of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Webster L.
Hubbell). For a discussion of how these spin-offs of the Whitewater case may affect future
Presidents, see Deborah Zabarenko, Will Case Isolate Presidents? PTIT. PosT-GAZETTE, Aug.
11, 1998, at A5.
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decisions that (whether one agrees or disagrees with them) can cer
tainly be categorized as aggressive. He has subpoenaed Monica
Lewinsky's mother to testify about her daughter's sex life;17 sub
poenaed Secret Service agents to testify about the President's
whereabouts in the Oval Office;18 subpoenaed White House law
yers to reveal their conversations with President Clinton concerning
the Lewinsky case;19 and subpoenaed the President to testify before
the grand jury, all of which culminated in impeachment proceedings
in Congress.20 The expansive power that Starr has sought to vest in
the independent counsel (at times with the apparent blessing of the
attorney general and the judiciary), has prompted commentators Democrats, Republicans, and agnostics alike - to question
whether the independent counsel statute has outlived its
usefulness.21
·
This Article seeks to diagnose the troubles plaguing the in
dependent counsel law, particularly in light of the recent blizzard of
activity during the tenure of Whitewater Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr. The "sunset" provision of the statute establishes a
deadline of June 30, 1999, by which Congress must face the difficult
task of determining if and under what terms the statute should be
reauthorized. This Article will offer specific proposals, arguing that
the law is worth saving - but in a dramatically overhauled form
designed to return the statute to its original purpose.
17. See Naftali Bendavid , Lewinsky's Mother Testifies: Starr's Subpoena Stirs Up Ethical
and Legal Debates, C m. TRIB. , Feb. 1 1 , 1998 , at 1 .
18. See Peter Baker & Bill Miller, 3 Secret Service Agents Testify, WASH. PosT, July 18,
1998 , at Al. The U.S. Court of Appeals ultimately up held t his power, and t he Supreme
Court denied certiorari on t he issue. See In re Sealed Case , 148 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ,
cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, No. 98-93 , 1998 WL 407152 (Nov. 9, 1998) .
19. See Stephen Labaton, Secret Session Led to Ruling on Privilege, N. Y. T1MES, May 28,
1998 , at A24; Ruth Marcus , Court Rejects Privilege Claim: White House Loses Appeal on
Shielding Attorney-Client Talks, WASH. PoST, July 28, 1998 , at Al; Roger Simon , Clinton's
Lawyers Must Testify, Rehnquist Rules, C m. TRIB. , Aug. 5 , 1998 , at 1; Excerpts from Rules in
Compelling Testimony of 3 in the Lewinsky Case, N.Y: TJMEs , May 28, 1998, at A24. The
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed t he power of Starr to compel testimon y from from deputy
W hite House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and t he Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue .
See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d. 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) , cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v.
Office of Independent Counsel , No. 98-316, 1998 WL 541012 (Nov. 9 , 1998) .
20. See Susan Schmidt & Rut h Marcus, President Has Been Served Subpoena: Testimony
Sought For This Week, Legal Source Says, WASH. PoST, Jul y 26, 1998 , at Al. The W hite
House worked out a deal b y w hich t he subpoena was withdrawn , and President Clinton re
luctantly agreed to give his testimony b y closed circuit television , to avoid t he "indignity" of a
personal appearance. See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt , Clinton Agrees to Testify for Grand
Jury, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1998, at Al; Scott Throw, A Secret Proceeding With No Secrets,
N. Y. T1MES, Aug. 2 , 1998 , § 4 , at 15.
21.

See infra note 160 and accompan ying text.
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In Part I of the Article, I review the genealogy of the special
prosecutor law, starting from the time of its conception in Congress
during the Watergate crisis. Focusing upon legislative history that is
often overlooked by scholars because much of it relates to early
proposals that were rejected during the five-year gestation period
of the statute, I will demonstrate that the global vision of Congress
was quite different from the scheme which has actually developed
under the statute. Indeed, I conclude that the independent counsel
law has evolved into precisely the sort of "Frankenstein monster"
that congressional leaders and commentators feared. In part due to
the conflicting signals sent by the Supreme Court in its 1988 deci
sion of Morrison

v.

Olson,22 and in part due to the failure of the

statutory language to match its original purpose, the law has bedev
iled the American system of government. What began as a cautious
piece of legislation, designed to deal primarily with extreme crises,
has transformed itself into a runaway statute
equivalent of a permanent special prosecutor.

creating

the

In Part II of the Article, I briefly review the constitutional de
bates that consumed the first twenty years of ,the statute's existence.
That scholarship has largely validated the Supreme Court's decision
in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the constitutionality of the special
prosecutor statute. Rather than rehashing the conceptual questions
of the past, however, I will assuriie that the general framework is
constitutional and instead suggest that Congress should move for
ward toward a frank examination of the tedious details of the stat
ute, addressing its obvious gaps and patent failures.
In Part III, I advocate over a dozen specific reforms that are
essential

if

the independent counsel law is to be brought back on

track. Tue proposed reforms

fall broadly into three categories:

re

forming the process by which independent counsels are appointed;
reforming the role of the independent counsel; and reforming the
role of the special court.
With respect to the appointment process, it will be argued that
the statutory triggering device must be set much higher, so that it is
"sprung" only rarely; the category of individuals covered by the
statute must be dramatically reduced; and the attorney general
must be given much more discretion to decide whether to appoint
special prosecutors in the lion's share of cases.
With respect to reforming the role of the independent counsel, it
is of paramount importance that his jurisdictional limits be firmly
22. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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established, with a strong presumption against expansion of those
limits. As well, the independent counsel should be required to
work full-time; should be carefully monitored to determine when
his investigation is "substantially complete"; and should be relieved
of the burdensome (and costly) task of producing a voluminous fi
nal report.
With respect to the special court, it should be given much more
explicit duties, and authority to carry out those duties. Among
other changes, it should be explicitly authorized to consult with the
attorney general in selecting an independent counsel (and in deter
mining when his or her work is "substantially complete"), and
should possess the power to replace an independent counsel under
certain circumstances.
This Article concludes that the independent counsel statute is
worth salvaging, but only if Congress pushes beyond those cosmetic
changes adopted during previous reauthorizations. Only dramatic
and radical reforms, bringing the special prosecutor law back to its
post-Watergate origins, will save it from complete destruction at
this period in American history.
!.

HISTORY OF

THE

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE

The modern independent counsel law is a direct byproduct of
the Saturday Night Massacre and the collapse of public confidence
in government officials that followed. Although the early legisla
tive history of the statute is often overlooked - because Congress
did not enact the law until 1978
an enormous amount can be
gleaned from the initial hearings at which the concept of a statutory
independent counsel was developed.23
Immediately after Cox's firing in the fall of 1973, thirty-five dif
ferent bills were introduced in the House and Senate with at least
165 sponsors.24 Most of the focus was upon quick legislation that
would authorize the appointment of a new Watergate Special
Prosecutor to replace Cox, and ensure that this new appointee was
-

23. Two books do an excellent job of examining the early congressional debates and hear
ings surrounding the independent counsel law. See TERRY EASTLAND, Enucs, PoLmcs
AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989, at 31-65
{1989); KATY J. lIAruuGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN
AMERICAN PoLmcs 40-72 {1992).
24. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 43. During the remainder of the 93d Congress
alone, at least 57 bills providing for special prosecutors were introduced. See Constance
O'Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday
Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the
Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 113, 118
n.29 {1982) (citing CONG. INDEX {CCH) 222 {1974)).
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protected from another "massacre" by the executive branch.25 Yet
congressional leaders also had an eye on long-term corrective meas
ures. Their broader goal was to institutionalize the position of spe
cial prosecutor in order to deal with future crises in unborn
administrations.
A.

An Urgent Push for Legislation

One of the first and most significant bills, S. 2611, was intro
duced in October 1973 by Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. (D. Ind.), a
prominent member of the Judiciary Committee. The Bayh bill, a
bipartisan legislative effort joined by fifty-five other Senators, pro
posed the creation of a temporary (rather than a permanent) spe
cial prosecutor, appointed by the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia.26 Although there was a flurry of other proposals including a bill sponsored by Senator Taft that would have allowed
the appointment of a special prosecutor by the attorney general in
consultation with the Senate27 - the germ of the original concept
offered by Senator Bayh was the one that ultimately prevailed five
years later.
The cast of legal scholars and political leaders who supplied tes
timony for and against the proposed legislation was quite remarka
ble. Besides Cox himself, Senators Adlai E. Stevenson

III

(D.

ID.)

and Robert Taft, Jr. (R. Ohio), Acting Attorney General Robert H.
Bork, Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund, Chicago Law Professor
Philip B. Kurland, former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and
a spectrum of other luminaries paraded through the Capital to offer
guidance.28
Professor Freund, a preeminent constitutional scholar, sought to
allay the immediate concerns of the Senate Judiciary Committee
See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 42-43.
26. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 98-100. The
general concept embodied in t he Bayh bill was debated extensively in t he Senate. See also
Special Prosecutor Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1973)
[hereinafter Special Prosecutor Hearings]. S. 2611 was first in troduced b y Senator Bayh on
October 26, 1973, and is reported in S. REP. No. 93-596 (1973). In t he House, H.R. 11401
took a similar approach. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35-36. Althoug h t he original ver
25.

sion of t he Bayh bill provided for t he District Court (i.e. Judge Si rica) to appoint t he special
prosecuto r directly, later amendments to S. 2611 provided t hat t he district court, sitting en
bane, would desi gnate a panel of t hree of its members to appoint t he special prosecutor. See
S. REP. No. 93-596. This approach t hus mirrored t hat embodied in House Bill 11401. See
EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35.

27. Senator Taft's bill, S. 2642, was introduced on November 2, 1973. See S . REP. No. 93596, (1973). For a discussion of t his and other early bills, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 3536; O 'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 118 n.29.
28. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at III-IV.
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that any plan divorcing the special prosecutor from the executive
branch would be :flatly unconstitutional. Freund mollified the Sena
tors by reporting that forty-nine deans of American law schools and
the American Bar Association had endorsed the Bayh bill or simi
lar legislation. "I think that if you are really interested in the inde
pendence of the prosecutor," Freund told the Senators, "you have
to forgo executive control."29 Professor Kurland of the University
of Chicago Law School submitted written comments supporting the
law,30 as did Harvard Law Professors Philip B. Heymann and
Stephen Breyer, both of whom had worked on Cox's Watergate
Special Prosecution force.31
Archibald Cox spent the bulk of his Senate testimony setting
forth the facts relating to his termination.32 A week later in the
House, however, Cox was more focused on the special prosecutor
proposal. He strongly urged the passage of such legislation, in part
because it would solve the problem of "divided loyalty or conflict of
interest" that had been so evident in the Justice Department during
Watergate.33 Cox also felt - although he understood the constitu
tional complexities of the issue - that Congress would be wise to
vest the power of appointing special prosecutors in the U.S. District
Court. The judiciary, he felt, assured the "greatest independence"
from political pressure. It also offered the greatest "appearance" of
that virtue. 34
At the same time, the concerns of those who opposed this legis
lation were taken quite seriously. Dean Roger C. Cramton of
Cornell Law School voiced a worry that would haunt the legislation
until its passage five years later: the special prosecutor law would
29. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 368. The "Statement by Law School
Deans" endorsing such legislation is reprinted in Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 ,
at 551.
30.

See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 319.

31.

See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 , at 556-60.

32. For a brief exchange in the Senate hearings in which Cox spoke about proposed legis

lation, and suggested that a special prosecutor under the supervision of the courts was proba
bly constitutional, see Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 , at 29-31.
33. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 , at 295 (remarks
of Archibald Cox).
34. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 , at 304 . In
the event that Congress feared the constitutional uncertainties of placing this power in the
judiciary, Cox suggested that an acceptable compromise might be to provide for the appoint
ment of the special prosecutor by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
However, the District Court would remain in charge of appointments if Congress was in
recess, to avoid manipulation of the process by the executive branch. See 1973 Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 , at 304.
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allow Congress and the courts to usurp the function of the execu
tive branch. Cramton explained:
The prosecution of crime is an essential element of the executive
function in the American scheme of government. Although the Con
stitution shares and diffuses powers among the three branches in a
manner that departs from the purity urged by Montesquieu, the fun
damental scheme calls for the legislature to write the laws, an execu
tive to enforce them, and a judiciary to interpret them in individual
cases.35

Federal District Judge John Sirica, the Watergate icon who had
resuscitated the original Justice Department prosecution of that
case and had displayed great courage in directing President Nixon
to turn over the tapes to Cox, wrote a letter. to the Judiciary Com
mittee admitting that he was leery of any statute that shifted the
responsibility to appoint and supervise the special prosecutor onto
the shoulders of the judiciary.36 District Judge Gerhard Gesell, in
an opinion handed down shortly thereafter declaring that the dis
missal of Special Prosecutor Cox had been invalid, joined Judge
Sirica in warning against the intermingling of executive and judicial
functions. Gesell cited the memory of Judge Learned Hand, cau
tioning: "Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate func
tions in the administration of justice; they must not merge. "37
Perhaps the most ardent critic of the proposed new legislation
was the man who had fired Archibald Cox at the direction of Presi
dent Nixon. Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, in Senate testi
mony, focused on the separation of powers issue and hammered
away at it. "The Executive alone," Bork contended, "has the duty
and the power to enforce the laws by prosecutions brought before
the courts."38 If Congress was permitted to take away that duty
from the executive branch,
I do not see why Congress could not simply abolish the Antitrust Di
vision or the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and hand
their law enforcement functions over to itself, to the courts, or to the
35. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 352.
36. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 556.
37. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973) (quoting United States v.
Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945)). Judge Gesell (like Judge Sirica) was responding
to suggestions that the judiciary should shoulder the task of appointing a new special prose
cutor to replace Cox and finish the Watergate case. He wrote these words in ruling that
Robert Bork's firing of Cox was illegal, in the context of a civil suit brought by citizen activist
Ralph Nader. Cox himself never put much stock in Gesell's ruling, and took no steps to have
himself reinstated. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 558 n.135.
38. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 451.
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Secretary of State. I do not see why it could not abolish the Depart
ment of Justice and enforce the laws itself on such a theory.39

Bork concluded bluntly: "That is simply not our system of
government. "40
In the House of Representatives, where simultaneous hearings
had been launched to consider parallel legislation,41 Bork was even
more insistent. He feared that the creation of statutorily-built spe
cial prosecutors would encourage witch hunts of the sort made infa
mous by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s,42 with "ugly legal
and political results." The idea of a permanent special prosecutor
- which was being floated in some House and Senate proposals was even more alarming to Bork. In a phrase that would be much
quoted in later years, Bork warned: "[W]hat you are doing is build
ing an office whose sole function is to attack the executive branch
throughout its tenure. It is an institutionalized wolf hanging on the
flank of the elk, which does not seem to me to be the way to run a
government."43
One House Judiciary Committee member, Republican
Lawrence J. Hogan of Maryland, summed it up in equally dark
terms: "Now, my question is, do you think that maybe we are creat
ing a Frankenstein monster, creating someone that does not have to
answer to anyone, to have unfettered power . . . ?"44
All of those debating the issue, both for and against the pro
posed legislation, understood that the legal questions facing Con
gress were grave ones.
39. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 452.
40. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 451.
41. Although the House hearings jumbled together debate on at least ten different bills,
the focus was on a joint House-Senate resolution (H.RJ. Res. 784) and a House bill (H.R.
11401) that- like the Bayh bill in the Senate - sought to create a temporary special prose
cutor supervised by the courts. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
supra note 4, at 98 (remarks of Senator Bayh). Technically, H.R.J. Res. 784 was designed to
preserve the machinery of the existing Watergate Special Prosecution Force in the wake of
Cox's firing. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 28.
H.R. 11401 was a broader bill that would have allowed the courts to create future special
prosecutors. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at
487.
42. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263
(remarks of Hon. Robert Bork). McCarthy, a Republican from WJSconsin, led controversial
Senate hearings aimed at proving that Communists had infiltrated positions of trust in the
U.S. government. The McCarthy hearings were later discredited as driven by political para·
noia. See generally, RoBERT GRIFFITI,I THE PoLrTics OF FEAR: JosEPH R. McCARTHY AND
THE SENATE (1970).
43. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263.
44. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 188.
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The Constitutional Quandaries

Three constitutional issues dominated the debate during those
early hearings on the special prosecutor law. These were the same
three issues that would occupy Congress and scholars for the next
two decades.
1.

The Appointments Clause

First, there was a question whether Congress had the power to
place authority to select a special prosecutor in the judicial branch,
without violating the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution.45 The 1839 decision of Ex parte Hennen stated
that "the appointing power . . . was no doubt intended to be exer
cised by the department of the government to which the officer to
be appointed most appropriately belonged,"46 which permitted the
inference that the appointment of a special prosecutor could be del
egated only to the executive branch. Yet, a later decision seemed to
abandon this rigid interpretation.47 The Court in Ex parte Siebold
had stated that although certain election supervisors were executive
creatures, Congress could authorize the judiciary to appoint them.48
Even though it might be "usual and proper to vest the appointment
of inferior officers in that department . . . to which the duties of
such officers appertain," the Court concluded, there was "no abso
lute requirement to this effect in the Constitution."49 This decision
provided a credible basis for the argument that the judiciary could
appoint special prosecutors. Yet the precedent remained murky.50
45. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall have the power to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law
" The section goes on to provide, however, that "the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2. Thus, early
cases distinguished between "principal officers" (who could be.appointed only by the Presi
dent) and "inferior officers" (whom Congress had some discretion to appoint themselves or
delegate power to others to do so). See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10
(1878).
46. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839) (upholding the ability of federal district courts to
appoint their own clerks).
47. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
48. See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98.
49. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
50. The Court in Siebold concluded that the question in each case turned on whether the
exercise of appointment power by the judiciary (or any other branch) created an "incon
gruity," because it was inconsistent with the powers of another branch. Siebold, 100 U.S. at
398. For a discussion of the Appointment Clause debate in Congress, see EASTLAND, supra
note 23, at 36-38. Cf. O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 128-35; Robert G. Solloway,
Note, The Institutionalized Wolf: An Analysis of the Unconstitutionality of the Independent
•

.

.

.
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The Removal Controversy

The second perplexing question was whether the removal provi
sion of the legislation - that would locate power to remove the
special prosecutor in the judiciary - encroached upon the Presi
dent's domain. The Constitution nowhere explicitly stated whether
Congress, the President, or both possessed the power to remove
federal officers once they were appointed. When it came to certain
subordinate employees who clearly served at the will of the Presi
dent, an early case suggested that the President was vested with
power to "remove an officer when in his discretion he regards it for
the public good. "51 When it came to a hodgepodge of other federal
officials, however, the precedent was blurred. Myers v. United
States suggested that the Chief Executive's removal power was
broad.52 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, decided a decade
later, abandoned that stance and suggested that the President could
be prevented statutorily from removing certain officials in the exec
utive branch, so long as they were not "purely executive officers."53
United States v. Wiener reinforced Humphrey's "functional"
approach.54
Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 21 IND. L. REv. 955, 969-73
{1988).
51. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 {1897) (involving the removal of a U.S.
Attorney by President Grover Cleveland).
52. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Myers involved an attempt by Congress to require the Senate's
assent before the President could remove certain postmasters. The Court took a "formalis
tic" approach, declaring that "[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of appoint
ment." 272 U.S. at 122. The presidential power to appoint a postmaster thus implied the
power of removal. Chief Justice Taft (formerly President Taft) expressed in dicta a broad
view of the President's power. According to Taft, the Chief Executive could constitutionally
remove "executive officers and members of executive tribunals," even those who had "duties
of a quasi-judicial character." 272 U.S. at 135. This was so because the President possessed
an independent duty to faithfully execute the law, as he saw fit. See 272 U.S. at 135.
53. 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935). Humphrey's Executor acknowledged that the President
could remove "purely executive officers" without cause. 295 U.S at 631-32. But the Presi
dent had no inherent power to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FfC), in
Humphrey's, because this Commissioner exercised quasi-judicial and legislative functions
and was not a "purely executive officer." 295 U.S. at 628-32. President Roosevelt had re
moved Humphrey from the FfC after only two years in the position, even though Congress
had established a seven-year term for the Commissioners and stipulated that the President
could only remove those officers for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
The modem version of the relevant statute can be found at 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West 1997).
54. See 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). Wiener reaffirmed the Humphrey's Executor approach,
concluding that the President could not remove a member of the War Claims Commission.
That body was established to adjudicate claims of individuals who had suffered personal in
jury or property losses during World War II. Despite congressional silence as to removal
power, the Court concluded that the Commission in question was designed to remain free of
executive interference, and the Commissioners' duties were "quasi-judicial" in nature. Re
moval power thus did not attach to the President. See 357 U.S. at 356. For a discussion of the
removal issue, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 38-40; Laura L. Cox, Case Note, Political
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The latter two cases thus provided a certain amount of comfort
for those supporting special prosecutor legislation in the wake of
Watergate. At the same time, congressional leaders were acutely
aware that the proposed special prosecutor would be assigned
prosecutorial functions that looked and smelled uniquely executive.
Thus, even the most generous removal cases
Humphrey's Execu
tor and Wiener
provided only shaky guideposts.ss
-

-

3.

The Separation of Powers Bugaboo

The third question that nagged the draftsmen of the special
prosecutor law subsumed the other two. Did the proposed legisla
tion run broadside into the doctrine of separation of powers? The
separation of powers doctrine warned that no branch of govern
ment should aggrandize itself by usurping. the powers directly or
implicitly assigned to another branch.s6 Dean Cramton of Cornell
Law School neatly summed up the principle during one House
hearing: "Each of the three branches of Government has a central
core of functions upon which the other branches may not unduly
encroach," Cramton explained. "[T]he basic tasks of one branch
cannot be removed from it and placed in either another branch or
an independent agency."s7 Because the Constitution mandated
that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe
cuted,"S8 did it not follow that one of the "core functions" of the
executive branch was criminal prosecution? If that was the case,
did it not further follow that any effort to encroach upon this "core

Accountability and the Independent Counsel· A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing? 57 U. CIN. L. REv.
1471, 1483-85 (1989).

55. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional removal question, see Cox, supra
note 54, at 1483-85; O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 135-39; Solloway, supra note 50,
at 973-76.
56. The doctrine of separation of powers dates back at least as far as the writings of John
Locke. See Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Pow
ers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385, 387-88 (1935). James Madison was one of the earliest proponents
of the doctrine in America. Writing in The Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that the
doctrine was essential because "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
325 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Following the theory of Montesquieu,
Madison maintained that absolute separation among the three branches was not required;
rather, some overlap was both necessary and desirable. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra, at
327-31.
57. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 339 (testi
mony of Dean Roger C. Cramton).
58. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
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function" of the executive branch by passing it off to an unelected
special prosecutor was constitutionally impermissible?59
The appointment, removal, and separation of powers issues thus
divided experts from the start, leading to lengthy (and unsatisfying)
hearings as Congress struggled to fit a square peg into an oblong
hole.60
A brief reprieve was granted to Congress on November 19,
1973, just one month after Cox's firing, when Leon Jaworski was
appointed as successor Watergate prosecutor.61 Jaworski's appoint
ment removed pressure on congressional leaders to find an instant
solution to the special prosecutor quandary. The following day,
November 20th, the Senate brought its hearings to a close, ending
the opening volley of debate.
Yet that first round of hearings in 1973, at which the concept of
a statutory independent counsel was invented and roughly defined,
shed important light on Congress's original vision of that office. It
revealed that the statutory special prosecutor was designed, most
immediately, to prevent the recurrence of a naked exercise of exec
utive power that had manifested itself in the Saturday Night Massa
cre of Watergate. Second, it was designed to build into the
American system of government a failsafe mechanism that would
protect future generations from constitutional meltdowns by al
lowing the judiciary (rather than the attorney general) to appoint
and monitor this neutral prosecutor. At the same time, Congress
understood that the law had to carefully circumscribe the roles of
the president, the attorney general, and the courts, if it was to be
effective and constitutional. The initial goal of the statute was to
59. For a fuller discussion of the separation of powers issue, see EASTLAND, supra note
at 40-41; Cox, supra note 54, at 1478-83; Solloway, supra note 50, at 963-68.
60. A nice discussion of these issues as they were intertwined with the early special prose
cutor law hearings can be found in EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35-41. Some examples of the
discussions of the appointment, removal, and separation of powers issues in the early con
gressional debates can be found in 1 Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975:
Hearings on S. 495 Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 94th Cong. 240-43 (1975)
[hereinafter Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations] (remarks of Erwin
Griswold); 2 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra (remarks of
Michael L. Uhlmann); Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 28-32 (remarks of
Archibald Cox); Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 479-86 (dissenting views of
Representative Mcclory et al.).
61. This was accomplished pursuant to a carefully worded order of Acting Attorney Gen
eral Bork that required consent of a Senate Committee before Jaworski could be terminated.
See Atty. Gen. Order No. 551-73, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973); GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 38081, 547 & n.25. Technically, Jaworski was named by the White House to replace Cox on
November 1st. See Remarks of Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork Announcing His
Appointment of Leon Jaworski, 9 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1303 (Nov. 1, 1973). Bork's
formal order re-establishing the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, however, was not is
sued until several weeks later. See HARruGER, supra note 23, at 43, 228 & nn.18-19.
23,
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maintain a delicate balance among the three branches of govern
ment, while grafting onto it a fourth sprig that would support
weight only during brief, unusual moments of crisis.
C.

A New Start: Permanent Special Prosecutors and
Other Proposals

In August 1974, President Richard M. Nixon left the White
House on a drab green helicopter, and the torment of Watergate
was brought to a close. Congress resumed debate over special pros
ecution legislation in the calmer environs of the Ford administra
tion. Senator Sam Ervin's Watergate Committee issued a final
report in June 1974, recommending the creation of a permanent Of
fice of Public Attorney, whose occupant would serve the function of
a special prosecutor whenever conflicts in the executive branch
arose.62 By 1975, Ervin's idea found embodiment in a new piece of
legislation - S. 495 - that proposed the creation of a permanent
special prosecutor lodged in the Office of Public Attorney, under
the control of three retired judges from the U.S. Court of
Appeals.63
The debates over S. 495 are routinely overlooked by scholars,
because the concept of a permanent special prosecutor never took
root. But it is unfortunate that this legislative history has been for
gotten. Not only are the debates involving S. 495 fascinating and
lively, but they provide invaluable clues concerning the nature of
the legislation that Congress was attempting to build during the
five-year gestation period of the independent counsel law. The
hearings relating to S. 495 that absorbed the 94th and 95th Con
gresses are critical because they make explicit what had been im
plicit when the special prosecutor law was first conceived in 1973:
that the finished legislation was meant to deal with rare, major cri
ses like Watergate and the Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920s,
rather than garden variety scandals that routinely dogged high level
officials in any administration.
S. 495, the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975,
was introduced by Senator Abraham Ribicoff at the start of the
94th Congress on January 30, 1975. The initial version of this legis62. See SAM ERVIN, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE ON PRESIDEN
TIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 93-981, at 80-81 (1974) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT
OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE]. Senator Ervin also chaired a subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee that Spring, which considered proposals to establish a perma
nent "special" or "public" prosecutor. See Removing Politics from Administration ofJustice,
supra note 6.
63. A copy of S. 495 can be found at S. REP . No. 94-823, at 159 (1976).
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lation proposed creating an Office of Public Attorney that would
operate independently of the Department of Justice and the Presi
dent. It would investigate and prosecute abuses in the executive
branch and relating to federal elections, with appointment to be
made by the special judicial panel for a five-year renewable term.6 4
The logic behind S. 495 was similar to that underlying the string
of special prosecutor bills that had preceded it. Washington lawyer
Lloyd N. Cutler, who had worked with Senator Ervin on an early
draft of the bill (and would later ·serve as White House Counsel to
Presidents Carter and Clinton), explained the purpose of S. 495 in
fundamental terms: "The Attorney General and his principal as
sistants in the Department of Justice are not simply prosecuting of
ficers but also appointees of the President and members of an
elected administration team that usually hopes for reelection. They
have an obvious conflict of interest when they investigate whether
crimes have been committed in their own election campaigns or
thereafter by high officers of the executive branch. "65
Not only would the appointment of a permanent Public Prose
cutor - charged with examining alleged improprieties in the execu
tive branch on a regular basis - allow a neutral outsider to remain
"on call" to investigate allegations of corruption, but the mere pres
ence of such a "watchdog" would presumably discourage abuses of
the law in the first place. 66
The response to S. 495 was swift, loud, and intensely negative.
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., who had been a key legislative fig
ure throughout Watergate, declared that the bill would "establish a
virtually inviolate fourth branch of Government, and would sub64. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 2-3. See
also S. REP. No. 94-823, at 93-99 (1976).
65. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 207-08.
There was a great deal of concern expressed in the hearings about conflicts of interest involv
ing the Attorney General. One source of particular concern related to the practice of some
modem Presidents to appoint their campaign managers and political advisors as Attorneys
General, heightening the chance of partisan political influence upon those individuals. See
Jack Maskell, Legislative History and Purposes of Enactment of the Independent Counsel
(Special Prosecutor) Provisions ofthe Ethics in Government Act of1978, at 3-6 (Mar. 4, 1987),
microformed on Major Studies and Issue Briefs of the Congressional Research Service, 198788 Supplement, Reel 30784 (Univ. Publications of Am.).
66. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 90
(remarks of Sam Dash). Professor Dash, former Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate
Committee who helped draft an earlier version of the bill, did not view the purpose of the
statute as creating a permanent special prosecutor, per se. "You do not have a public attor
ney running wild beginning any prosecution he wants and interfering with the Attorney Gen
eral. Most often he acts as an ombudsman making inquiries. Only rarely, in a crisis, does he
become a special prosecutor." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra
note 60, at 89.
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stantially diminish the accountability of law-enforcement officials to
the President, the Congress, and the American people."67 Veteran
presidential advisor Clark M. Clifford opposed the measure as
overkill. "My experience in Washington for the past 30 years,"
Clifford told the assembled Senators, "convinces me that corruption
in federal government is rare; it is an aberration and an exception.
Excessive zeal or possibly boredom by the Public Attorney, or a
desire to avoid being tagged as a 'do-nothing'' could lead to petty
prosecutions and harassment of persons in the Executive Branch
"68
•

•

•

•

Philip A. Lacovara, a Republican who had worked with
Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski on the Watergate Special Prose
cution Force (and argued United States

v.

Nixon in the Supreme

Court) warned that such legislation would undercut the role en
trusted to the Attorney General since 1789. "Even though I con
sider the work of the Special Prosecutor's Office to be a major
contribution to vindication of the rule of law and indeed to public
confidence in government," stated Lacovara, "it does not follow
that such a function should be institutionalized permanently."69
Lacovara also feared that the jurisdiction of the proposed Public
Attorney was too "open-ended." It would allow a permanent pros
ecutor "to inquire into every instance of alleged mismanagement or
petty bungling by every minor bureaucrat in the Executive
Branch."70
Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, a Watergate hero
who recently had been appointed Ambassador to Great Britain,
told the Senate Committee in· a letter from London that the ap
pointment of a special prosecutor was (and should remain) a rare
occurrence in American history. S. 495 was a dangerous piece of
legislation because it would transform such appointments into a
preoccupation: "I feel strongly that this [establishment of a perma
nent Special Prosecutor's office] is neither necessary nor desirable,"
Richardson wrote. He continued:
67. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 21. The
Watergate Special Prosecution Force mirrored Senator Baker's concerns, noting that a "spe
cial organization" rarely remains "special" for more than several years before turning into a
rigid bureaucratic body. See WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138. "Such rigidity is
especially likely, and especially harmful, in an agency that is as unaccountable as a permanent
special prosecutor would be." WATERGATE REP ORT, SUPRA note 4, at 139.
68. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 204.
69. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 262.
70. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 270-71.
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It implies that the kin,ds of problems which twice in our history (Tea
pot Dome and Watergate) have called for the creation of a Special
Prosecutor's office are chronic and continuing. To put it the other
way around, it assumes that the regularly constituted law enforcement
authorities are neither sufficiently competent nor trustworthy to be
capable of dealing with the more-or-less routine problems of corrup
tion and abuse of power that have to be dealt with from year to year.
I do not believe that this assumption is warranted.71

The American Bar Association (A.B.A.) likewise panned the
idea of a permanent special prosecutor as undesirable and unwise.
In a report issued for the benefit of Congress, the A.B.A. declared
S. 495 to be legislative overkill. In most cases, the A.B.A. insisted,
the Attorney General could appoint a special U.S. Attorney or As
sistant Attorney General to handle a case in which a potential con
flict existed - and build a "Chinese Wall" around this government
lawyer - rather than going to the extraordinary lengths of ap
pointing a special prosecutor. Only in "exceptional circumstances,"
the A.B.A. report suggested, was it desirable that a special prosecu
tor from outside the Department of Justice should be recruited.72
Senator Howard Baker concluded the assault on the proposed
"permanent special prosecutor" bill by quoting an ominous passage
from History of the Republic of the United States, authored in 1859:
"Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of confu
sion . . . to gratify momentary passions, by letting into government
principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to
themselves."73
Hit by this barrage of opposition, supporters of S. 495 sought to
amend the bill to delete the permanent Public Attorney provision
and provide for an elaborate temporary special prosecutor provi
sion, similar to that proposed by Archibald Cox (among others)
during earlier hearings.74 This new version of the bill relied upon a
71. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85.
72. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 418. The
AB.A. report appears in Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note
60, at 342-430, and is entitled Removing Political Influence From Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies. The A.B.A. position found support in the WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4,
published by the Cox-Jaworski prosecutors in October 1975. The Watergate Report took the
unusual step of declaring the idea of a permanent special prosecutor unacceptable:
Central to the question is the fact that such a public officer would be largely immune
from the accountability that prosecutors and other public officials constantly face. Lack
of accountability of an official on a permanent basis carries a potential for abuse of
power that far exceeds any enforcement gains that might ensue.
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 437.
73. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt Operations, supra note 60, at 84 n.75
(quoting JoHN c. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1859)).
74. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 46, 50. Cox and former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark had offered this proposal. Id. at 50.
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mechanism by which a special prosecutor could be appointed by a
special judicial panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, after a prelimi
nary investigation conducted by the Attorney General,

if sufficient

evidence existed of high-level misconduct.75
Although Senate opponents may have been mollified by the
newly overhauled S. 495, the White House was not. President Ford
sent a stiffly-worded communication to the Senate on July 19, 1976,
raising multiple constitutional concerns about the revised legisla
tion. Not only did this proposed statute resurrect worrisome sepa
ration of powers issues, the White House transmission stated, but
the whole notion of a temporary special prosecutor sprouting up
outside the Department of Justice unleashed a host of practical
problems. President Ford's official communication stated:
Department of Justice estimates that

if

"The

S. 495 were now law, ap

proximately half a dozen special prosecutors would have to be ap
pointed,

and

close

to

50

other

matters

possibly

requiring

appointment would be under advisement by a special court." This
"extraordinary result," concluded the President, was bad for the
American legal system and bad for the country.76
In its place, the White House transmission proposed yet another
version of S. 495 that would make the special prosecutor (once
again) a permanent creature. Three important changes, however,
were introduced to make it a net gain for the executive branch.
Under the new White House plari., the special prosecutor would be
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen
ate, for a three year term. This would allow the President to con
trol, to a large extent, the appointment process.

Even more

importantly, the special prosecutor would remain within the Justice
Department, meaning that the Attorney General would retain su
pervisory and removal power over this official. Finally, the White
House proposal would make the independent counsel law applica
ble to allegations of criminal wrongdoing in all three branches of
government, including Congress and the judiciary. This would en
sure that the executive branch was not singled out for adverse treat-

75. See id. at 50-51; MASKELL, supra note 65, at 7. This version of S. 495 included a
mechanism by which the Attorney General was required to petition a three-judge division of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for the appointment of a special prosecu
tor under certain circumstances. See generally S. REP. No. 94-823 (1976).
76. See Watergate Reforms: Communication from the President of the United States,
Transmitting Proposed Substitute Language to Correct Constitutional and Practical Problems
Contained in S. 495, H.R. Doc. No. 94-550, at 5 (1976) [hereinafter Watergate Reforms].
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ment. What was good for the goose was good for the legislative
gander.77
In response to an intense lobbying blitz by Attorney General
Edward Levi (who ardently defended President Ford's plan), and in
order to make peace with the White House in anticipation of diffi
cult congressional elections in the Fall, the Senate switched alle
giance to the President's revised version of S. 495, and approved it
by a vote of 91 to 5.78
But in the House, the retooled version of S. 495 drew harsh criti
cism from those who feared the notion of a permanent special pros
ecutor in any form. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, objected: "I think the circumstances that are
contemplated [for appointment of a special prosecutor] are unusual
circumstances, which I think arise because of unusual events, and
therefore would require us to act in an extraordinary manner. I do
not believe that setting up the Office of Permanent Special Prosecu
tor would meet that kind of an exigency."79
Archibald Cox, having returned to his faculty position at
Harvard Law School, flew back to Washington to testify against the
Ford administration proposal. He worried that it would create too
many special prosecutors too easily. Cox told a House Subcommit
tee that a permanent special prosecutor, even one given the bless
ing of the Senate, reflected too little trust in the Justice
Department. "In the end," insisted Cox, "we have to rely upon the
integrity of men, particularly on the integrity of the Attorney Gen
eral and of the lawyers in the Department of Justice; and I am con
vinced that on the whole and over the years they have proved fully
worthy of that trust." It was a bad idea, he told the Representatives
in conclusion, to attempt to "substitute laws for character."80
Cox reminded the House Subcommittee that the original point
of the legislation was as follows:
there may be a few extraordinary situations like the Teapot Dome
scandal, or like the Watergate affair, in which it is not fair to ask any
Attorney General to be responsible for the investigation and prosecu
tion because so much is at stake; and while many of them no doubt

77. The White House proposal is set forth in Ford's transmission to the Senate. See
Watergate Reforms, supra note 76.
78. See Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Jus
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1-3 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice]; EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 52-54. For a discus
sion of the political concerns hovering over Congress before the 1976 elections, see
lIARruGER, supra note 23, at 50-59.
79. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 153-54.
80. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155.
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would act with complete honor and integrity, questions would be
raised about full public confidence. As I understand it, the original
conception was that this would be truly a very narrow class of excep
tional cases.81

lieu of S. 495, Cox proposed the creation of a temporary special
prosecutor who would be appointed by a panel of U.S. Court of
Appeals judges, but only in a very narrow category of cases. In
other cases, the attorney general would have discretion to apply for
a special prosecutor, but no legal duty to do so.82
Cox's proposed law (which looked much like the special prose
cutor law that was ultimately adopted in 1978), was designed in
such a way that it would rarely be triggered.83 Cox and others
feared that if the permanent model was adopted, Congress's quest
to cure abuses in the executive branch would lead to overuse.84 In
some cases it might lead to abuse by over-ambitious special prose
cutors. As John Doar, former special counsel to the House Judici
ary Committee, expressed it:
In

With the whole criminal code at his disposal, the permanent special
prosecutor could embark on a self-defined crusade for all sorts of rea
sons including making a name for himself. The idea that any federal
official, appointed not elected, should have the uncontrolled power to
thumb through the entire federal criminal code as a basis for investi
gating a targeted group of public officials is anathema to me.85

The cautious position of Cox and others who shared his view
won the day. President Ford's proposal calling for a permanent
special prosecutor within the executive branch died in the House,
where Representatives were skittish about the upcoming Fall elec
tion.86 Democrats quickly regained control of the White House and
increased their majority in Congress.87 Buoyed by this success (and
with Republicans shell-shocked from their significant losses in the
election as a backlash to Watergate), Senators Abraham A. Ribicoff
(D. Conn.), Charles H. Percy (R. ID.), and twenty-four co-sponsors
introduced S. 555 on February 2, 1977.88
81. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-56.
82. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 157-58.
83. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-56,
158-59.
84. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-59.
85. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 172.
86. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 55; HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 66.
87. HARRINGER, supra note 23, at 59.
88. See O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 119 n.29.

624

Michigan Law Review

D.

[Vol. 97:601

Legislation Is Born: S. 555

S. 555 was the infant version of what became mature legislation
the following year. As Senator Ribicoff explained the bill, it estab
lished a mechanism for creating a temporary special prosecutor, "to
deal with the extraordinary case involving criminal misconduct of
high-level Government of:ficials."89 It closely resembled the second
version of S. 495 that had been poised for approval before President
Ford's compromise intervened. In line with recommendations by a
special committee of the A.B.A., the bill provided that the special
prosecutor would be appointed by a panel of U.S. Court of Appeals
judges upon application of the attorney general.90 S. 555 faced the
same recurring constitutional issues (appointment, removal, and
separation of powers) that had confronted each prior bill. Yet the
opposition was weakening. Senator Baker offered an amendment
attempting to move the special prosecutor back to the Department
of Justice.91 Senator Ribicoff rehashed four years of congressional
debates and swiftly dismissed Senator Baker's challenge.92 The
amendment failed and on June 27, 1977, S. 555 soared through the
Senate by a vote of 74 to 5.93
After a full year of delays due to unrelated ethics provisions that
were bogged down in the House, the House and Senate hammered
out a deal by which the Senate version of S. 555 was incorporated
into a joint piece of legislation.94 On October 7, 1978, the related
conference report was adopted by the Senate.95 On October 12th,
by an overwhelming margin of 370 to 23, the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978 was enacted by the House, containing (in Title VI of
the legislation) the Senate's version of the special prosecutor provi89. 123 CoNG. REc. 20,956 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Ribicofi) (emphasis added).
90. See 123 CONG. REc. 20,970 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Scott); HARRIGER, supra note 23,
at 59-60. For a detailed discussion of the A.B.A. recommendations concerning a temporary
special prosecutor, see MASKELL, supra note 65, at 9-12.
91. See 123 CoNG. REc. 20,996 (1977). Senator Baker's amendment would have created
a Division of Government Crimes in the Justice Department, under the supervision of an
Assistant Attorney General for Government Crimes, to be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
92. See 123 CoNG. REc. 20,997 (1977).
93. See 123 CoNG. REc. 21,007 {1977). See also New Senate Watergate Bill Allows Special
Prosecutor, Sets Financial Disclosure, 35 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1235 (predicting easy passage
of bill).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1756, at 65, 77-78 {1978). For a discussion of these events,
including the delays in the House, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 57; HARRIGER, supra
note 23, at 60-62. For a look at the separate House and Senate bills, see H.R. 9705, 95th
Cong. {1978), analyzed in H.R. REP. No. 95-1307, at 6-12 {1978); S. 555, 95th Cong. (1978),
analyzed in S. REP. No. 95-170, at 51-160 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4265-66.
95. See 124 CoNG. REc. 34,526 (1978) (Senate vote on conference report); 124 CoNo.
REc. 36,469 {1978) (House vote on conference report).
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sions.96 Five years to the month after Cox's firing in the Saturday
Night Massacre, the modem special prosecutor law was born, a
product of extensive bipartisan hearings and debate.
President Jimmy Carter, a consistent supporter of the legisla
tion, commented that the law provided essential authority to inves
tigate crimes at the highest level of an administration.

"I'm

hopeful, of course, that this authority will rarely be needed," stated
Carter at a bill-signing ceremony in the Cabinet Room of the White
House, "but I believe it is necessary in response to the lessons that
we have learned to the embarrassment of our country in the past."97
The special prosecutor statute, as :finally enacted, embodied
much of the consensus reached during its five-year incubation pe
riod in Congress.98 The law established a temporary, rather than a
permanent office. It created a special prosecutor removed from the
executive branch and loosely appended to the judicial branch, with
only limited involvement by the attorney general. As originally
adopted, the statute neatly compartmentalized duties. The attorney
general was required to conduct a limited "preliminary investiga
tion" upon receiving "specific information" that the President,
Vice-President, cabinet members, or other high-level executive offi
cials designated in the statute had violated a federal criminal law
(the statute was not triggered by "petty offenses").99 The Attorney
General then had ninety days to complete the "preliminary investi
gation."100 If the Attorney General determined that the matter
warranted "further investigation"

(or

if

the ninety-day period

elapsed without a determination that the matter was "so unsubstan
tiated as not to warrant further investigation"), the Attorney Gen
eral was required to apply to a special three-judge court for the
appointment of a special prosecutor.101 This Special Division of the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States, and consisted of one judge from the
D.C. Circuit, and two appellate judges from two different cir-

96. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 (1994)); HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 61-62. For a de
tailed chronology of the history of the Ethics in Government Act through 1977, see S. REP.
No. 95-170, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4265-66.
97. Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S. 555 Into Law, II PUB.
PAPERS 1854-55 (Oct. 26, 1978).
98. For a section-by-section analysis of the statute as originally adopted, see 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4267, 4267-97.
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1994).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (1994).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(l).
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cuits. 102 The special panel was then charged with appointing "an
appropriate independent counsel;" defining the scope of his or her
jurisdiction; and generally monitoring the activities of the special
prosecutor (including making decisions about expanding jurisdic
tion) from that point forward.103 The special prosecutor could be
removed by the attorney general only for physical or mental inca
pacity, or "extraordinary impropriety" (a term borrowed from
Cox's Watergate charter). 104 The three-judge panel, however, exer
cised ultimate authority over the case, and could terminate the of
fice of a special prosecutor at any time by determining that the
prosecutor had "substantially completed" his or her work such that
it was "appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such
investigations and prosecutions. " 105

E.

The Lessons of Legislative History

It is possible to make several global observations about the spe
cial prosecutor law as adopted by Congress, based upon the exten
sive legislative history that constitutes its genealogy.

First, the

statute's overarching purpose was to drag certain investigations of
the President and other high-level executive officials out of the
muck of partisan politics in order to restore public confidence in
government. Watergate had virtually destroyed public trust in gov
ernment - particularly in the presidency, but it tainted all three
branches. The number of citizens who felt government could not
be fully trusted to do what was right had risen by a dramatic
twenty-two percent between 1972 and 1978.106 Reversing this lack
of trust, by adopting legislation that addressed the appearance of
conflict as much as actual conflict, was a goal that transcended all
others in crafting the special prosecutor legislation.107
The second lesson that can be distilled from the statute's pro
tracted history is that (at least in theory) it was built to address "big
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994).
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b), (c) (1994).
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994); GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 237.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). For a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the statute as origi
nally drafted, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 58-65; O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at
119-26.
106. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 44.
107. Senator Joseph Eiden, Jr. (D. Del.) would later write: "There are certain extraordi
nary moments of crisis when the people's faith in the integrity and independence of their
elected officials is caused to waiver . . . . To restore the utmost public confidence in the
investigation of criminal wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials, the appointment
of a special prosecutor then becomes necessary." Joseph R. Eiden, Jr., Shared Power Under
the Constitution: The Independent Counsel, 65 N.C. L. REv. 881, 886 (1987).
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problems." It was primarily designed to deal with rare, major crises
in the executive branch - like Watergate in the 1970s and the
Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s - rather than the ongoing
stream of picayune matters that inevitably dog high-level executive
officials during any administration. Congress's unequivocal rejec
tion of a permanent special prosecutor provision, in the latter part
of 1976, strongly supports this interpretation of the legislative his
tory. The special prosecutor law was never meant to ordain a per
manent inquisitor (or inquisitors), sniffing into alleged scandal on a
regular basis while setting up a fixed post-office box. The tempo
rary prosecutor, set into motion by a triggering mechanism that was
(at least in theory) fairly difficult to trip, was expected to come alive
only under extraordinary circumstances involving maj or
con:flicts.108
Evidence of Congress's general intent on this score is quite tan
gible. The hearings and debates are littered with references to
Watergate and Teapot Dome as. models.109
Although the facts of the Teapot Dome scandal are generally
buried in hasty footnotes in modem discussions of the independent
counsel law,110 they provide powerful insight into the meaning of
108. As Peter Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated during
debates: "I think the circumstances that are contemplated are unusual circumstances, which
I think arise because of unusual events, and therefore would require us to act in an extraordi
nary manner." 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at
153-54.
109. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at
155-56 (remarks of Archibald Cox). Cox also made reference to Teapot Dome and Water
gate in his Senate testimony. In 1974, he told a Senate Subcommittee:
Teapot Dome, Watergate, and all its associated wrongdoings have taught us the sad les
son that crime and the interference with the administration of justice can reach toward
the top of the executive branch. Where there is reason to believe that this may have
happened, investigation and prosecution cannot be left under the Attorney General or
Assistant Attorney General or others in the Department of Justice appointed by the
President and necessarily answerable to him.
Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice, supra note 6, at 200; MAsKELL, supra
note 65, at 5. Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson likewise used these two major
scandals as guideposts in commenting on the proposed legislation. See Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85. Even Senator Ervin's select
committee referred to Watergate and Teapot Dome in advocating the creation of a perma
nent special prosecutor. The Committee wrote: "In each of the Nation's two major scandals
during the past half century, Teapot Dome and Watergate, the appointment of a special pros
ecutor was essential to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system and public confi
dence in the rule of Jaw. In both situations, the office was created after serious abuses had
occurred." FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITrEE, supra note 62, at 96. The
Senate Government Operations Committee that reported favorably on S. 495 in the 94th
Congress discussed the Watergate affair and the Teapot Dome scandal, in explaining the
need for a statutorily created temporary special prosecutor. See S. REP. No. 94-823, at 2-6
(1976). Fmally, the legislative history at the time the Ethics in Government Act was adopted
in 1978 also refers back to these scandals. See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218, 4218-19.
110. See, e.g., O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 115-16 n.16.
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the statute and perceived parallels between that scandal and Water
gate as impetuses for the legislation. The Teapot Dome crisis
erupted shortly after the death of President Warren G. Harding in
1923. It involved the corrupt leasing of government-owned naval
oil reserves in Teapot Dome, Wyoming, by Harding's Secretary of
the Interior, Albert B. Fall. The leases were made to oil tycoons
Harry F. Sinclair (of Mammoth Oil Company) and Edward L.
Dohany (of Pan-American Petroleum), in return for personal
"loans" to Fall totaling approximately $400,000.111 With President
Harding's Attorney General, Harry M. Daugherty, under suspicion
for his own improprieties in office, the Justice Department was
viewed as incapable of conducting an impartial investigation of the
charges.112 President Calvin Coolidge therefore appointed two spe
cial prosecutors (one Democrat and one Republican) to look into
the allegations at the request of the Senate, follo,ving Congress's
own internal investigation.113 The two special prosecutors nomi
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate were Senator
Atlee Pomerene (of Ohio) and attorney (later Supreme Court Jus
tice) Owen Roberts of Philadelphia. Their investigation culminated
in the conviction of former Secretary of the Interior Fall on bribery
charges in 1929.114 Fall was fined $100,000 and sentenced to a year
in prison.115
Watergate and Teapot Dome thus shared much in common, his
torically. Both involved allegations of criminal activity by high
ranking executive officials while holding federal office. Both in111. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND His
ADMINISTRATION 461-73 (1969); FRANCIS RUSSELL, THE SHADOW OF BLOOMING GROVE!
WARREN G. HARDING AND His TIMES 488-532 (1968). Teapot Dome was named for a dis
tinctive rock resembling a teapot that sat on the controversial oil-lands.
112. See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 473-85. Daugherty's alleged improprieties,
although not directly related to Teapot Dome, raised serious questions as to whether he
could conduct that investigation in a neutral fashion. Id. at 474-82. In tum, these raised
questions about the entire Harding administration. Id. at 482. Daugherty had been Har
ding's mentor from Ohio political days.
113. See SJ. Res. 54, 68th Cong., 43 Stat. 5 (1924) (resolution requesting special prosecu
tors); S. Res. 282, 67th Cong., 62 CoNG. REc. 6097 (1922) (congressional investigation).
114. See Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1931); United States v. Fall, 10 F.2d
648 (D.C. Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 757 (1930). Fall was the only cabinet officer ever
convicted of a crime committed while in office. See Stephen A. Wolf, In the Pursuit of Power
Without Accountability: How the Independent Counsel Statute is Designed and Used to Un
dermine the Energy and Independence of the Presidency, 35 S.D. L. REv. 1, 13 n.22 (1989).
115. See RussELL, supra note 111, at 488. At the early stages of the Teapot Dome scan
dal, Attorney General Daugherty had resigned in disgrace in 1924 (after the House at
tempted to impeach him). He was indicted twice and barely escaped conviction for
attempting to defraud the government. (His alleged improprieties were only marginally re
lated to Teapot Dome). Daugherty's account can be found in HARRY M. DAUGHERTY, THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE HARDING TRAGEDY (1932).
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valved a tainted Justice Department that could not be trusted to
conduct a neutral investigation. At the time of the Teapot Dome
debacle, Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty was himself en
gulfed in scandal, and could not be relied upon to investigate execu
tive branch officials to whom he might owe allegiance.116 In
Watergate, two of President Nixon's Attorneys Generals - John
Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst - had been forced to resign
under the cloud of suspicion. The head of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen,
was also tainted and had become "a conduit for a constant flow of
information from the grand jury and the prosecutors first to [John]
Dean and then to the President."117 A neutral investigation by the
Justice Department, by the time a special prosecutor was brought
in, was considered an impossibility.
Thus, Congress was particularly alert to situations in which the
attorney general and/or the Department of Justice might be part of
the problem. As Chief Justice Taft once stated, the attorney gen
eral was "the hand of the President" in enforcing the laws of the
United States.118 Although the legislative draftsmen were also con
cerned with the appearance of impropriety, to the extent this fueled
the public perception of mistrust in government, the most urgent
candidates for the appointment of special prosecutors were those
cases in which evidence existed that the Justice Department was
tainted.

Although there had been other special prosecutors in

American history - such as those appointed to investigate the
"Whiskey Ring" during the Grant administration,119 and the "spe
cial assistant" named during the Truman administration to investi
gate allegations of a tax fix and other improprieties by high-ranking
executive of:ficials120 - Watergate and Teapot Dome remained the
prototypes.
116. See supra note 112.
117. FINAL REPORT OF nm SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 62, at 80; see also
GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 256-60, 368-71; MASKELL, supra note 65, at 1-3.
118. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922).
119. The "Whiskey Ring" was the name given to a network of Midwest distillers who
bribed revenue officers and pocketed liquor taxes; some of the funds allegedly made their
way into Grant's reelection campaign fund through his close friend and secretary, Orville E.
Babcock. The Whiskey Ring investigation was mentioned in Senate Report 823, see S. REP.
No. 94-823, at 2-6 (1976), in reviewing past special prosecutors in American history. For a
more detailed account of the Whiskey Ring investigation, see 7 JAMES FoRD RHODES, His
TORY OF TilE UNITED STATES 182-89 (1906).

120. See S. REP. No. 94-823, at 2-6 (1976). During the Truman administration, Attorney
General J. Howard McGrath appointed a "special assistant" to investigate alleged improprie
ties in granting government loans and engaging in "tax fixes," by high level executive officials
(including President Truman's Appointment Secretary and high-ranking Justice Department
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A final lesson that can be gleaned from the legislative history is
that Congress intended that the scope of the special prosecutor's
job would be narrowly circumscribed. True, the special prosecu
tor's authority would be broad in the sense that he or she would
have the same power as the attorney general to investigate and
prosecute an alleged crime, once the parameters of his or her juris
diction were established.121 At the same time, the jurisdictional
limits would be carefully mapped out by the three-judge panel.
One of the few duties specifically assigned to the special court, in
the otherwise obscure statutory language, was the obligation of de
fining the precise boundaries of the special prosecutor's jurisdiction
in a written statement or charter. 122 Both proponents and oppo
nents of the law understood that

if such

a statute gave the special

prosecutor too much power to roam - beyond carefully delineated
jurisdictional borders - the statute would be patently unconstitu
tional. Congress's final piece of legislation, which created a tempo
rary (rather than permanent) special prosecutor and issued that
prosecutor a passport identifying his or her precise jurisdiction, was
meant to avoid that dangerous precipice.123
For reasons that remain obscure, however, the statute as finally
drafted and implemented has not matched the original noble design
of Congress. In the twenty years since the law's enactment, the of
fice of independent counsel has managed to become everything that
the framers of the law initially intended that it should not become.
While at least many of the key draftsmen envisioned a special pros
ecutor cropping up rarely - perhaps every generation or two the statute has collapsed into a horribly overused (and costly) law,
with investigations triggered almost effortlessly by either political
lawyers). When Special Assistant Newbold Morris sought McGrath's files, McGrath fired
him. Truman then fired McGrath for interfering in the investigation. Several convictions
were ultimately obtained by the special assistant during the Eisenhower administration. See
Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 921 (1958). This
episode is discussed in Wolf, supra note 114, at 13.
121. Archibald Cox advocated this sort of broad authority during the course of his House
testimony. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 300·
04, 317.
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994). As Charles Ruff, one of the Watergate Special Prose·
cutors who succeeded Cox and Jaworski, stated: "One of the advantages of the temporary
Special Prosecutor mechanism that has been proposed is that there would be limited jurisdic
tion in that temporary Special Prosecutor . . . ." 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 116.
123. The American Bar Association strongly pushed the requirement of a clearly deline
ated statement of jurisdiction, since this "would serve as a restricting influence on any tempo
rary special prosecutor who might othenvise have notions of expanding an investigation
beyond its proper limits." 2 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra
note 60, at 164-65.
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party pushing easily manipulated buttons. While the statute was
built to confine the special prosecutor's jurisdiction to a narrow
piece of turf, and thus minimize separation of powers worries, the
law has devolved in such a way that an independent counsel can
virtually write his or her own jurisdictional ticket.
Precisely how this disconnect has occurred remains one of the
great puzzles of the legislation. The early House and Senate history
reveals a relatively clear picture of what Congress thought it was
attempting to accomplish in assembling a special prosecutor law af
ter Watergate. Yet the original goal is almost unrecognizable in the
modem statute, as applied.
Congressional intent, of course, is an evanescent concept. It can
be argued with force that Congress intended the independent coun
sel statute to mean whatever the words of the statute say. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."124 Pursu
ant to this view of the statute's history, prior debates and oral blus
terings are irrelevant.125 If one examines the words of the statute
itself and limits the inquiry to that document alone, the extremely
broad sweep of the independent counsel law that has evolved today
is warranted (if not mandated) by the statutory text. An opposing
view of congressional intent, however, would place much more
weight upon the paper trail left during debates, congressional hear
ings, and other evidence of legislative history. The words of the
independent counsel statute would be properly shaped and inter
preted with reference to those legislative proceedings that led up to
the law's codification - most of which suggest a more cautious
piece of legislation.126
124. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 203, 207 (1920). Holmes also wrote, however, that "the general purpose is a more
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down."
United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905).
125. Judge Kenneth Starr, while on the federal bench, espoused such a narrow view of
the value of legislative history. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use ofLegisla
tive History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371. See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917) (Day, J.) (stating that when statutory language is plain, legislative history cannot be
examined); Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 1 1
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 59, 65-66 (1988). Fo r a statement of the related principle i n the law
of contracts, see JoHN EDWARD MuRRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 105-07 (2d rev.
ed. 1974).
126. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (Brewer,
J.) (stating the "spirit" of a statute, evidenced in part by its legislative history, controls over
seemingly clear statutory language); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
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Given the protracted and public nature of the debates over the
special prosecutor law, the latter notion of congressional intent is
particularly apropos in this case. It is fair to say, in retrospect, that
the global intent of Congress became lost in the words of the stat
ute.

Perhaps due to the pro-good-government, put-Watergate

behind-us fervor of the Carter years (when the Congressional plan
was finally reduced to text), and an over-ambitious desire by the
legislature to avoid appearances of conflict even where no actual
conflicts of interest existed, Congress overshot its mark. The devil
has now emerged from the details, and wreaked havoc upon the
statute. Nowhere in the congressional history does one find a core
of legislative support for a law that looks like the one that presently
exists. Indeed, it is fair to state (based upon the legislative history
recounted above) that

if

a statute had been drafted in the 1970s

resembling the independent counsel law as currently implemented,
it would have been viewed as more shocking and abhorrent than
any other proposal on the table, including the permanent special
prosecutor provisions of S. 495 that were so overwhelmingly
rej ected.127
Fortunately, the "textualists versus purposivists" debate that has
found new life in recent years - particularly due to the lively and
controversial writings of Justice Scalia128 - can be largely avoided
when it comes to the current controversy over the independent
counsel law. Those who fasten tightly onto the statutory text gener
ally do so primarily out of separation of powers concerns - the
judiciary should not usurp the function of the legislature, by re
writing statutes.129 In the instant case, however, it is not necessary
to argue that courts should "reform" and re-interpret the independ
ent counsel law. Rather, the simpler (and less controversial path) is
for Congress itself to repair the statute.
Congress is free to determine for itself within the next year what
the statute was meant to accomplish; the House and Senate are em
powered to adjust the statutory language accordingly. If the statute
is to be salvaged before the "sunset provision" ticks to a close in
Reading ofStatutes, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 527 {1947); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's
Observations, 1987 DuKE LJ. 380.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 64-86.
128. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997) {advancing a strong argument in favor of "textualism");
Willi am N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal? 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509, 1513
{1998) {listing critics of the "new textualism").
129. See ANTONIN ScALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA, supra note
128, at 9-14.
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Congress must squarely face the disconnect between the

words of the statute and its original purpose, and bring the law back
to its sensible moorings.
II.

THE FIRST TWENTY YEAR S:

E STABLI SHING THE LAW' S

C ONSTITUTI ONALITY

This Article will not rehash the debate concerning the legisla
tion's constitutionality. That subject consumed commentators for
the first decade of the statute's life, leading to the landmark clash
between the executive and legislative branches in Morrison

v.

Ol

son.130 Morrison was a hard fought tug-of-war, with the Senate and
House of Representatives filing amicus briefs in the Supreme Court
staunchly defending the independent counsel statute, and the
Reagan Department of Justice (led by Solicitor General Charles
Fried) filing an amicus brief arguing that the statute was patently
unconstitutional.131

The Justice Department's position was

summed up best in an old provision from the Massachusetts Consti
tution, that presumably demonstrated the Founders' desire to
achieve a strict separation among the three branches of govern
ment. That

1780

provision read:

In the Government of this Commonwealth, the Legislative De
partment shall never exercise the Executive and the Judicial Powers,
or either of them; the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative
and Judicial Powers or either of them; the Judicial shall never exercise
the Legislative and Executive Powers, or either of them: To the end,
it may be a Government of Laws and not of Men.132
130. 487 U.S. 6 54 (1988). Morrison involved a ch allenge to th e i ndependent cou nsel pro
vi si ons of th e E thics i n Government Act filed by Theodore B . Olson, Carol E . D inkins, and
E dward C. Sch mults. These three for mer Ju stice D epartm ent lawyer s were u nder i nvestiga
ti on for pr ovi di ng fa lse testi mony and withholdi ng evi dence from th e Hou se Ju dici ar y Com
mittee, in connection wi th a congressional i nvestigation into efforts by th e E nvironmental
Pr otection Agency and th e Ju sti ce D epartment to enforce th e so- called " Su per fu nd Law."
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665-6 8. After a di vi ded panel of th e U.S. Court of Appeals for th e
Distri ct of Columbi a Cir cui t held th at Title VI of th e E thics Act was u nconsti tu ti onal, see In
re Sealed Case, 838 F .2 d 476 (D .C. Cir . 1988), I ndependent Cou nsel Alexi a Morrison took an
appeal to th e Su preme Court. For a copy of th e br iefs filed by th e par ties in th e Cour t of
Appeals, see E ditor's Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act:
Morri son v. Olson, 16 HoFSTRA L. REv. 65 (1987).
131. A slew of other i nter ested parti es su bmitted amicus br iefs for and against th e stat
ute. These i ncluded th e citiz en watch dog gr ou p Common Cau se (then ch air ed by Ar chibald
Cox), wh o filed an amicus brief defending th e consti tutionali ty of th e E thics Act pr ovisions.
132 . MAss. CoNsT. OF 1780, pt. 1, ar t. XXX. Fr ied would later ci te thi s par agr aph in
lamenting th e Cour t' s ruling in Morrison. See Ch ar les Fried & Pau l M. B ator, D ebate: After
the Independent Counsel Decision: Is Separation of Powers Dead? 26 AM. CRIM . L. REv.
166 7, 166 9 (1989). Ju stice Scali a also qu oted th is Massachu sett s provi sion in his vi gor ou s
di ssent. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 6 97 (Scali a, J., di ssenting).

634

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:601

This purist view of separation of powers, however, did not pre
vail. On the last day of its October

1987 term,

the Supreme Court

upheld the independent counsel statute in a strong seven-to-one de
cision authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.133 The
Court's lengthy opinion in Morrison

v.

Olson considered and dis

missed as uncompelling the three constitutional concerns that had
haunted the statute since its inception. It also rejected sweeping
assertions that the special three-judge panel, as part of the judicial
branch, was constitutionally unfit to play a role under the independ
ent counsel statute.134 First, the Morrison Court concluded that
there was no Appointments Clause problem under Article II, Sec
tion 2, because the independent counsel was an "inferior officer"
and the judiciary had historically shared a certain amount of power
to appoint such officers with the president.135 Second, the Court
declared that limiting the ability of the attorney general to termi
nate an independent counsel - for "good cause" only - did not
impermissibly impinge upon the executive branch's removal power.
Cases like Humphrey's Executor136 and Wiener

v.

United States137

supported the proposition that as long as vesting the removal power
in another branch did not impede the president in carrying out his
constitutional duties as chief executive, such a removal provision
was legitimate.138 Third, the Court swept aside the overarching sep133. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. Justice Kennedy did not take part in the considera
tion or decision of the Morrison case.
134. In this regard, the Morrison Court considered and rejected an argument that the Act
violated the "cases and controversies" provision of Article III. The Court concluded that the
judiciary possessed ample power to perform the duties Congress delegated to the special
court under the .statute (including the appointment of the special prosecutor), even though
they were not strictly judicial in nature. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-85. For a further
discussion of these issues, see notes 344-56 and accompanying text.
135. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-77. The Court has interpreted the Appointments
Clause to mean that: "Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President
alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132
{1976) {per curiam). For a detailed discussion of the Appointments Clause issue in Morrison,
see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 111 (1988);
Kenneth R. Feinburg, The Separation of Powers Issue in the Independent Counsel Debate, 25
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 171, 175-82 {1987); Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, The
Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v. Olson: A Common Sense Application ofthe Consti
tution to a Practical Problem, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 362-66 {1989); Lazarus & Larson, supra
note 2, at 191-92; Cox, supra note 54, at 1486-88; Solloway, supra note 50, at 969-73; Alexan
der I. Tachmes, Note, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978: A
Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check on Executive Power? 42
U. MIAMI L. REv. 735, 743-54 {1988).
136. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
137. 357 U.S. 349 {1958).
138. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93. In essence, the Court in Morrison was distancing
itself from the "formalistic" approach of Myers v. United States
which favored strict sepa·
ration of powers and focused on whether the official was performing a "purely executive"
-
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aration of powers concern, concluding that neither Congress nor
the judiciary was guilty of improperly encroaching upon executive
terrain under the statute, in view of the limited overlap among the
branches of government authorized by the legislation.139
Morrison represented an "unqualified victory" for supporters of
the Watergate-era special prosecutor law.140 Justice Scalia spoke as
the lone voice of dissent, berating the majority for shattering the
constitutional balance embodied in the American legal system.
"Frequently," Scalia wrote, "an issue of this sort will come before
the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the
asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium of
power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a care
ful and perceptive analysis." Scalia concluded with a pessimistic
observation: "But this wolf comes as a wolf."141
In the decade since Morrison

v.

Olson, a vast mountain of legal

literature was produced, most of which focused upon the constitu
tional questions. The statute and the Court's opinion in Morrison

function that belonged to the President - and embracing a less rigid "functional" approach
that had its seed in Humphrey's Executor and Wiener, tolerating much more overlap among
the branches of government so long as Congress was not invading the "core function" of the
executive branch. For an in-depth examination of the formalist versus functional issue, see
Peter B. Davidson, Note, Chipping Away at the President's Control Over His Administration:
An Analysis of Morrison v. Olson and Beyond, 6 J.L. & PoL. 205 (1989); William L.
Weingard III, Comment, Morrison v. Olson: Renewed Acceptance for a Functional Approach
to Separation ofPowers, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 603 (1989). For a more complete discus
sion of the removal issue, see Cox, supra note 54, at 1483-85; Michael L. McCoy, Note, The
Office of Independent Counsel - A Constitutional Overview, 28 WASHBURN L.J. 150, 167-71
(1988); Solloway, supra note 50, at 973-78.
139. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-96. For a fuller discussion of the separation of powers
issue, see William C. Banks, When They Get Close to the Truth: Challenging the Special
Prosecutors, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 623, 628-36 (1987); Feinburg, supra note 135, at 171-73;
Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra note 135, at 369-82; Cox, supra note 54, at 1478-83; Solloway,
supra note 50, at 963-68.
140. See David O. Stewart & Scott Nelson, Separation ofPowers, Cont., A.B.A. J. Sept. 1,
1988, at 40, 44.
141. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) .

636

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:601

were criticized,142 lauded,143 commented upon,144 and analyzed at
such length that few rocks were left unturned . Most of the scholar
ship churned out pre- and post-Morrison tended to validate the
Supreme Court's path of logic. Scholars confirmed that Congress,
since the founding of the nation, had delegated a wide range of
tasks to the judiciary which intersect with those of the executive
branch, including the appointment of "inferior" executive of
ficers.145 Scholars also demonstrated that the prosecution of fed-

142. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 135; Donald A. Daugherty, Recent Case, The Separation
ofPowers and Abuses in Prosecutorial Discretion, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 {1988);
Thomas S. Martin & David E. Zerhusen, Independent Counsel - Checks and Balances, 58
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 536 (1990); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts From the Administration of
Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act,
79 GEO. L.J. 1 {1990); Independent Counsel Symposium 25 AM CRIM. L. REv. 167 app. A at
279 {1987); Kevin R. Morrissey, Co=ent, Separation of Powers and the Individual: Morri·
son v. Olson, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 965 {1989).
.

143. See, e.g., Biden, supra note 107; Harold H. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Con·
stitution, 24 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 539 (1988); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A
Modest Assessment, 38 AM U. L. REv. 255 {1989); Feinburg, supra note 135; Glitzenstein &
Morrison, supra note 135; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforce·
ment: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM U. L. REv. 275 {1989); Richard J. Pierce,
Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, The Structure of Government, Sup. CT. REv. 1, 1
{1988); Donald J. Simon, A Constitutional Rationale for the Independent Counsel Law, 25
AM CRIM. L. REv. 229 {1987); Frank Tuerkeimer, Prosecution of Criminal Cases: Where
Executive and Judicial Power Meet, 25 AM CRIM. L. REv. 251 {1987).
.

.

.

.

144. See, e.g., Steven Breyer, Foreword to Independent Counsel Symposium, 25 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 167 {1987); Fried & Bator, supra note 132; Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra
note 135; Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2; Alan B. Moore, Recent Development, Separation
of Powers and the Independent Counsel Act - Morrison v. Olson, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pun.
POLY. 259 {1989); Irvin B. Nathan & David P. Gersch, Strengthening the Independent Counsel
Law Requires Judicial Review ofthe Attorney General's Decisions, 25 AM. CruM. L. REv. 199
{1987); Stewart & Nelson, supra note 140; Carolyn M. Corry, Note, On the Constitutionality
of the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do They Comport
with the Separation ofPowers?, 26 Duo. L. REv. 715 {1988); Davidson, supra note 138; Alton
L. Lightney, Note, Constitutional Law: The Independent Counsel and the Supreme Court's
Separation of Powers Jurisprudence, 40 FLA. L. REv. 563 {1988); McCoy, supra note 138;
Solloway, supra note 50; Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Power and Liberty: The Ap·
pointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1515 (1990);
Weingard, supra note 138.
145. See James A. Cohen, SelfLove and the Judicial Power to Appoint a Special Prosecu·
tor, 16 HoFSTRA L. REv. 23 {1987); Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2, at 191-94. A number of
states have similarly permitted the judicial branch to appoint special prosecutors. See People
ex rel Lindsley v. District Court, 66 P. 896 {Colo. 1901); State ex rel. Kelly v. Alcorn, 6 Conn.
Supp. 210 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1938); Pelaez v. State, 144 So. 364 (Fla. 1932); Mach v. State, 135
S.E.2d 467 (Ga. 1964); State v. Bell, 370 P.2d 508 (Idaho 1962); People v. Sears, 273 N.E.2d
380 (Ill. 1971); Hendricks v. State, 196 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. 1964); White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa
413 (1864); Attorney General v. Flynn, 120 N.E.2d 296 {Mass. 1954); In re Investigation of
Recount, 258 N.W. 776 (Mich. 1935); State v. Jones, 268 S.W. 83 (Mo. 1924); Lizar v. State,
166 P.2d 119 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946); State v. Bute, 234 N.W. 605 {S.D. 1931); State v.
Gonzales, 26 Tex. 197 {1862). See also Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Validity, Under State Law,
ofAppointment ofIndependent Special Prosecutor to Handle Political or Controversial Prose·
cutions or Investigations of Persons Other Than Regular Prosecutor, 84 A.L.R. 3o 29 {1978).
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eral crimes were neither exclusively reserved to the executive
branch,146 nor a "core function" of that branch.147
Yet little scholarly synergy went into examining the mechanics
of the law, or the important question: "[H]as it worked properly, as
a policy matter?"148 As a result, twenty years later, a host of
bumps, warts, and now malignant tumors have revealed themselves
growing across the statute's surface.
This Article will avoid reiterating debate over the constitutional
questions that surrounded the special prosecutor law after it was
adopted in the 1970s. Five years' worth of congressional hearings
and a plethora of scholarship have covered that ground, and it need
not be revisited.149 Nor will this Article quarrel with the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison

v.

Olson, upholding the specific

method employed by Congress to implement its special prosecutor
apparatus.150 The lion's share of legal scholarship since Morrison
has tended to support the position that it is constitutionally sound
to allow a three-judge panel to appoint and oversee the independ
ent counsel.151 It will therefore be assumed that the general frame146. One of the finest articles on this subject is Krent, supra note 143. See also Cohen,
supra note 145; Feinburg, supra note 135; Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2; Peter M. Shane,
Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 596, 603-06 {1989). For a recent case holding that federal courts could ap
point private counsel to prosecute criminal contempt charges, see Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987). Such cases frequently arose in the patent/counterfeit
trademark area, where the court had little power to enforce its contempt orders without
appointing a special prosecutor to do so. See Cohen, supra note 145, at 23-24.
147. The best pieces of scholarship on this subject are Krent, supra note 143 and
Stephanie AJ. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson
and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 {1990). See also Dudley, supra note 143. But see
Solloway, supra note 50, at 964-68 (suggesting that prosecution is a core function of the
executive).
148. One of the most impressive articles devoted to sorting out how to cure the statute's
defects is Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: 'Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 463 (1996). See also Judge Griffin B. Bell et al., A Roundtable Discussion on
the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REv. 457 {1998); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Post
Watergate Legislation in Retrospect: The Alfred P. Murrah Lecture on the Administration of
Justice, 34 Sw. LJ. 1043 (1981).
149. See supra notes 142-44.
150. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. But see Carter, supra note 135, at
136-41 (criticizing decision in Morrison as misguided); Independent Counsel Symposium,
supra note 142, app. A at 279 (statement by former Attorney General Griffin Bell to House
Judiciary Committee, calling legislation unconstitutional and unwise).
151. See, e.g., Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra note 135; Keith Werhan, Toward an Eclectic
Approach to Separation ofPowers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q.
393 {1989); Morrissey, supra note 142. For an engaging debate between two prominent con
stitutional scholars on the separation of powers question presented in Morrison, see Fried &
Bator, supra note 132. More recently, Professor Akhil Amar has sharply questioned the
constitutionality of the independent counsel law. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional
Nightmare, WASH. PoST, Sept. 20, 1998, at Cl. Amar's lively discussion with Professor Lau
rence Tribe about the constitutionality of the statute, in light of its recent application in the
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Despite

the

creative

arguments by Professor Akhil Amar that the independent counsel
law is patently invalid under the separation of powers doctrine, and
his contention that the present Court has signaled its readiness to
junk the statute,152 it is doubtful that this position - although elo
quently presented - will win the day. There is scant indication
that the Court would abandon its position in Morrison, even consid
ering subsequent changes in the composition of the Court.153
The more important question that now faces Congress, legal
scholars, and the American public is this: Can the language of the
independent counsel statute be reformed and rehabilitated, such
that its provisions (as applied in the real world that intersects with
politics) conform to its original theoretical design? Can Congress
rewrite the legislation, such that its tedious details match the cau
tious model that Congress seemed to envision when it went to the
drafting table in the 1970s?
This Article will advance the proposition that the independent
counsel statute can be salvaged - but only through aggressive sur
gery. Those cosmetic reforms that have been undertaken by Con
gress in the past154 will not be sufficient to save the statute now, in
the face of mounting public (and legislative) opinion that grows in
creasingly hostile toward its failures. Serious reforms that rebuild
the statute's defective components are necessary

if it

is to become

Lewinsky investigation, can be found in Akhil Reed Amar & Laurence Tribe, The Independ
ent Counsel, SLATE (Sept. 10, Sept. 15, Sept. 29, Oct. 1, Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.slate.com/
code/DDD/DDD.asp?file=IC&i:Msg=l>. A masterful argument by Amar with respect to
the unconstitutionality of the independent counsel law appears in Akhil Reed Amar, ln
tertextualism, 112 HARv. L. RE.v. (forthcoming Jan. 1999). However, this author remains
unpersuaded.
152. Amar, supra note 151; Amar & Tribe, supra note 151. Professor Amar hinges his
prediction upon the recent decision of Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), in which
the Court (per Justice Scalia) discussed the concept of "inferior" and "principal" officers
under the Appointment Clause of Article II, Section 2, in some detail. See also Nick Braven,
Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appointment Clause Jurisprudence,
98 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1103 (1998). Yet, Edmond dealt with the unique subject of military law,
and specifically avoided casting any stones at the Morrison decision. See 520 U.S. at 661-62.
Thus, Professor Amar's conclusion that Edmond effectively repudiates the Court's decision
in Morrison seems to be a stretch (however valiant). Professor Tribe, in his September 15th
reply to Amar in the Internet publication Slate, above, apparently agrees. Amar & 1libe,
supra note 151.
153. Justice Ginsburg, as a federal appeals judge, favored the position that the independ
ent counsel law was constitutional. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, as a First Circuit judge and former Harvard Law
professor, participated in a Symposium for the American Criminal Law Review that was gen
erally supportive of the independent counsel law, although Breyer himself remained neutral
in his co=ents. See Breyer, supra note 144.
154. See infra note 156-58 and accompanying text.
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the viable failsafe mechanism it was intended to be, rather than a
dysfunctional drag upon the American justice system.
III.

REFORMING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW

On June 30, 1999, the sunset provision contained in the in
dependent counsel statute will tick to a close. Unless Congress
reauthorizes the legislation, it "shall cease to be effective."155 This
represents the fourth - and most controversial - occasion on
which the statute will face reauthorization. The law was amended
and renewed by Congress in 1982 and 1987 without a significant
struggle.156 In 1992, the statute was allowed to lapse for two years
when Senate Republicans blocked it, angry and weary from the
Iran-Contra investigation.157 Congress then renewed the law in
1994158 after President Bill Clinton moved into the White House.
Clinton himself lauded the independent counsel statute at that time,
calling it " a force for Government integrity and p ublic
confidence. "159
That enthusiasm has now waned, however, within the White
House and beyond. Particularly since the recent uproar over the
expansion of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater investigation into the
Monica Lewinsky matter, there has been a deluge of commentary
calling for the gutting and scrapping of the independent counsel
law, from both Democrats and Republicans.160 Whitewater Associ155. 28 u.s.c. § 599 {1994).
156. See Ethics in Government Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039; Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293.
For a discussion of the 1982 reauthorization and related amendments, see Thomas J. Satery,
The Ethics in Government Act of1978 and Subsequent Reforms: The Effect of Political and
Practical Influences on the Creation of Public Policy, 13 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 243, 251-59
{1990). For a discussion of the 1987 reauthorization and amendments, see Stanley I. Kutler,
In the Shadow of Watergate: Legal, Political, and Cultural Implications, 18 NovA L. REv.
1743, 1751-54 (1994); Satery, supra, at 260-67.
157. See James P. Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting
the Dilemma of Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REv. 427,
440 (1998); Kutler, supra note 156, at 1754.
158. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732.
159. President's Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, I
PuB. PAPERS 1169 (June 30, 1994). President Clinton later had a change of heart about the
statute, after being hounded by the Whitewater scandal. Following the 1996 election, he
reportedly told his opponent, Senator Bob Dole, who had opposed reauthorization of the
independent counsel law: "You were right and I was wrong on the independent counsel."
BoB WOODWARD, THE CH01cE: How CLINTON WoN 444 (1997).
160. See Paul T. Cappuccio, Scalia Was Right About the Independent Counsel Law, WALL
ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A19 (stating that the "statute has utterly failed to achieve its overrid
ing goal" and should be scrapped); Gerard E. Lynch, The Problem Isn't in the Starrs But in a
Misguided Law, WASH. PoST, Feb. 22, 1998, at C3; Julia Malone, Some Rethinking Support of
1978 Counsel Statute, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 1998, at AlO, available in
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ate Counsel Brett M. Kavanaugh would scrap the present system in
favor of a new statute that allows the President to nominate the
independent counsel, and the Senate to approve the selection, with
significant discretion granted to the President in deciding when to
appoint a special prosecutor.161 1\vo-time White House counsel
Lloyd Cutler would similarly provide for the selection of an in
dependent counsel from a pre-established panel nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate; or in the alternative, he
would create an Office of Public Prosecutor charged with prosecut
ing alleged ethical crimes committed by all public officials, as in
Britain or Northern Ireland.162 Inspector General Michael R.
Bromwich and Professor Kathleen Clark would replace or supple
ment the independent counsel law with an "Inspector General" for
the White House, assigned to keep a watchful eye for ethical viola
tions in order to prevent abuses from occurring.163 Former Justice
Department official Terry Eastland would abandon the present stat
ute entirely, and allow the dual mechanism of congressional investi
gations and the impeachment process to take care of any problems
of executive malfeasance.164
The call for complete abandonment of the statute - an under
standable reaction when legislation reveals such ugly design defects
- is an expedient yet unsatisfying solution. Virtually every former
special prosecutor, although acknowledging serious flaws in the law,
has endorsed its preservation in conjunction with major reforms.165
Few pieces of legislation in this century have been fashioned after
so much soul-searching, deliberation, and congressional resolve.
The original special prosecutor legislation was created after five
years of legislative debate. The constitutional issues relating to the
ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 3627743; Jeremy Rabkin, Rule by Unaccountability: Critics ofthe In·
dependent Counsel Don't Go Far Enough, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1998, at 52; David E.
Rovella, Ken Starr: A Hard Man to Fire, NATL. L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at Al; James Toedtman,
Independent Counsel Law - Democrats Eating Humble Pie Now, SEATTLE TIMES, July 24,
1998, at A2.
161. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 Gao. L.J.
2133, 2135-36 (1998).
162. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 477-78; Fleissner, supra note 157, at 449.
163. See Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General
Model, 86 Gao. L.J. 2027 (1998); Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An
Inspector General for the White House, 49 MERCER L. Rav. 553 (1998). The Inspector Gen·
eral Act of 1978 is codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-12 (1994).
164. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 134; see also Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of
the Fourth Circuit: The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should it be
Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1515, 1590 (1997) [hereinafter Sixty-Seventh Judicial Con·
ference] (remarks of Terry Eastland).
165. See Kenneth Jost, Independent Counsel Disconnect: Some Critics Suggest Limiting
Lengths and Targets of Investigations, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 30, 30.
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general structure of the statute were hashed out for another decade,
culminating in Morrison

v.

Olson. The statute was reauthorized

three times by Congress, each time with detailed amendments.
Although Congress may not have succeeded in reducing to text,
gracefully, those core provisions that had seemingly driven the stat
ute's creation after Watergate, the framework remains a viable one.
Rather than throwing out two decades' worth of legislative work
inspired by a legitimate perception that some form of special prose
cutor law was necessary, Congress should tackle the more daunting
but productive task of reforming the statute. If members of the
House and Senate take a hard look at the lessons .to be learned
from the current Whitewater imbroglio, they may succeed in fight
ing off the political pox that has debilitated the statute in recent
years. Over a dozen specific reforms are essential if the law is to be
returned to its original, sensible purpose. These can be roughly or
ganized into three categories: Reforms relating to the appointment
of special prosecutors; reforms relating to the functions of special
prosecutors; and reforms relating to the role of the special court.
A.

Reform the Method and Frequency of Appointing
Independent Counsels

Since the statute's adoption in

1978,

there have been twenty

separate independent counsel investigations (eighteen public and
two under seal) with the number growing with each administra
tion.166 Some independent counsels have branched off into multi166. The twenty independent counsel investigations, and their subjects, are as follows.
Carter Administration: Investigation of White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan for co
caine use (Independent Counsel: Arthur H. Christy) (no charges filed); Campaign Manager
Tllllothy Kraft for cocaine use (Independent Counsel: Gerald J. Gallinghouse) (no charges).
Reagan Administration: Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan for larceny and fraud (In
dependent Counsel: Leon Silverman) (no charges); White House counsel Edwin Meese for
financial improprieties (Independent Counsel: Jacob A. Stein) (no charges); Assistant Attor
ney General Theodore B. Olson for lying in congressional testimony (Independent Counsel:
Alexia Morrison) (no charges); White House Aide Michael K. Deaver for lying about lobby
ing foreign clients (Independent Counsel: Whitney North Seymour, Jr.) (convicted of per
jury); Various Reagan Administration officials for illegally selling arms to Iran and diverting
funds to Nicaraguan Contras (Independent Counsel: Lawrence E. Walsh) {multiple indict
ments, convictions, and guilty pleas, some nullified by presidential pardon); Attorney Gen
eral Edwin Meese and White House Aide Franklyn Nofziger for contracting scandal
involving Wedtech Corp. (Independent Counsel: James C. McKay) (one acquittal, one con
viction overturned on appeal); Assistant Attorney General W. Lawrence Wallace for finance
related abuses (Independent Counsels: James R. Harper; Carl Rauh) (no charges); White
House aide James Cicconi for improper loan (under seal) (Independent Counsel: Dan
Webb) (no charges); Housing and Urban Development Secretary Samuel Pierce for fraud
and mismanagement (Independent Counsels: Arlin Adams; Larry D. Thompson) (multiple
convictions and guilty pleas, one acquittal) (final report not yet filed). Bush Administration:
Under seal (name of subject and independent counsel under seal) (no charges); Bush Admin
istration officials for illegal search of Bill Clinton's passport file during campaign (Independ-
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ple investigations.167 As of late 1998, six different independent
counsels are in existence, operating simultaneously.168 As discussed
above, this proliferation of special prosecutors - unattached to the
executive branch - was not what Congress seemed to envision
when it conceived the law during the Watergate era. The concept
of a permanent special prosecutor's office, built to root out scandal
in the executive branch on an ongoing basis, was flatly rejected. It
was viewed as dangerous, constitutionally infirm, and abhorrent to
the tripartite system of American government. Yet with a half
dozen independent counsels being bred and sustained at any given
time, under the statute as drafted, it has produced the "institution
alized wolf hanging on the flank of an elk" that Acting Attorney
General Robert Bork warned against at Congressional hearings as
early as 1973 .169
The runaway nature of the statute is not attributable to a single
independent counsel or a single political party. Both Democrats
and Republicans have discovered how to push the buttons and tilt
the machine, in the years following Watergate. They have discov
ered that careers can be made and political opponents eviscerated
ent Counsels: Josep h E. DiGenova; Michael Zeldin) (no c harges). Clinton Administration:
Bill and Hillar y Clinton regarding W hitewater land deal {Independent Counsels : Robert
Fiske; Kenneth W. Starr) (multiple indictments, guilty pleas, acquittals, and convictions)
(pending); Secretary of Agriculture Mi ke Esp y for accepting improper gifts (Independent
Counsel: Donald C. Smaltz) (multiple convictions, guilty pleas, and acquittals) (acquitted);
HUD Secretary Henry G. Cisneros for l ying to FBI about size of payments to mistress (In
dependent Counsel: David M. Barrett) (pending); Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown
for personal financial irregularities {Independent Counsel: Daniel S. Pearson) {case termi
nated and transferred to Justice Department upon Brown's death); AmeriCorps head and
former campai gn c hief of staff Eli Segal for conflict of interest allegations (Independent
Counsel: Curtis von Kann) (no c harges); Secretar y of Interior Bruce Babbitt for allegedl y
testifying falsely to Congress regarding rejection of Wisconsin Indian casino license (In
dependent Counsel: Carol Elder Bruce) (pending); Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman for
allegedly receiving kic kbacks to steer contributions to t he Democratic party as director of
W hite House Office of Public Liaison {Independent Counsel: Ralp h I. Lancaster, Jr.) (pend
ing). See Jack Maskell, The Independent Counsel Law, FED. LAw., July 1998, at 28, 31; Don
ald E. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel, a View from Inside, 86 Gso. L.J. 2307, 2323-24
(1998); Susan Page, Independent Counsel Law: Parties Switch Sides, USA TODAY, Nov. 14,
1997, at 4A; Roberto Suro, Labor Secretary Under Investigation: Reno Seeks Independent
Counsel, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 12, 1998, at Al; Counsel Appointed for Babbitt In
quiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at A14; Independent Counsel Investigations, WASH. PosT,
Apr. 13, 1997, at A12; Investigator Chosen in Labor Secretary's Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1998, at A18.
167. Besides t he multiple investigations of Kenneth Starr, discussed supra at notes 12-16
and accompanying text, Independent Counsel Donald C. Smalz has broadened his investiga
tion of Mi ke Esp y t hrough a "referral" b y t he special court. See In re Esp y, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C.
Cir 1996). See discussion infra note 268.
168. The pending investigations are t hose involving Samuel Pierce (Reagan administra
tion); and Bill and Hillary Clinton, Henry Cisneros, Bruce Babbitt, and Alexis Herman (Clin
ton adminis tration). See supra note 166.
169. 1973

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263 .
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through a good scandal.17° As this undignified game of political
pinball has been perfected, there has come with it an abandonment
of the original notion that the special prosecutor law would be re
served for rare and special crises. The number of independent
counsels will only continue to multiply, in future years,

if significant

changes are not made. Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox re
cently commented that only two investigations triggered by the stat
ute since its enactment have matched his conception of the law at
the time he testified in its favor.171 This over-use and trivialization
of the independent counsel law is the single greatest flaw that has
emerged since 1978.
Most of the allegations that have set the gears of the independ
ent counsel statute whirring thus far - such as allegations of co
caine use by President Carter's White House Chief of Staff
Hamilton Jordan, and assertions that President Clinton's HUD Sec
retary Henry Cisneros lied in an FBI background check about the
size of payments to a mistress - are a far cry from the sort of na
tional crises and executive branch conflicts that provided the initial
impetus for the law. Watergate and Teapot Dome both involved
special prosecutors who were appointed to defuse national crises
when the normal chain-of-command in the Justice Department had
collapsed. We have learned from two decades' worth of experience,
unhappily, that when a special prosecutor law can be triggered at
the earliest stages of alleged wrongdoing with a faint puff of smoke,
it will be triggered constantly.
There are three adjustments that must be made to the independ-'
ent counsel statute,

if

it is to be reserved for the sort of rare and

extreme cases for which it was originally built.
170. See Ken Gormley, When prosecutors aren't so special, BoSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1997,
at Cl. For an excellent discussion of the harmful politicizing of the statute, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEo. L.J. 2267 (1998).
171. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1579-80 (remarks of
Archibald Cox). The two matters were the first investigation of Attorney General Edwin
Meese by special prosecutor Jacob Stein that involved serious allegations against the Attor
ney General himself, and the Iran-Contra affair of the Reagan administration. The latter
raised weighty questions whether the President, Vice President, Attorney General, and other
high-level executive officials had abused their offices in conspiring to sell arms to Iran in
violation of the federal Arms Control Export law; diverting those funds to freedom-fighting
Contras (rebels) in Nicaragua after Congress had forbidden such action; and conspiring to
cover up this activity. See LAWRENCE E. WAI.sH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CoNSPIR
ACY AND CoVER-UP (1997); Bell et al., supra note 148, at 466-67 (containing Lawrence
Walsh's own defense of his investigation); Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Con
flicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales ofJustice After Iran-Contra,
91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1651, 1667 n.82 (1991); Christopher Drew & Christopher J. McNulty, 7Year Tale of Intrigue Concludes: Iran-Contra Inquiry Faults Reagan, Bush, Cm. TRIB., Jan.
19, 1994, at Al.
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Amend the Triggering Device

The first crucial (yet simple) adjustment that must be made to
the statute is retooling the triggering device contained in Section
592 of the statute. At present, Section 592(c) requires that - after
conducting a preliminary investigation - the Attorney General
must apply to the special three-judge panel for the appointment of
an independent counsel

if

she determines that there are "reason

able grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted."172
Regrettably, this standard is so loose that virtually any half-credible
allegation against an individual covered by the statute will amount
to "reasonable grounds" to move to the next stage, forcing the At
torney General to seek appointment even in cases that present only
marginal evidence of criminal wrongdoing. As Lloyd Cutler has
criticized, the threshold is "about one micro millimeter high."173
The result, as Theodore Olson's lawyers have accurately described,
is that a target is forced to prove the "negative" to the Attorney
General, i.e. "that no reasonable grounds to investigate exist." 174
This has been a principal villain in causing the statute to malfunc
tion, since (1) it strays far from the "crisis" model originally envi
sioned by Congress, and (2) it triggers the statute even when there
is only a remote chance that some conflict within the Justice De
partment might prevent the Attorney General from handling the
case as a routine matter. In short, the present statute has sanc
tioned the use of "howitzers to combat mice" and spawned a large
number of investigations in which criminal wrongdoing is not ulti
mately found.11s
How should the statutory language be reformed? Lloyd Cutler
has proposed, in place of the present language, a new threshold that
requires the Attorney General to find "reasonable grounds for be
lieving that a significant federal crime may have been commit172. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(l)(A) (1994).
173. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470.
174. Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 544.
175. Stephen Labaton, Rethinking a Law: Time and Targets Alter Capitol Views on the
Independent Counsel Statute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at AlO. Out of the 19 independent
counsel investigations to date, indictments have been handed down in only seven of those
investigations. See Maskell, supra note 166, at 39. Even after cases go to trial, juries are not
necessarily impressed. In the recent trial of former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, by
independent counsel Donal D. Smaltz, the federal jury acquitted Espy of all thirty criminal
counts. Espy's acquittal came after a four-year, $17 million investigation related to charges
that he had accepted gifts, including sports tickets and other favors, from companies with
whom he had dealt as Agriculture Secretary. See Neil A. Lewis, Espy is Acquitted on Gifts
Received While in Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
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ted."176 The "reasonable grounds" language is still weak, however;
it does little to strain out cases that are based more upon rumor and
speculation than hard evidence. The American Bar Association's
White Collar Crime Committee of the Criminal Justice Section has
recommended a fl.at "probable cause" requirement,177 that would
mandate probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, before the Attor
ney General was required to apply for appointment of a special
prosecutor. But this has its problems, as well. Since probable cause
is the standard that historically governs grand juries, adopting a
probable cause standard for the preliminary investigation phase
would jumble together the roles of the Attorney General and the
grand jury, creating confusion.178 It might also cause the Justice
Department to keep the appointment of an independent counsel in
abeyance until a grand jury was ready to be empaneled, injecting
the Attorney General into the process longer than she needs to be
involved. The ideal standard thus should be a new one, unique to
the independent counsel law, that helps to reserve the triggering
mechanism for extraordinarily serious matters.
Thus, Section 592(c) should be amended to require the Attor
ney General to appoint an independent counsel when there exist
"substantial grounds to believe that a felony has been committed
and further investigation is warranted."179 Not only does this lan
guage ratchet the threshold upwards, but it provides a nice balance
between weak, premature allegations (which should not trigger the
statute) and weighty, well-developed allegations (which should
cause an independent counsel to be appointed). It also grants the
Attorney General much-needed discretion to determine which
types of crimes are serious enough to warrant further investigation
176. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470.
177. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30. Probable cause, in the context of an arrest, exists
when an officer has within her knowledge reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances
sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect has committed, or is
committing a crime. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
178. For criticism of the probable cause standard in this context, see Martin & Zerhusen,
supra note 142, at 544. See also Bell et al., supra note 148, at 471-72. A well-known case that
supports the proposition that grand juries are governed by a probable cause standard is
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) ("The role of the grand jury is re
stricted to a finding as to whether or not there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed.") See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ("The grand
jury's responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded
criminal prosecutions.").
179. The "substantial grounds" language is similar to the "substantial evidence" test that
is frequently used in agency law. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
980 F.2d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 1992); Silwany-Rodriquez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
975 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
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and prosecution, taking into account established Justice Depart
ment policies.180 The inability to make this sort of common-sense
judgment has been a perennial thorn in the side of those imple
menting the statute, leading to the forced appointment of special
prosecutors in cases that would ordinarily lead to a slap on the wrist
for any Justice Department lawyer who attempted to bring such a
case in the door.181 Once the triggering mechanism is adjusted in
this fashion, the statute will operate in a much more restrained (and
sensible) fashion.
2.

Allow the Attorney General to Exercise More Power in
Conducting the Preliminary Investigation

The second change necessary to reform the runaway independ
ent counsel statute involves allowing the Attorney General to exer
cise much more authority in conducting the preliminary
investigation. As presently drafted, Section 592 unnecessarily con
stricts the power of the Attorney General. Once she receives infor
mation that an individual covered by the statute may have
committed a crime, her ability to conduct a preliminary investiga
tion is dramatically limited. Unlike a typical investigation carried
out by the Justice Department, the independent counsel statute
does not permit her "to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant
immunity, or issue subpoenas."182 The theory behind restricting the
Attorney General's power during the ninety-day preliminary inves
tigation stage is that the Justice Department - because it is poten
tially enmeshed in a conflict of interest - should not be permitted
to take action that might "spoil" the case for future independent
prosecutors.183 Yet this restriction has made it virtually impossible
for the Attorney General to perform her statutory task in a respon180. For a similar argument that the Attorney General must be vested with more discre
tion when it comes to triggering the statute, see Harriger, supra note 4, at 2115-16. Former
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti also would limit the statute to federal felonies, eliminat·
ing all misdemeanors. See Civiletti, supra note 148, at 1054.
181. Cf Civilette, supra note 148, at 1044-45. One example of a case that most likely
would not have been brought pursuant to ordinary Department of Justice policy was the case
against Henry Cisneros, involving "a false statement under oath where the only falsity is in
the size of the payment that is acknowledged by the possible defendant." See Bell et al.,
supra note 148, at 472.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(A) (1994).
183. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470. As Lawrence Walsh explained:
If you are going to investigate and prosecute someone, you do not want somebody else
getting in there first and getting the documents and giving everybody time to think up
what their defense is going to be and tell other people what it is going to be so they can
acco=odate it.
Id.
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sible fashion, and has contributed to the unrestricted flood of cases
that have been spawned by the statute. As President Bush's Attor
ney General, William P. Barr, described the Justice Department's
unenviable position: "[Y]our hands are tied during the investiga
tion phase . . . . "184
The problem, of course, is that the hurdles are already set too
low. Section 591 of the statute directs the Attorney General to ini
tiate a preliminary investigation if she receives "information suffi
cient to constitute grounds to investigate" whether a person
covered by the statute may have committed a crime.185 At the first
puff of smoke, she must take action to determine if there may be a
conflagration. She is permitted to consider, under Section 59l(d),
only the "specificity" of the information and the "credibility" of the
source.186 As law enforcement officials are acutely aware, it is diffi
cult to knock out any allegation on the basis of credibility and speci
ficity, except in extreme cases.187 The statute, by design, inevitably
propels even weak allegations toward a preliminary investiga
tion.188 The problem is only compounded by the fact that the stat
ute prohibits the Attorney General from using her ordinary
investigative tools - the subpoena power, the empaneling of grand
juries, the use of immunity - in completing her preliminary investi
gation.189 This phase thus becomes a shallow legal exercise, with
the vast majority of cases unleashing a special prosecutor, like it or
not.19o As former Attorney General Barr explained the problem:
184. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1529-30 (remarks of William P.
Barr).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l{a) {1994).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l{d){l){A), (B).
187. As one co=entator joked, it might be necessary for the informant to display
mental instability by asserting that "the CIA requires them to wear a colander on their head
to avoid getting [ga=a] rays, or something like that," before his or her credibility could be
questioned. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1529 (remarks of
William P. Barr).
188. For a disturbing description of how the statute "compelled" the dubious Olson in
vestigation, despite the fact that the vast majority of prosecutors would have declined to
prosecute it, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 132-33. For a similar discussion of how the
weak statute allowed the media to propel forward the Bruce Babbitt inquiry, see Robert
Worth, How The New York Tlllles, The Washington Post, and the Independent Counsel Law
Screwed Bruce Babbitt, WASH. MoNTIILY, Apr. 1, 1998, at 14. For an excellent look at inves
tigations that take up an enormous amount of time by the Justice Department, but do not
trigger a formal preliminary investigation, see Wolf, supra note 114, at 26-27.
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 592{a){2){A) {1994).
190. One recent exception where Attorney General Reno refused to request the appoint
ment of an independent counsel related to her decision not to ask the special court to name a
special prosecutor to investigate whether Vice President Al Gore lied to Justice Department
officials during their inquiry into fund raising phone calls Gore placed from the White House
during the 1996 campaign. See Robert Suro, Probe of Gore on Lying Ruled Out: Reno Re
jects One Investigation Involving Fund-Raising, WASH. PosT, Nov, 25, 1998, at Al. Under

648

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:601

"It is very hard to conceive of a case where you can make that call
where you haven't subpoenaed documents and you haven't brought
witnesses before the grand jury, [and] you haven't compelled cer
tain people to speak to you . . . . "191
Admittedly, there is a danger in allowing the Attorney General
to delve too far into the merits of a case, when the investigation
may soon be bumped to an independent counsel. If, for instance,
the Justice Department grants immunity to an individual during the
preliminary investigation stage, this can later thwart the ability of
an independent counsel to prosecute that individual.192 In extreme
cases, it might allow an Attorney General to block intentionally the
prosecution of high-level executive officials, by handing out immu
nity and preventing further criminal action. Yet such unlikely pos
sibilities shoul d not j ustify emasculating the preliminary
investigation at the Justice Department level.
At a minimum, the statute must be amended to permit the At
torney General to subpoena witnesses and gather reliable evidence
during the ninety-day investigation period, as in any other criminal
case. This will ensure that she can make an informed decision
whether the appointment of an independent counsel is justified and
sensible.193 At the same time, the convening of a grand jury by the
Attorney General is something that should remain discouraged (or
prohibited) under the statute.194 First, it represents a major intru
sion into the merits of the criminal matter, leaving the independent
counsel - if appointed - with a partially-baked proceeding not of
his or her creation. Second, as a practical matter, ninety days is an
the weak statutory standard, this matter most likely could have prompted the appointment of
a special prosecutor. However, given the controversial nature of the Lewinsky investigation,
the Attorney General most likely has decided to guard against the appointment of new spe·
cial prosecutors, except where absolutely necessary, thus rebelling against the statute.
191. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1530 (remarks of William P.
Barr); see also Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 544 (suggesting the difficulty in estab·
lishing lack of reasonable grounds absent the Attorney General's investigative tools). A sim
ilar point was made by former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. See Bell et al., supra note
148, at 469.
192. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470-71.
193. Even Lawrence Walsh, who has expressed concern about allowing the Attorney
General to wade too far into a case before the independent counsel is appointed, agrees that
the subpoena power is essential. See id.; Lawrence E. Walsh, The Need for Renewal of the
Independent Counsel Act, 86 GEo. LJ. 2379, 2385 (1998).
194. It is true that a grand jury was convened in the Whitewater case, by Attorney Gen·
eral Janet Reno, before the independent counsel statute was triggered. But this was an unu
sual case. The first Whitewater independent counsel, Robert Fiske, was appointed by the
Attorney General in 1994, during a period in which the statute had lapsed. See O'Sullivan,
supra note 148, at 471-72. Thus the original grand jury was attached to a more traditional
investigation under the control of the Justice Department.
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exceedingly short amount of time in which to convene and com
plete a major grand jury investigation. It makes good sense to with
hold (or at least strongly discourage) the use of grand juries by
Attorneys General during the preliminary investigation stage.195
However, it is neither productive nor sensible to ban the use of sub
poenas by the Attorney General. The current version of Section
592, which strips the Attorney General of this rudimentary investi
gative tool, only exacerbates the problems that flow from a weak
triggering mechanism. The inability to gather evidence and reliable
information prevents any meaningful screening of serious cases
from the mundane - which is supposed to be the Attorney Gen
eral's principal function during the initial process.
Finally, a related problem is that the Attorney General must re
fer each case for further investigation unless there exists "clear and
convincing evidence" that the subject lacked the requisite state of
mind.196 As a result, the key question normally assessed by a prose
cutor in a criminal matter before exercising his or her discretion to
prosecute - i.e. whether the conduct was inadvertent or negligent
rather than knowing and intentional - cannot be considered by the
Attorney GeneraJ.197 This provision should be deleted entirely,
since it further hamstrings the Attorney General and prevents her
from conducting a meaningful preliminary investigation to separate
serious cases from minor, politically mischievous matters.
3.

Limit the Categories of Persons Covered by the Statute

The third essential reform, that garners almost universal support
among former special prosecutors and commentators, is the limiting
of the list of individuals covered by the statute.198 Presently, Sec
tion 59l(b) sweeps within its ambit not only the President and Vice
President, but a laundry list of other executive officials. It covers
seventeen cabinet officials;199 any individual working in the Execu195. Many administrative agencies (including the Internal Revenue Senrice, the Securi
ties Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and others) possess subpoena
power to interrogate witnesses, compel production of documents, and gather information in
an investigation, even though they cannot convene a grand jury. See Donald R.C. Pongrace,
Comment, Requirement ofNotice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued In SEC Investigations: A
New Limitation On the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 701, 708-19
(1984).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
197. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 480; Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note
164, at 1531-33 (remarks of Jamie Gorelick and William Barr).
198. See infra note 207.
199. The statute encompasses "any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312
of title 5." This provision, in turn, sets forth 17 different cabinet officers, namely: Secretary
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the
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tive Office who is compensated above a certain level;200 any Assis
tant Attorney General and any Justice Department employee who
is compensated above a certain level;201 the Director of Central In
telligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue;202 certain individuals who held
the above positions during the incumbency of the current Presi
dent;203 and the chairman, treasurer, and other high-ranking mem
bers of the committee seeking the election or reelection of the
President.204 In all, nearly 240 persons are covered, most of whom
hold "considerably subordinate p ositions" in the executive
hierarchy.205
Not only is this list of "covered individuals" absurdly broad, but
it cheapens the independent counsel statute by forcing its applica
tion in cases that are far from kindling for incendiary national cri
ses. Professor Julie O'Sullivan, who worked as Associate Counsel
on the Whitewater investigation under both Robert Fiske and
Kenneth Starr, has criticized the statute for its overbreadth, stating
that it "guard[s] against 'appearance' problems in lower profile
cases where no such problems truly exist."206 A parade of former
special prosecutors including Archibald Cox, Lawrence Walsh, Ja
cob Stein, Joseph DiGenova, Robert Fiske, and others have con
cluded that the reach of coverage is far too broad, although no
precise consensus exists as to how sharply to limit the language.207
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of
Transportation, United States Trade Representative, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Edu
cation, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
Commissioner of Social Security of the Social Security Administration. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 591(b)(2) (1994); 5 u.s.c. § 5312 (1994).
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(3). The level of compensation is that set forth in 5 U.S.C.
§ 5313 (1994) for certain sub-cabinet officials.
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(4). The level of compensation is that set forth for various
administrative heads and other officials enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 5314 (1994).
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(5).
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(6), (7).
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l(b)(6).
205. Civiletti, supra note 148, at 1054.
206. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 464. Specifically, Professor O'Sullivan referred to the
Theodore Olson and Tunothy Kraft investigations as low-profile matters unsuited for a spe·
cial prosecutor. Id.
207. Some commentators suggest limiting the field to the President and cabinet officers.
See, e.g., Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 541. An ABA subcommittee has also made
that recommendation. See id. Archibald Cox would limit the statute to covering the Presi
dent, Vice-President, and "maybe the three most important Cabinet officers." See Bell et al.,
supra note 148, at 473. Jacob Stein, the first independent counsel assigned to investigate
Attorney General Edwin Meese during the Reagan Administration, would limit coverage to
the "highest people in the government." See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note
164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein). Lawrence Walsh, the Iran-Contra independent coun-
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The statute should be amended to reduce the list of covered in
dividuals to an essential core, at least when it comes to the
mandatory application of its provisions. The original impetus for
the special prosecutor law - eliminating actual and apparent con
flicts to restore public faith in the system of government - points
toward the President,2°8 Vice-President, and the Attorney General
as essential candidates for coverage. Since the law was designed to
ensure that individuals at the top of the executive pyramid could
not, and would not, investigate themselves, the statute would be
hollow if it did not subsume these three key members of the execu
tive branch. Likewise, the highest officials on the committees to
elect and reelect the President, who have been covered by the stat
ute since its adoption in 1978 because they act as alter egos for the
President with respect to fund-raising - an activity that inherently
creates potential for criminal abuse under the American electoral
system - must also remain listed under the mandatory provision.
With respect to the laundry list of other cabinet officers, sub
cabinet officers, and administrative heads presently covered by Sec
tion 591 of the statute, however, these should be moved into a new
"optional" category. When it comes to allegations of criminal activ
ity involving such lower-level officials, the Attorney General should
be permitted to set the statute into motion by initiating a prelimi
nary investigation pursuant to its provisions - on her own initiative
or at the request of Congress - but she should not be bound to do

sel, would restrict the statute to the same categories as Cox. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at
473-74. Joseph DiGenova, the independent counsel appointed to investigate the Bush Ad
ministration's search of Bill Clinton's passport file, would limit the statute's reach to the
President, Vice-President, Attorney General, and top Justice Department officials. See Jost,
supra note 165, at 30. Robert Fiske, the first Whitewater independent counsel, would limit
the coverage to the President, Vice-President, Attorney General, and perhaps the Deputy
Attorney General and head of the F.B.I. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note
164, at 1533, 1564 (remarks of Robert Fiske). Leon Silverman, however, who led the investi
gation of President Reagan's first labor secretary, Raymond Donovan, would continue fairly
broad coverage under the statute, allowing it to encompass all cabinet officers and White
House staff members. Silverman has stated "[t]he attorney general ought not be put in the
position of pursuing an investigation against a political friend." Jost, supra note 165, at 30.

208. Significant issues arise, however, when the President is the subject of an independent
counsel investigation. Because there exists a serious question whether a sitting President can
be indicted and/or prosecuted while in office, issues arise as to the proper function of an
independent counsel when the primary target of an investigation is the President. Related
issues also arise concerning whether Congress can permit the independent counsel to take
over the role of the legislature in gathering evidence for the purposes of impeachment pro
ceedings (as opposed to gathering evidence for an actual criminal prosecution). For the au
thor's detailed views on these fascinating but distinct subjects, see Ken Gormley,
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REv.

_

(1999).
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so.209 The Attorney General should also remain free to conduct her
own investigation, unconstrained by the statute.

The Attorney

General should possess complete discretion to determine whether
the existence of a conflict, or the potential thereof, warrants the
triggering of the extraordinary machinery of the independent coun
sel law in such cases. The Attorney General's determination on this
score should be final and nonreviewable.
The reach of the statute should be narrowed further by amend
ing Section 591 to limit it to crimes committed while in federal of
fice, or in seeking that office. Currently, the statute sweeps with a
broad brush, mandating a preliminary investigation whenever the
Attorney General receives a whiff of evidence that a covered indi
vidual "may have violated any Federal criminal law" (other than
certain petty offenses enumerated in the statute).210 This standard
is unbounded in terms of time; it also requires no link whatsoever
to misbehavior in public office, which was the sine qua non of the
statute when it was conceived during Watergate. As Jacob Stein,
independent counsel in the first investigation involving Attorney
General Edwin Meese (and later lawyer for Monica Lewinsky),
summed it up: "The nature of the inquiry should be limited to
things done in office, misuse of the office. "211
The above three modifications would alter dramatically the
number of cases swept within the mandatory provisions of the stat
ute, and help return the legislation to a sensible path. The statute
would be reserved, by definition, for rare crises involving the top
members of the executive branch. Since the public has "come to
distrust" the office of independent counsel itself,212 due to overuse
209. Section 591(c) of the independent counsel statute already creates a sort of "op
tional" category, under which the Attorney General may trigger the machinery of the in
dependent counsel if she believes that a particular investigation "may result in a personal,
financial, or political conflict of interest." 28 U.S.C. § 59l(c)(l). Thus, there is already a
mechanism in place by which the Attorney General may trigger the statute with respect to
any lower-level executive official, if she believes that such a course is appropriate. See also 28
U.S.C. § 592(g)(l) (1994), which allows members of the Judiciary Committee of the House or
Senate to request appointment of an independent counsel.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a). The petty offenses are those listed as Class B or C misde·
meanors in the federal criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (1994).
211. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein).
Not only would this approach "limit the type of crime" that was covered by the statute, but it
would also - as a practical matter - limit "how far back you went." Bell et al., supra note
148, at 474 (comments of Archibald Cox). Lawrence Walsh concurs that the statute should
be limited to crimes committed while in office, and those involving significant misuse of that
office. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1563-64 (remarks of
Lawrence Walsh); Walsh, supra note 193, at 2384.
212. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1594 (remarks of Archibald
Cox); see also S. REP. No. 103-101, at 11 (1993) (remarks of former Attorney General
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of the statute during its controversial twenty.:.year lifetime, reducing
the field of coverage to essential cases would enhance its central
purpose of rehabilitating public trust in American government.

4.

Leave Other Investigations to Ad Hoc Appointments of
Special Prosecutors

Assuming that the above reforms to the independent counsel
statute are implemented by Congress, the question will still linger:
What happens to the rest of the investigations concerning allega
tions of wrongdoing by high-level executive officials? Based upon
the narrowed list of covered individuals, proposed above, most of
the recent independent counsel inquiries would never have come
into existence. Investigations into alleged illegal gratuities received
by Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy;213 allegations that HUD
Secretary Henry Cisneros lied to FBI during a background check
about the size of his payments to a mistress;214 the investigation into
the personal finances of deceased Commerce Secretary Ronald
Brown;215 claims of perjury involving Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt in connection with his Congressional testimony con
cerning an Indian casino license;216 the investigation of Secretary of
Labor Alexis Herman relating to alleged kickbacks for steering
contributions to the Democratic party217 - all of these investiga
tions would fall outside the purview of the "reformed" independent
counsel statute.218 Moreover, since the statute would be limited to
alleged crimes committed while occupying or seeking federal office,
the Whitewater investigation219 that has spawned so much controNicholas deB. Katzenbach) (stating that the law "has served to destroy rather than preserve
public confidence in the integrity of government").
213. See David Johnston, Agriculture Chief Faces New Inquiry on Business Gifts, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al.
214. See David Johnston, Concluding that Cisneros Lied, Reno Urges a Special Prosecu
tor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al.
215. See The Ron Brown Problem, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1995, at A30.
216. See Counsel Appointed for Babbitt Inquiry, supra note 166, at A14. For a fascinating
discussion of how the Babbitt inquiry was driven by the media, see Worth, supra note 188.
217. See Investigator Chosen in Labor Secretary's Case, supra note 166, at A18.
218. But see Reno's Decision Activates a Sixth Investigation of Clinton's White House,
MINN. STAR TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, at A19 (describing the recent investigation relating to
Clinton campaign chief of staff Eli Segal (who later served as director of AmeriCorps)). This
case still might have fallen within the statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8) relating to
campaign officials. For more information concerning these investigations during the Clinton
Administration, see supra note 166.

219. This matter involved alleged improprieties in an Arkansas land deal relating to Bill
and Hillary Clinton in the 1980s, long before Clinton was elected President. For a good
discussion of the original Whitewater matter, see, for example, JAMES B. STEWART, BLOOD
SPORT. THE PRESIDENT AND ms ADVERSARIES (1996); Michael Isikoff & Howard Schnei-
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versy during the Clinton administration would never have been ini
tiated, at least under the mandatory provisions of the statute .
Additionally, Kenneth Starr's Whitewater add-ons involving the
Vince Foster suicide, the White House Travel Office firings, and
"Filegate" (involving the improper request for key Republicans'
FBI background files by White House administrators) would not
have triggered the statute.220 Indeed, of the twenty-plus independ
ent counsel investigations initiated under the statute since its incep
tion in 1973,221 only four - the two investigations of Attorney
General Edwin Meese; the Iran-Contra matter (because it involved
allegations that encompassed the President, Vice-President, Attor
ney General, and others); and the investigation involving Clinton
campaign chief of staff Eli Segal (because it presumably involved
irregularities by a top campaign official acting as a surrogate for the
President) - would have triggered the mandatory provisions of the
statute.222
What would have happened to the rest of the twenty investiga
tions and cases like them? They would have remained governed by
the state and federal criminal justice systems that have successfully
handled such matters for the past two hundred years. Much of the
problem relating to the modern epidemic of special prosecutors
flows from the fact that the nation, traumatized by Watergate, has
forsworn its trust in the Attorney General and other government
lawyers. Ever since 1789,223 the Attorney General has supervised
difficult cases, many of them involving corrupt public officials inder, Clintons' Former Real Estate Firm Probed, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1993, at Al; Michael
Isikoff & Howard Schneider, The Unfolding of Whitewater, WASH. PoST, Jan. 21, 1994, at
A20.
220. For a review of the "add-ons" appended to Kenneth Starr's Whitewater investiga
tion, see Adam Cohen, ls the Prosecutor Running a Starr Chamber?, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at
58; Ken Gormley, Starr Should Give Case to the House, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 1998, at ASS;
Starr's Galaxy of Investigations, supra note 12, at 52.
221. Although there have been 20 independent counsels appointed, several of them
(most prominently Kenneth Starr) have branched out into multiple investigations. See supra
notes 12-16, 167, and accompanying text.
222. The Monica Lewinsky investigation, because it is appended to the Whitewater
probe, presumably would not have been authorized either. However, to the extent the
Lewinsky case involves alleged criminal wrongdoing by the President - perjury in a civil
deposition and suborning perjury - it still could have {independently) triggered the
mandatory appointment of an independent counsel under the proposed amendments to the
statute set forth above. Of course this also depends on whether a sitting President can be the
direct target of an independent counsel investigation, which in turn depends on whether a
sitting President can be indicted or prosecuted. See supra note 208.
223. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 261
(remarks of Philip A. Lacovara). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the office of the Attor
ney General, but the Department of Justice was not established until 1870. See Biden, supra
note 107, at 883-84.
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eluding those in the executive branch.224 The presumption in recent
years has been that any allegation that involves even a hint of po
tential conflict - because it relates to an actor within the executive
branch - must be removed from the Justice Department and
farmed out to an outside prosecutor. The reverse presumption,
however, should apply.

As former Attorney

General Elliot

Richardson testified eloquently in the Senate in 1975, to do other
wise assumes that "the regularly constituted law enforcement aµ
thorities are neither sufficiently competent nor trustworthy to be
capable of dealing with the more-or-less routine problems of cor
ruption and abuse of power that have to be dealt with from year to
year. I do not believe that this assumption is warranted.�'225
The point of retooling the present law is not to allow guilty pub
lic officials to go free or unpunished. Rather, it is to prevent the
triggering of the extraordinary mechanism of the mdependent
counsel law - with its potentially limitless resources - except in
special cases.226 Every purported scandal that touches an official in
the executive branch is not special enough. It is detrimental to as
sume that competent, professional, aggressive career prosecutors in
the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys' offices are not capable
of investigating and prosecuting charges simply because White
House aides or cabinet officers are the targets. "Indeed,

if ambition

plays a role," Professor Julie O'Sullivan has astutely pointed out, "it
probably would be better served by indicting a big name official
than by exonerating him."227 As Clinton administration Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick recently noted: "I don't think
that there is any reason why Attorney General Reno couldn't inves224. During the Garfield Administration, the Justice Department investigated the "Star
Route Frauds," which involved alleged fraud in contracting for mail delivery, and implicated
the secretary of the Republican National Committee {who had also been Garfield's campaign
manager). In the Kennedy Administration, the Justice Department investigated conflict-of
interest charges against President Kennedy's Secretary of Navy. President Nixon's Attorney
General investigated allegations of extortion and bribery against Vice-President Spiro T.
Agnew, that led to Agnew's resignation. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 8.
225. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85.
Archibald Cox similarly testified that it was not "desirable to start off with the presumption
that our Attorneys General cannot be trusted. Tue presumption should be the other way,
and they should be held responsible when they were proved incompetent or unfaithful." See
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, supra note 6, at 211 (remarks of
Archibald Cox); see also Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 541 (arguing that the Depart
ment of Justice generally should be permitted to use its normal investigative process unless
there is an actual conflict of interest); O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 475 (suggesting that
Justice Department lawyers "are privy to a store of institutional knowledge and experience"
that makes them particularly suited for even the most sensitive investigations).
226.

See Gormley, supra note 170, at C7.
supra note 148, at 477.

227. O'Sullivan,
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tigate [HUD Secretary] Henry Cisneros ."228 Although the Attor
ney General (ironically) and the special court may have contributed
to the under-reliance on Justice Department lawyers, in recent
years, this skewed outlook must be repaired .229
Several backups will exist to ensure that serious cases requiring
the injection of a neutral prosecutor do not fall through the cracks,
intentionally or unintentionally. First, as discussed above, the stat
ute would include an "optional" category (encompassing those cab
inet

officers,

sub-cabinet

officers,

agency

heads,

and

other

individuals currently subsumed under Section· 591 of the legisla
tion). The Attorney General would thus have the ability to conduct
a preliminary investigation relating to these high-level executive of
ficials, and refer the matter to the special three-judge panel for ap
pointment of an independent counsel, if she believed that the threat
of conflict warranted it. For example, in a serious case where a
close friend or advisor to the president in the White House were
implicated, the Attorney General might voluntarily elect to trigger
the statute, in order to distance herself from any appearance of
political influence, even

if the

statute did not mandate that she do

so.
Second, in the event that the Attorney General suffered from an
actual conflict of interest because of her personal or financial asso
ciation with a member of the executive branch under investigation
(including another member of the Justice Department), the statute
still would mandate her automatic recusal under Section 591(e).230
Thus, the overt case of a conflict of interest would be amply
covered.
Third, the Attorney General would still retain the ability to ap
point ad hoc special prosecutors under his or her own supervision,
without going through the costly machinery of the independent
counsel statute, as an alternative in select cases. The appointment
of ad hoc prosecutors by the executive branch was the normal prac
tice prior to the Watergate crisis.231 Even after Watergate, Attor228. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1533 (remarks of Jamie
Gorelick). For a suggestion that the independent counsel statute has adversely affected the
morale of Justice Department lawyers, see Feinburg, supra note 135, at 184.
229. See Alison Frankel, Blame the Law, Not the Lawyer, AM. LAW., Mar. 1998, at 58
(describing Attorney General Reno's hasty use of the statute); Ken Gormley, Starr's Three
Silent Chaperons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A25 (criticizing the court's passive role under
the statute).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(e) (1994) (providing for mandatory recusal of the Attorney
General in specified cases).
231. President Grant appointed a special counsel to help prosecute the "Whiskey Ring,"
in which his personal secretary was allegedly involved. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 8.
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neys General in several instances appointed their own ad hoc
special prosecutors where the danger of conflict warranted it. Pres
ident Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, appointed a former
U.S. Attorney from New York to investigate charges that the Presi
dent's brother, Billy Carter, was funneling money from the Bank of
Georgia through the Carter peanut warehouse to the presidential
campaign. At the conclusion of the investigation, the special prose
cutor "accounted for every peanut and every nickel" and filed an
expeditious report.232 President Bush's Attorney General William
Barr exercised his inherent authority to appoint neutral investiga
tors to handle three politically sensitive matters, dealing with the
"Inslaw Octopus Scandal," "Iraqgate," and a controversy involving
alleged abuse of the House of Representatives B ank. In each case,
Attorney General Barr hired prominent retired judges to investi
gate the allegations, and "I did that on my own nickel, not under
the statute."233 More recently, the original special prosecutor in the
Whitewater case - Robert Fiske - was appointed by Attorney
General Janet Reno pursuant to her own inherent powers during a
lull in which the independent counsel law had lapsed.234 Thus, the
ad hoc method of appointing special prosecutors that has been fol
lowed by the Justice Department for much of this century has
President Theodore Roosevelt's Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to investi
gate a land fraud ring, allegedly involving the Commissioner of the General Land Office. See
id. President Roosevelt himself named a special prosecutor to investigate alleged corruption
by Post Office officials. See id. President Coolidge appointed (and the Senate confirmed)
two special prosecutors in the Teapot Dome scandal. See id. President Truman appointed a
commission to investigate tax-fixing in his administration. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at
15-16. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appointed Leon Jaworski as special counsel to
handle the prosecution of Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi for contempt, relating to his
defiance of federal civil rights laws, where the danger existed that the public might perceive
the Kennedy Administration as too soft on Barnett. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 175 (remarks of John Dear). For a discussion of the
appointment of such ad hoc special prosecutors, generally, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at
7-16; HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 13-39; Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 2143; Smaltz, supra
note 166, at 2311-20.

232. See Fleissner, supra note 157, at 464-65; see also S. REP. No. 97-496, at 5 {1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3541 (noting success of this investigation). The special
prosecutor appointed by Attorney General Bell was Paul Curran.

233. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1533 (remarks of William P.
Barr). In the "Inslaw" scandal, Barr appointed Senior U.S. District Judge Nicholas Bua of
Illinois. In the "lraqgate" matter, he appointed retired Judge Frederick Lacey of the U.S.
District Court for New Jersey. In the House bank controversy, Barr appointed former U.S.
Court of Appeals Judge Malcolm Wtlkey of the D.C. Circuit to investigate the matter. For a
discussion of the "Inslaw" scandal, see Mary Fricker & Stephen Pizzo, Outlaws at Justice, S.F.
CHRON., June 14, 1992, § 7, at 11. The "Iraqgate" scandal is reviewed in Peter Mantius,
Cover-up on BNL? The Idea is Absurd, Investigator Claims, ATLANTA JouRN. & CONST.,
Dec. 10, 1992, at AS. The House bank scandal is discussed in David Johnson, Ex-Manager of
House Bank Accepts Plea Deal and Admits Embezzlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at A18.
234. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-72.
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worked effectively. For the bulk of minor investigations involving
cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, agency heads, and Justice Depart
ment officials below the Attorney General, this method will remain
perfectly satisfactory.
Additionally, Section 592(g) of the statute acts as a :final safe
guard, since it permits the members of the Judiciary Committee of
either the House or the Senate to request the appointment of an
independent counsel directly.235 Working in tandem with the above
three devices, this back-up will provide the political impetus neces
sary to spur the Attorney General to appoint an independent coun
sel in non-mandatory cases that may warrant the injection of a
neutral, outside investigator. Because Congress can directly re
quest that the Attorney General take action, and can exert political
influence upon her to do so when extraordinary cases arise (as oc
curred when the Senate pushed the Nixon administration to ap
point a special prosecutor during Watergate),236 the legislature has
a direct safety-check against unsatisfactory decisions by the Attor
ney General.

Congress can further strengthen Section 592(g) by

amending that provision to allow the full House or Senate to call
for the appointment of an independent counsel - rather than limit
ing the decision to the Judiciary Committees that may be aligned
with a particular political party at a given time - in order to in
crease the influence of the legislature in this important function.237
With these minor adjustments made, there will exist little dan
ger that important cases will slip through the cracks. Three sepa
rate mechanisms will allow the Attorney General to appoint a
special prosecutor, even in non-mandatory cases. Coupled with
Congress's ability to exert political pressure (and indeed to conduct
its own investigations)238 when it concludes that an outside prosecu
tor is essential, the vision of a renegade Attorney General refusing
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (1994). This section provides: "The Committee on the Judici
ary of either House of the Congress, or a majority of majority party members or a majority of
all nonmajority party members of either such committee, may request in writing that the
Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel." 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(g)(1). That provision goes on to require the Attorney General to provide a written
report to the congressional committee, within 30 days, explaining whether a preliminary in
vestigation will be conducted and why. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(2). After the preliminary
investigation is completed, the statute requires a report to the committee notifying it whether
an application for an independent counsel has been made and why. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(g)(3).
236.

See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 241-45.

237.

See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(1).

238. For a discussion of Congress's own ability to conduct investigations, see Harriger,
supra note 180, at 2116-17.
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to ensure a neutral investigation for a potentially conflicted crimi
nal case will remain a remote and unlikely possibility, at worst.

B.

Reform the Role and Regulate the Power of
Independent Counsels
·

Even after Congress establishes an appropriate line of demarca
tion between those serious (and exceptional) cases that should au
tomatically trigger the statute, and those that should be left to the
sound judgment of the Attorney General, much work still remains.
The job description of the independent counsel himself - and the
scope of his extraordinary power - require close scrutiny. First,
the special prosecutor's jurisdictional statement, or charter, should
serve carefully to limit the extent of his permissible work. Second�
a string of miscellaneous reforms should be implemented to reel in
otherwise limitless (and costly) investigations.

1.

The Independent Counsel's Jurisdictional Limits Must Be
Strictly Controlled

The most serious breakdown in the regulation of independent
counsels, once appointed, has occurred in territory unfamiliar to
most non-lawyers. The multiple expansions of Whitewater prosecu
tor Kenneth Starr from his original charter into unrelated terrain culminating in the Monica Lewinsky investigation - have revealed
a gaping hole in the statute. Although few newspaper or television
accounts have cast it in these terms, the recent crisis involving the
independent counsel law had far less to do with a young White
House intern and far more to do with a single, unsexy word:
jurisdiction.239
One of the principal features of the legislation that saves it from
patent unconstitutionality is its careful limitation of the special
prosecutor's field of authority.

The congressional debates are

abundantly clear in this regard. One of the ways that Congress in
tended to ensure that the special prosecutor could not run amok,
and become the dreaded "Frankenstein monster" uncontrolled by
any branch of government, was to narrowly constrain his or her
scope of authority and nail down his or her jurisdictional limits in a
written charter.240 Thus, one of the few duties of the special court
that was carefully delineated in the statute was its duty to define the
239.
A43.

See Ken Gormley, Starr is Overstepping His Mandate,

NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1998, at

240. See supra discussion at notes 121-23 and related text. For another example of the
general concern about allowing overly-broad jurisdiction in creating the special prosecutor,
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"prosecutorial jurisdiction" of the newly ordained independent
counsel.241 Section 593(b) (3) of the statute directs the court to de
fine the jurisdiction in such a way as to "assure that the independ
ent counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and
prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney
General has requested the appointment. "242 It also contemplates
that the special prosecutor will have power to explore "all matters
related to that subject matter."243
The sweep of the independent counsel's jurisdiction is thus
broad in one sense - allowing him or her (in essence) to stand in
the shoes of the Attorney General in conducting a particular in
quiry. Yet it is narrow in another crucial sense. Unlike an ordinary
prosecutor sitting in the Justice Department or U.S. Attorney's of
fice, this special prosecutor is not free to investigate and prosecute
any federal crime placed upon his or her desk. Rather, he or she is
forever tied to the written statement of jurisdiction, formulated by
the Attorney General and reduced to writing by the special court.
This narrow jurisdictional lock is an essential component of the
independent counsel law. Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.), one of
the Senate leaders intimately involved with the statute since its in
ception,244 has underscored the importance of the jurisdictional
charter. Senator Levin recently stated on the floor of the Senate:
"[T]he most fundamental limit in the law is that an independent
counsel can investigate only that which is within the scope of juris
diction granted by the court that appoints him."245 Likewise, when
the Supreme Court upheld the law in Morrison

v.

Olson, it specifi-

see the remarks of Henry S. Ruth, Jr., who succeeded Leon Jaworski as Watergate Special
Prosecutor, in Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 121.
241.

See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b){l) (1994).
28 u.s.c. § 593(b){3).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3). The statute provides that jurisdiction should include the au

242.

thority to investigate and prosecute other federal crimes - excluding certain petty offenses
- "that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of the matter with respect to which
the Attorney General's request was made, including perjury, obstruction of justice, destruc
tion of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b){3). Section 593(b)(3)
authorizes the court - and the court alone - to make public the written statement of juris
diction (i.e. the special prosecutor's charter). This may occur only upon the request of the
Attorney General or after the court reaches its own determination "that disclosure of the
identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel would be in the best inter
ests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(4).
244. Senator Levin served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Govern
ment Management, which has legislative jurisdiction in the Senate over the independent
counsel statute. See Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter
of Public Confidence and Constitlltional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11 (1987).
245. 144 CoNG. REc. Sll, 952, at Sll, 953 {daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Levin). See also Levin & Bean, supra note 244, at 20-21 ("Authorizing the court to describe
the scope of the counsel's inquiry is an inherent part of the appointment power since the
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cally referred to the restricted nature of the special prosecutor's ju
risdiction in justifying the constitutionality of the statute. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained in unequivocal terms: "Unlike other
prosecutors, [the independent counsel] has no ongoing responsibili
ties that extend beyond the accomplishment of the mission that she
was appointed for and authorized by the Special Division to
undertake."246
It is absolutely essential that the independent counsel's jurisdic
tion remain carefully circumscribed. First, if it were not so, he or
she would no longer be an "inferior officer" constrained by the pa
rameters set by the executive and judicial branches. Rather, he or
she would have become a "principal officer," subordinate to no
other official in determining his or her responsibilities. The statute
would thus be facially unconstitutional (since only the President can
appoint principal officers).247 Second, if the independent counsel
could dictate the terms of his or her own jurisdiction, this would
create separation of powers problems of mammoth proportions, be
cause Congress would be creating a free-floating satellite branch of
government unaccountable to any other, a cardinal sin under our
tripartite constitutional system.248 Regrettably, the independent
counsel statute has evolved in such a way that the jurisdictional
constraints envisioned by Congress have been rendered worse than
impotent. This has been accomplished, primarily, through the de
fective "expansion of jurisdiction" provisions codified in Section
593(c). It has been exacerbated, moreover, by the recent strain of
the multiple Whitewater investigations.
Section 593(c) of the statute allows the court, upon the request
of the Attorney General, to "expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction"
of an independent counsel "in lieu of the appointment of another
court appoints the independent counsel to a temporary office whose tenure must be defined
by the completion of a particular task.").
246. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988). The Court made this point in con
nection with its analysis under the Appointments Clause. The Court concluded that in
dependent counsels are "inferior officers" rather than "principal officers," and thus subject to
appointment by the judiciary (rather than exclusively by the President), in part because the
independent counsel "is empowered by the Act to perform only certain, limited duties," and
his or her office "is limited in jurisdiction." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
247. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-72; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
248. For a discussion of the dangers of creating an unaccountable fourth branch of gov
ernment, see discussion infra note 330 and accompanying text. For a spirited argument that it
is "empty" to contend that modem independent counsels are "unaccountable," since they are
bound by the same policies as the Justice Department and can be removed for misconduct,
see Samuel Dash, Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86 GEo.
L.J. 2077, 2081-83 (1998).
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independent counsel" under certain circumstances.249

Section

593(c) (2)(A) of the statute provides that

counsel

if an independent

receives information concerning possible criminal violations com
mitted by persons covered by the statute - but outside of the scope
of this particular independent counsel's jurisdiction - he or she
may forward such information to the Attorney General and request
permission to expand the investigation into this unrelated matter.zs0
The Attorney General is then required to conduct a preliminary
investigation (similar to that mandated when the independent coun
sel is first created). However, rather than the ninety-day period
that applies in the first instance,251 the Attorney General is given
only thirty days to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine
expansion of jurisdiction is warranted.252 During that abbrevi

if

ated investigation, the statute mandates that the Attorney General
give "great weight to any recommendations of the independent coun
sel" concerning expansion of jurisdiction.253
Section 593(c)(2)(B) goes on to provide that if the Attorney
General concludes that "there are no reasonable grounds to believe
that further investigation is warranted," she must notify the special
court and the issue is closed.254 If, on the other hand, the Attorney
General determines that reasonable grounds do exist to believe that
further investigation may be warranted (giving great weight to the
recommendation of the independent counsel), the court must ex
pand the independent counsel's jurisdiction to encompass this mat
ter, or appoint another special prosecutor to investigate the same
matter.255
The net effect of these statutory provisions is to create a cham
ber of horrors for the potential target of an investigation, almost
guarantying (and mandating) that the expansion of jurisdiction oc
cur once an independent counsel requests it. The statute's three
step procedure, coupled with an aggressive independent counsel in
a particular case, yields a recipe by which the independent counsel
can perform a feat of prestidigitation and expand his jurisdiction
249. 28 U.S.C.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

§ 593(c)(1) (1994).
See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A).
See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(l) (1994).
See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A).
28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(B).
See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C). It is unclear from the language of the statute whether

255.
the special court has the power, unilaterally, to appoint a different independent counsel to
investigate the matter (rather than expanding the jurisdiction of the existing special prosecu
tor), or whether this can only occur at the request of the Attorney General.
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almost at will. The rapid expansion of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater
probe into the unconnected Monica Lewinsky matter provides a
useful case study of how effortlessly this statutory jump can be
accomplished.
As Step #1 of the statutory process, Starr - after receiving in
formation from Linda Tripp that President Clinton may have lied in
his affidavit in the unrelated Paula Jones civil case when he denied
a sexual affair with Lewinsky - contacted Attorney General Reno
and requested permission to expand his jurisdiction into this mat
ter.256 Starr's initial request to the Attorney General was explicitly
premised upon a potential link to the existing Whitewater investiga
tion. Starr conveyed to the Attorney General that Clinton friend
Vernon Jordan may have steered consulting work and other im
proper benefits to Webster Hubbell (a primary target in the White
water investigation) in order to buy his silence in that case. It
similarly appeared that Jordan might be providing Lewinsky attrac
tive job interviews, in order to buy her silence about her affair with
President Clinton. The Whitewater independent counsel explained
to the Attorney General that he had only thirty-six hours in which
to confront Lewinsky and seek cooperation, since Newsweek was
preparing to publish an article breaking open the story and alerting
Jordan to the inquiry.257
As Step #2 of the process, Attorney General Reno then con
ducted a truncated "preliminary investigation�' of the matter, and
decided one day later to authori.Ze expansion of Starr's jurisdiction
to cover the Lewinsky case.258 The Attorney General's order noted
the potential link to Whitewater.259 That connection, however,
256. See Dan Baiz, Washington's Extraordinary Week: How the Events Unfolded, From
Jones to Lewinsky, WASH. PoST, Jan. 25, 1998, at Al. One criticism of Starr, at the time these
events took place, was that he authorized the placement of a wire on Linda Tripp to obtain
further inculpatory statements from Monica Lewinsky before he requested expansion of ju
risdiction from the Attorney General or received approval to expand jurisdiction into the
Lewinsky matter by the three-judge panel. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 239, at A43. For an
excellent summary of the events leading to the expansion of Starr's jurisdiction into the
Lewinsky matter, and criticism thereof, see the statement of Senator Levin in the Congres
sional Record, supra note 245, at Sll, 954-56.
257. These events are discussed in numerous sources. See Baiz, supra note 256; Ronald
Brownstein & Kenneth T. Walsh, Starr Struck, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 2, 1998,
at 14, 16-17; Nancy Gibbs, Clinton's Crisis, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 21; Gormley, supra note
229, at A25; Michael lsikoff & Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2,
.L998, at 31, 41-43.
258. Brownstein & Walsh, supra note 257, at 16-17; lsikoff & Thomas, supra note 257, at
41-42.
259. Attorney General Reno's order stated: "It would be appropriate for Independent
Counsel Starr to handle this matter because he is currently investigating similar allegations
involving possible efforts to influence witnesses in his own investigation. Some potential sub
jects and witnesses in this matter overlap with those in his ongoing investigation." See Notifi-
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proved largely irrelevant - indeed, little mention was made of it
thereafter, at least until Kenneth Starr testified in front of the
House Judiciary Committee nearly a year later.260 Regardless of
the lack of overlap between Whitewater and the Lewinsky matter,
pursuant to Section 593 of the statute Attorney General Reno had
little alternative but to honor the request to expand jurisdiction,
once it was made by Starr.261 Because the independent counsel had
asked that this matter be referred to him,262 the Attorney General
was mandated to give "great weight" to that request. She therefore
approved it.
As Step #3, the special panel then endorsed the expansion of
Starr's jurisdiction on that same day - January 16, 1998 - al
lowing the Whitewater independent counsel to investigate
"whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed
justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law . . .
in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others
concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton. "263 This result was liter
ally inevitable. Pursuant to the statute, the special court had no
option but to expand jurisdiction (or perhaps appoint a new in
dependent counsel), since Section 593(c)(2)(C) mandates that the
court "shall expand the jurisdiction of the appropriate independent
counsel to include the matters involved or shall appoint another in
dependent counsel to investigate such matters, "
Attorney General.264

if so

directed by the

Thus, although observers commenting upon the Lewinsky inves
tigation have stated that Whitewater independent counsel Starr was
cation to the Court of the Initiation of a Preliminary Investigation and Application to the
Court for the Expansion of the Jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel [hereinafter Applica
tion for Expansion of Jurisdiction] at 2, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Assn., No.
97-1, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998).
260. See Ken Gormley, Court Must Do Its Duty in Starr Case, NEwsoAY, July 9, 1998, at
A45. Kenneth Starr did discuss the putative connection between the Lewinsky matter and
Whitewater during his House Judiciary Committee testimony in November of 1998. See In
dependent Counsel Kenneth Starr's Prepared Testimony Before the House Judiciary Com
mittee, 1998 WL 801023 (F.D.H.C.) (Nov. 19, 1998); see also Alison Mitchell, Rancorous
House Panel Hears Starr's Case for Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at Al.
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (1994). For a discussion of how Attorney General
Reno may have contributed to the general over-use of the jurisdictional provisions, however,
see Frankel, supra note 229.
262. See Application for Expansion of Jurisdiction, In re Madison Guaranty, 1998 WL
472444, at 2.
263. In re Madison Guaranty, 1998 WL 472444, at 1 (order granting expansion of
prosecutorial jusrisdiction, unsealed by order filed Jan. 29, 1998).
264. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C). The court also presumably has the power to appoint a
different independent counsel to investigate the same matter, rather than expanding jurisdic
tion. However, it is unclear whether the court is bound by the request of the Attorney Gen
eral, or can make an independent judgment on the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C).
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only carrying out his duty to investigate the Lewinsky matter since it was assigned to him by the Attorney General and the
court265 - such a characterization misses the mark.

Once in

dependent counsel Starr set the process in motion by requesting
permission to expand his jurisdiction into the Lewinsky case, the
statute almost guaranteed that the Attorney General and the court
would authorize it. A serious internal flaw was thus revealed within
the folds of the statute: it permits virtually unlimited expansion of
jurisdiction,

if an aggressive independent

counsel seeks to stake out

new territory for himself.
Of all the defects exposed within the statute over the past
twenty years, relating to the powers of the independent counsel,
this is the most serious. It defeats the elaborate system of controls
built into the special prosecutor law by Congress, and creates a sep
aration of powers nightmare. It means that the independent coun
sel can leap from one matter to the next, becoming a permanent
inquisitor of a president or some other target of choice.266 It means
that the already-minuscule threshold for triggering and conducting
a preliminary investigation can be bypassed, since the Attorney
General must grant great deference to the independent counsel's
recommendation in favor of expansion. It also means that the im
portant pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Morrison

v.

Ol

son, that the independent counsel shall have "no ongoing
responsibilities that extend beyond the accomplishment of the mis
sion that she was appointed for and authorized by the Special Divi
sion to undertake," becomes rubbish.267
265. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Judiciary Panel, In Party Vote, Urges Impeachment Hear
ings; House Will Decide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al (Rep. Howard L. Berman (D. Cal.),
stated that "it was Mr. Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, who approved Mr. Starr's
inquiry into the Lewinsky matter."). See also Michael Hedges, Starr Says More to Come,
PGH. PoST-GAZ., Oct. 10, 1998, at Al (Charles Bakaly, a spokesman for Starr's office, stated:
"We are committed to discharging our duties to investigate the matters that the attorney
general requested we investigate, and that the special division gave us jurisdiction over.").
266. See David E. Rosenbaum, Some Experts are Faulting Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1998, at Al4.
267. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). Another problem with the flimsy
jurisdictional standard is that an independent counsel can circumvent an Attorney General's
decision to reject expansion of his or her jurisdiction, by requesting the court to rule that the
new subject matter is implicit in the original grant of jurisdiction. Since Section 593 has
considerable play in the joints, and allows the court to define jurisdiction to cover "all mat
ters related to that [primary] subject matter," 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3), an independent counsel
can use this as an end-run if the attorney general refuses to expand jurisdiction. See Morris
sey, supra note 142, at 990-91; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 485-88. This is precisely what
the independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson succeeded in doing, in seeking to pursue con
spiracy charges against two targets after other allegations evaporated. See In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Morrissey, supra note 142, at 990-91. If Congress
amended the statute to create a presumption against expanding jurisdiction of the independ-
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Indeed, we have discovered that even where the Attorney Gen
eral puts up a fight, and seeks to prohibit expansion of jurisdiction,
the independent counsel can still approach the court (as Donald
Smaltz did in the Espy case), and seek a determination that the
matter is "related" to the subject of his original charter.26s Thus,
expansions can be accomplished both directly and indirectly, even
without the consent of the Attorney General.
The only cure for this fundamental flaw in the jurisdictional ma
chinery is to amend the statute to create a presumption against ex
pansion into matters unrelated to the special prosecutor's original
charter. This change is essential for several reasons. First, there is
an inherent danger in allowing unlimited jurisdiction for a
prosecutorial creature like the independent counsel. Unlike other
prosecutors (even the Attorney General herself), the independent
counsel operates outside the sphere of political and constitutional
accountability. As the first Whitewater independent counsel,
Robert Fiske, put it: "[T]he independent counsel doesn't have to
seek authority from anybody to do anything. He or she can do
whatever they feel is appropriate, without any review by any
one. "269 Jacob Stein, the independent counsel in the first investiga
tion of Attorney General Edwin Meese concurred: "I had more
authority than anybody should have. I was reviewing myself. "270
Moreover, the existence of such potentially unbounded power (and
ent counsel directly, it would simultaneously curtail the independent counsel's ability to indi
rectly expand his authority through this "related matter" approach.
268. For an excellent discussion of how the independent counsel accomplished his desired
result in the Espy case, see Maskell, supra note 166, at 36-37; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at
485-88. The "related matter" provision of the independent counsel statute is contained in 28
U.S.C. § 593(b)(3). The Supreme Court in Morrison held that such matters must be "demon
strably related to the factual circumstances that gave rise to the Attorney General's investiga
tion and request for the appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case."
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679. The Eighth Circuit has interpreted this to mean that the "related
matter" provision is "exceedingly broad." See United states v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1316-19
(8th Cir. 1996). At the same time, that circuit has ruled that the determination of the Attor
ney General as to the independent counsel's jurisdiction is final and non-reviewable. See
Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316-19 holding that it was exclusively within the power of the Attorney
General to make determinations as to relatedness, and that this decision was not subject to
judicial review). However, the special court apparently has not embraced the latter position.
See In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting the Attorney General's determination
that a matter was not "related"). But see In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir 1998) (agreeing
with the Attorney General that a matter was not "related" to independent counsel's original
jurisdiction charge.)
269. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1546 (remarks of Robert Fiske).
270. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein).
Attorney General (later Justice) Robert Jackson once described the danger inherent in over
broad prosecutorial power as follows:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America. His discretion is tremendous. . . .
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resources) can easily skew the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
As Professor O'Sullivan - who worked on the Whitewater investi
gation herself - observed, the intense focus on a single case com
bined with the extraordinary power of the office poses unique
hazards. An independent counsel's performance - and entire ca
reer - may be "assessed on the basis of the one matter referred to
him." This awkward fact "will certainly alter his perspective and
may well alter his substantive decisions."271 The further the in
dependent counsel's power is stretched, the greater the danger that
the braking mechanism known as prosecutorial discretion will fail
entirely.
Third, there is a built-in inconsistency in allowing an independ
ent counsel to spring from one matter to another, given the ultimate
purpose of the statute. The goal is to select the most neutral person
available - in both fact and appearance - in order to shore up
public confidence in highly controversial cases.

An existing in

dependent counsel, by definition, arrives with the baggage of the
extant investigation on his or her back. Given the inevitable split of
public opinion as to whether a special prosecutor in any case particularly one involving the president or high administration offi
cial - is motivated by political bias or the desire to build a career
at the expense of a political foe, an existing independent counsel is

almost never the best choice for a new investigation.272

A number of specific amendments to the statute must be accom
plished by Congress, in order to switch the presumption against ex
panding an independent counsel's jurisdiction into unrelated turf.
First, Section 593(c)(2)(A) should be revised to give the Attorney
General a full ninety-day period in which to complete her prelimi
nary investigation, when the independent counsel seeks to expand
. . . With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a
fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some ·act on the part of almost
anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and
then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and
then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on
him. It is in this realm . . . that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Before the Second Annual Conference
of United States Attorneys (April 1, 1940), in 24 AM. JUDICATURE SoCY. 18, 18-19 (1940).
271. O'Sullivan,

supra note 148, at 490.

272. The perception of a large segment of the American public that Kenneth Starr was
"out to get the President" in the Whitewater investigation - even before the Lewinsky mat
ter arose - is well documented. See Donald Kaul, Special Counsels Spend Millions Working
as Hatchet Men for GOP, Aruz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1997, at B7; Richard Reeves, Witch
Hunt, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1997, at 29A; Angie Cannon, Independent Counsel
Starr Losing Reputation For Impartiality, HouSToN CHRON., June 1, 1997, at A6, available in
ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 8414316. Thus, regardless of Starr's actual bias, or lack thereof, he
was far from the "best choice" for a controversial new investigation.
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jurisdiction. The existing thirty-day period encourages shortcuts
and discourages a serious investigation of the new matter. More
over, Section 593(c)(2)(A) should be amended to strike the lan
guage that requires the Attorney General to "give great weight to
any recommendations of the independent counsel."273 In its place,
language should be inserted stating that "there exists a presumption
against expansion of jurisdiction into subjects unrelated to the origi
nal grant of jurisdiction to the independent counsel by the Special
Court." In malting a determination whether extension of jurisdic
tion is appropriate, the Attorney General should be required to
take into account the "degree of relatedness" between the two mat
ters. The more remote the connection between the new matter and
the independent counsel's original charter, the stronger the pre
sumption should be against authorizing expansion. The Attorney
General's decision not to expand jurisdiction should be deemed fi
nal and nonreviewable. However, in the event that she recom
mends expansion, Section 593(c)(2) (C) could be amended to allow
the special court - the entity that established jurisdiction in the
first place - to review the Attorney General's recommendation
determine for itself whether an enlargement of the jurisdictional
boundary line is prudent.274
Once the existing presumption is switched in this fashion, facile
expansions of jurisdiction will be curbed and one of the greatest
deficiencies of the statute will be corrected. The legislative history
of the statute makes clear that a critical duty of the special court
was to guard against expansions of jurisdiction that "convert a tem
porary special prosecutor into a permanent special prosecutor."275
A statutorily-imposed presumption against expansion will consti
tute a major step toward accomplishing that end.
Besides re-asserting strict jurisdictional controls over independ
ent counsels, Congress should fine-tune a number of other provi
sions that govern the identity and breadth of power of special
prosecutors. These should be aimed at correcting two other peren
nial problems with the modem-day special prosecutor: lack of time
limits and lack of budgetary constraints.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (1994).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(B) also would have to be amended to eliminate the "reason
able grounds" threshold for triggering the appointment of an independent counsel. A higher
threshold should be inserted consistent with revisions to Section 592{c)(l)(A), discussed
supra at notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
275. See Ethics In Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4281
{103 Stat. 1724).
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Control the Duration of Investigtitions Through
Periodic Review

One recurrent criticism of the statute, after twenty years of fine
tuning, is that there is still no practical limitation upon the length of
time a particular investigation may take. The Iran-Contra investi
gation consumed seven years.276 The less noteworthy probe into
irregularities of the Reagan administration's Department of Hous
ing and Urban Development has taken an equal length of time, and
is still not complete.277 The Whitewater investigation commenced
in January 1994. Its many appendages have already kept the case
going for nearly five years, as if animated by a life and breath of its
own.21s
In response to the seemingly endless time-line for a modern in
dependent counsel inquiry, some commentators have proposed a
statutory cap on investigations.

Archibald Cox has suggested a

one-year time limit after which an independent counsel must
demonstrate to the court that his or her investigation should con
tinue "for good cause shown."279 Several bills have been intro
duced in Congress that would require, in a similar vein, that an
independent counsel must "go back to Congress" or petition the
court for additional funding after two years have elapsed.280
These proposals, although based upon legitimate concerns for
the slinky-like ability of investigations to grow, are nonetheless un
satisfying. Iran-Contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh, who
oversaw one of the longest investigations in modern history, ex
pressed legitimate concern that any such arbitrary time limit would
place the special prosecutor in an unwinnable position: "All [the
opposition] has to do is hold back documents, delay testimony, let
the time run out, and talk about the expense of your office. That is
276. See Drew & McNulty, supra note 171, at 1. See also LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL
REPORT OF THE lNDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR !RAN-CONTRA MATTERS (1993).
277. See Tom Hamburger, Latitude Given to Special Prosecutors Draws Fire; Sprawling
Investigations Into Reagan, Clinton Cases Trigger Demands for Change, MINN. STAR TRIB.,
May 10, 1998, at 17A.
278. See, e.g., Howard Fmeman & Karen Breslau, What Will He Say? NEWSWEEK, Aug.
10, 1998, at 22.
279. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 474; Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note
164, at 587 (remarks of Archibald Cox). Cox envisioned that the request for extension of
time would be made to the court "in camera, if necessary" and could be renewed each year
for good cause shown. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 474. Lloyd Cutler also would impose
a one-year time limit, but would allow the Attorney General some say over whether such an
extension was appropriate. See id. at 475-76.
280. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30.
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the way to undercut an independent counsel."281 Not only would
the targets of investigations and their political allies find creative
ways to sabotage the work of a special prosecutor by stalling until
deadlines ticked to a close, but the nature of a criminal investiga
tion is such that its precise duration can never be mapped out in
advance. The Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920s took nearly six
years to investigate, from start to finish.282 Watergate took two and
a half years, from the time Cox was appointed in May 1973 until the
Final Report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force was issued
in October 1975.283
Rather than placing artificial time limits on the duration of an
independent counsel's work, the simpler (and more sensible) ap
proach would be for Congress to insert teeth into the existing provi
sion that requires the special court to review the status of an
independent counsel investigation every two years (and after two
such cycles, every year) .284 As will be discussed in greater detail,
Section 596 of the statute already mandates that the court periodi
cally assess the independent counsel's work and determine if it is
"substantially completed" such that his or her office should be ter
minated.285 By ensuring that periodic reviews actually take place,
and by establishing concrete standards by which the court must
make its assessment, Congress will strengthen the incentive for the
independent counsel to wrap up his or her work expeditiously, and
avoid the embarrassment of being terminated for over-staying his
or her welcome.
Congress also should provide the court with standards for as
sessing whether an investigation is "substantially completed" under
Section 595(b) (2). In rendering this important determination, the
court should be required to consider: (1) the amount of work that
has been completed by the independent counsel and the amount of
remaining work that he or she can reasonably anticipate;

(2)

the

amount of the remaining work of the independent counsel that re
lates to the subject matter of his or her original jurisdictional state
ment, and the amount of remaining work that is peripheral (the
281. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 475. Larry Thompson, one of two independent coun
sels investigating fraud and mismanagement in the Reagan Administration Department of
Housing and Urban Development, raised similar concerns about placing "artificial limits"
upon the length of an investigation. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at
1550-51 (remarks of Larry Thompson).
282. See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 471-73.
283. See WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4.
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994).
285. See discussion infra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
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more work that is peripheral, the more reason to conclude that the
assignment is "substantially complete"); and

(3)

the amount of the

remaining work that could be completed by the Justice Department
without the danger of conflict or appearance thereof.
The statute should specifically authorize the special court to
seek input from the Attorney General, as well as from the in
dependent counsel, in determining whether the above criteria point
toward the near completion of the special prosecutor's assigned
task. In this way, lingering investigations will be brought to a defin
itive close, and artificial time limits will become unnecessary.

3.

Require That Each Independent Counsel Work Full-Time

Another controversy that reached a crescendo in the recent
Whitewater matter relates to the question whether a special prose
cutor must work full-time. Kelln.eth Starr, throughout most of his
tenure as Whitewater independent counsel, treated the appoint
ment as a part-time position.
mately

$1

Starr continued to earn approxi

million per year in private legal practice, as a lawyer for

the prestigious Kirkland & Ellis firm in Washington, leading some
to criticize him as a high-priced moonlighter.286

Judge David

Sentelle, on the other hand, has suggested that a full-time job com
mitment from potential independent counsels would "make our job
very nearly impossible."

Sentelle's concern was that "attorneys

who have the ability, the reputation and the proven integrity for the
job do not want to give up years of their career . . . in order to do
something that will be lower paying, unpopular, and may not lead
anywhere."287 Congress itself worried about this possibility, and
declined to build a requirement of full-time job commitment into
the statute.288 As Judge Butzner, who formerly sat on the special
court explained, a salary of

$55.43 per hour with a maximum statu-

286. See Naftali Bendavid, Starr Takes Leave From Chicago Finn, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1,
1998, at 8; Tlll1othy Burger, Starr Still Stalling on 1997 Take, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1998,
at 8; Robert Scheer, Setting Fire to Tobacco Legislation; Kenneth Starr Lives in a Glass House
When it Comes to Conflicting Duties, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at B7. Starr was also criti
cized for representing tobacco interests in challenging anti-tobacco legislation, a high priority
of the Clinton Administration. See Scheer, supra. Even after he expanded his Whitewater
inquiry to encompass the Monica Lewinsky matter, Starr argued a major appeal for Meineke
Discount Mufflers. See Burger, supra. In response to increased criticism about his outside
legal work, Starr took a leave from his law practice in August of 1998, just as the controver
sial Lewinsky investigation reached a crescendo. See Bendavid, supra note 286.
287. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1540 (remarks of David B.
Sentelle).
288. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-452, at 26-27 (1987).
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tory cap of $115,682 per year, would make it "very, very difficult"
to attract someone with a first-rate law practice.2s9
Although not all special prosecutors have worked full time,290
many former special prosecutors and commentators have con
cluded that a statutory amendment mandating full-time work by an
independent counsel is essential.291 For Archibald Cox, such a re
form would represent a "symbolic plus."292 Moreover, if the statute
were limited to serious cases and major crises, as originally envi
sioned by Congress, Cox found it hard to believe that "there aren't
qualified people who aren't willing to put aside their normal lives in
order to serve in a position of this responsibility under these cir
cumstances. "293

As former Attorney General Griffin Bell ex

pressed in a similar vein: "If it is important enough to have this
procedure, then I think you ought to work at it full time."294
A statutory amendment mandating a full-time commitment by
each independent counsel has many things to recommend it. First,
an Attorney General is not permitted to engage in private legal
practice, during the term of his or her office.295 There is no reason
to permit independent counsels, who stand in the shoes of the At
torney General and wield extraordinary power in cases of critical
importance, to live by different rules. Second, such a requirement
would boost public confidence in the independent counsel's office,
something that is desperately needed after the divisive Whitewater
investigation.296 Third, such a requirement would help screen out
frivolous cases. As Professor Julie O'Sullivan has noted, few attor
neys would drop their careers and make financial sacrifices to work
on marginal cases that were not of "sufficient public import to draw
289. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1540 (remarks of John D.
Butzner). After Judge Butzner made his comments, the statutory maximum for Starr's salary
was raised to $118,000. See Chris Caldwell, The All Starr Team, GEORGE, Apr. 1998, at 126.
The salary is that established pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5315, level IV of the Executive Schedule.
See 28 U.S.C. § 594(b) (1994).
290. For a review of those special prosecutors who have worked part-time, in the years
prior to the appointment of Kenneth Starr, see Nolan, supra note 142, at 22 n.96.
291. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 476-77; See Jost, supra note 165, at 30; Sixty-Seventh
Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1587.
292. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1587 (remarks of Archibald
Cox).
293. Id. at 1587.
294. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 476-77. This sentiment was also expressed by Michael
Zeldin, independent counsel in the investigation involving the Bush Administration search of
Bill Clinton's passport records. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30.
295. See 5 C.F.R. § 3801.106 (1998); 61 Fed. Reg. 59811-01, 1996 WL 675232 (F.R.) (Nov.
25, 1996).
296. A similar point was made in O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 482.
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them from their practices."297 Just as importantly, a full-time re
quirement for independent counsels would bring investigations to a
close much more swiftly. Archibald Cox was paid a salary of
$38,000 per year as Watergate Special Prosecutor, and took a leave
from his tenured position on the Harvard Law School faculty to
accept the post.298 Leon Jaworski, who succeeded Cox as Water
gate Special Prosecutor, likewise left behind his lucrative Texas law
firm practice to re-locate to Washington throughout the duration of
his service.299 In each case, the special prosecutor had a powerful
incentive to complete the investigation, wrap up his work, and go
home.300 In the Whitewater case, there is ample room to wonder
whether it would have spun off into so many addendums (including
the Monica Lewinsky investigation) if independent counsel Starr
had been required to work at the initial Whitewater investigation
full-time, write a report, and return to his legal practice at Kirkland
& Ellis.301
When Attorney General-designate Elliott Richardson asked
Archibald Cox to move to Washington, at age 61, and take on an ill
de:fined and untested position in the Watergate case, seven promi
nent lawyers and judges had already turned Richardson down.302
Cox accepted the post, knowing it was probably a "no-win job,"
because he concluded that "[s]omebody clearly has to do it."303
The only hope for the independent counsel statute, in the future, is
that conscientious lawyers and jurists will continue to accept such
positions, regardless of the relatively low pay and large time com
mitment.304 To gear the statute to attract lawyers who wish to keep
one foot in their existing jobs, is to attract individuals who are not
prepared to unqualifiedly accept the position at the outset.

297.

Id. at 482.

298.

See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 240-41.

299. See JAMES DoYLE, NoT .ABOVE nm LAW: THE BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECU
TORS Cox AND JAWORSKI 237-39 (1997).
300. Jaworski returned to Texas as soon as tbe Watergate case was in a position for trial
by his litigation team. See id. at 349, 374-76.
301. For an argument that independent counsels really do not have unlimited time to
conduct their investigations, since the special court can terminate tbem pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 596(b)(2) (1994) if it determines that tbeir work is "substantially completed," see Dash,
supra note 248, at 2083-84.
302.

See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 233-34.

303. GoRMLEY, supra note 3, at 240.
304. Every federal judge and cabinet official in tbe nation presumably has to make such
financial trade-offs in deciding whether or not to engage in public service.
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Control Costs by Reducing the Number of Cases That Trigger
the Statute
Another public criticism leveled at the independent counsel

statute relates to the enormous financial costs it generates.305 The
statute provides that the Justice Department must "pay all costs re
lating to the establishment and operation" of an independent coun
sel office.306 As former Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann
has commented, the office has turned into a "juggernaut" uncon
strained by practical pressures including budget and time con
straints.307

The price-tag for the twenty independent counsel

investigations launched under the statute thus far, since 1978, is
roughly $136 million.308 The cost of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater
investigation and its various appendages is approximately $40 mil
lion (and counting) as of late 1998.309 On top of these direct tabs
run up by the independent counsels, there are additional hidden
costs. For instance, the FBI spent approximately $4.6 million in car
rying out its work in the Iran-Contra investigation,310 on top of the
almost $48 million expended directly by independent counsel Law
rence Walsh.311 All of these expenses are ultimately borne by the
taxpayer.
No talisman exists for controlling the cost of the independent
counsel mechanism, other than regulating the number, scope, and
duration of investigations. The most cost-effective manner in which
to conduct any investigation at the federal level, of course, is to
305. See, e.g., Paul Delaney, Losing Faith in the Independent Counsel Act, BALT. SuN,
July 5, 1998, at 17A, available in ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 4974596; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at
Home: After Kenneth Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A19; Relax, It's Just Money,
GEORGE, Apr. 1998, at 130. In the first four years of existence of the independent counsel
statute, the median length of an investigation was seven months and the median cost was less
than $200,000. In the last four years, the median length of an investigation was two and a half
years, and the median cost was nearly four million dollars. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the
Pricefor Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government
Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. R.E.v. 65, 127 {1997). For a detailed list of costs by
investigation, see Kathy Kiely, $54M For Independent Counsels, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 12,
1998, at 2, available in ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 11032723 (covering Clinton Administration);
Investigations, by Administration, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1997, at A4 (covering entire span of
the statute).
306. 28 u.s.c. § 594{d){2) {1994).
307. See Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120-21 (1998).
308. See Malone, supra note 160, at AlO; Maskell, supra note 166, at 31; Page, supra note
166, at A4;.
309. See Relax, It's Just Money, supra note 305, at 130; Page, supra note 166, at A4; Kiely,
supra note 305, at 2; Gormley, supra note 170, at Cl; Gormley, supra note 260.
310. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 124.
311. See Investigations, by Administration, supra note 305, at A4.

The Independent Counsel

December 1998]

675

have the Justice Department handle it. The Justice Department is a
massive operation with 115,667 employees, thousands of lawyers,
and a budget of $18.6 billion.312 Each time an independent counsel
is created, a mini-law firm must be set up, divorced from the De
partment of Justice, requiring its own office space, staff, equipment,
and overhead. All of this only duplicates the resources already in
place at the Justice Department, and represents a horribly ineffi
cient way of doing business at an enormous cost to the taxpayer.
Some commentators have suggested that the Attorney General
should establish staffing levels and budgetary constraints for the in
dependent counsel, at the time of appointment, in order to build a
de facto cap onto potential expenditures.313 However, this ap
proach is impractical; an Attorney General could then use the purse
strings to effectively suffocate an investigation that posed a threat
to his or her administration. The better solution is to address the
root of the problem. If Congress amends the statute such that it is
triggered only on rare and serious occasions,314 as discussed above,
the spiraling costs will recede (quite naturally) to an acceptable
level. This check on the escalating costs of special prosecutors is far
superior to artificial budgetary caps, because it will keep spending
under control without hampering legitimate investigations.
5.

Sharply Limit Final Reports

A final way that the independent counsel statute can be
strengthened, while simultaneously containing costs, is sharply to
limit the practice by which independent counsels draft voluminous
(and expensive) reports at the conclusion of their investigations.
Once again, the statute itself is the principal culprit. Professor
O'Sullivan has expressed the problem by stating that the statute
"creates incentives for [independent counsels] to investigate too
long and report too fulsomely."315 Section 594(h)(l)(A) requires
that each independent counsel file a report with the court, every six
months, which "identifies and explains major expenses, and summa
rizes all other expenses, incurred by that office" during the relevant
period, and "estimates future expenses."316 This is a sensible re312. See 1997 ATTY. GEN. ANN. REP. 1, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/aglar97/
doj1997.pdf>.
313. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 542-43 (arguing that the jndependent
counsel should be required to seek enlargements of time and money from the court).
314. See supra discussion at notes 172-238 and accompanying text.
315. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 500.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(A) (1994).

676

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:601

quirement. The Court and Congress have a strong interest in moni
toring expenditures and ensuring that the independent counsel who, unlike other federal entities, has no precise budget - does
not indulge in lavish expenses.
Section 594(h)(l)(B), however, drops a fly in the ointment. This
section requires, before the office of the independent counsel is ter
mi:Ilated, that such counsel "file a final report with the division of
the court, setting forth fully and completely a description of the
work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all
cases brought."317 This means that the independent counsel must
go beyond reporting the input and output of funds. Section
594(h)(l)(B) requires every special prosecutor, prior to leaving of
fice, to explain the work history of his or her operation, and justify
(in essence) all of his or her actions.31s
This is a daunting task for independent counsels, most of whom
are top professionals and have much at stake if the public is permit
ted to scrutinize each move and decision made during a protracted,
politically-charged investigation.319 Not surprisingly, independent
counsels have thus tended to err on the side of over-completeness,
preparing vast reports that leave no stone unturned, and racking up
significant time and expenses in discharging their final statutory
duty.320 A prime example is Lawrence Walsh's Iran-Contra investi
gation report, which consisted of three bound volumes comprised of
nearly 1,500 pages,321 and kept his office working long after the sub
jects of the investigation had left office.322
Almost universally, the "final report" requirement has been
criticized by former independent counsels and those intimately fa
miliar with the process. It has been called a "wasteful require
ment,"323 an expensive chore that "serve[s] to overly politicize the
investigation,"324 and a "pain in the neck."325 Not only is this kind
of report foreign to any other prosecutor's office in the country,32�
317. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(B).
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(B).
319. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1559.
320. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 484-85.
321. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1558.
322. See Drew & McNulty, supra note 171, at 1; Carl P. Leubsdorf, Report Says Reagan
Fostered Iran-Contra; He Denies Creating Climate For Aides' Efforts, DALLAS MoRNINO
NEws, Jan. 19, 1994, at lA.
323. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1556.
324. Id. at 1558.
325. Id.
326. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 547.
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it also raises serious concerns about basic faimess.327 Criminal in
vestigations are traditionally shielded from blow-by-blow accounts
and detailed public scrutiny. Particularly where no indictment is
lodged or no prosecution is commenced, there is a tradition of cir
cumspection and silence, designed to safeguard the reputation and
privacy of the individuals under investigation. In the typical case,
professional and ethical limitations sharply limit what prosecutors
can say and do about criminal investigations, beyond what is con
tained in the public record.328 When it comes to the high-profile
world of special prosecutors, however, the "final report" require
ment casts these practices to the wind, and forces an independent
counsel (in essence) to air the dirty laundry of his targets.329
The most sensible solution to this problem is for Congress to
dramatically shrink the scope of the information that must be pro
vided at the conclusion of the independent counsel's work. Since
the independent counsel must provide periodic reports to the court,
at six-month intervals, accounting (in detail) for each expenditure
pursuant to Section 594(h)(1)(A), the court will have ample chance
to become familiar with the nature of the work being performed by
the office. At the conclusion of the investigation, the statute should
require nothing more than a reckoning of expenditures, personnel
information, and a concise summary of the work performed by the
office. If the special court wishes to obtain further information, on
particular subjects, the statute may authorize the court to request
additional details from the special prosecutor in order to resolve
specific questions. Yet the presumption should be toward a lean,
straightforward report. Grand jury information and other material
generally shielded from public disclosure should be excluded from
the principal report, since it will inevitably be made public. If the
court determines that such confidential information is essential to
complete its own review, the statute should permit the independent
counsel to provide a sealed, supplemental report containing such
information. Because the special court has no veto power over the
327.

See Heymann, supra note 307, at 2128-30; Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 2155-57.

328.

See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 547; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 484-85.

329. One significant injustice decried by commentators is that an individual against whom
criminal charges are not brought can still be "publicly branded a criminal or wrongdoer" in
the final report. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 546-47. This occurred, most
notably, in the second investigation of Attorney General Edwin Meese by independent coun
sel James McKay. See EASTLAND , supra note 23, at 123; Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142,
at 547 n.39. See also OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REPORT OF INDEPENDENT COUN
SEL IN RE EoWIN MEESE III 73-76, 95-99 (1988) (suggesting that evidence "probably" existed
to convict Meese for certain offenses, although criminal charges were not brought).
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prosecutorial decisions of the independent counsel,330 in any event,
the court (as a general rule) need not explore the nitty-gritty of the
independent counsel's operation. A short and pithy report (in con
junction with the information the court receives from periodic
budget reports) will more than suffice.
One independent counsel charged with handling the unusually
lengthy (and costly) investigation of the Reagan administration De
partment of Housing and Urban Development lamented: "When I
was a prosecutor in the Department of Justice, when I ended a case,
I simply shut the door and turned the lights out. Now I have to
spend millions of your money doing this report."331 If costs are to
be controlled and investigations are to be brought to a close, the
statute must allow independent counsels to tum their lights out at some point - and shut the door.
C.

Reform and Clarify the Duties of the Special Court

One of the great failures of the independent counsel statute in
recent years is that the body that Congress envisioned acting as a
moderating and restraining influence on special prosecutors - the
special three-judge panel - has all but surrendered any meaningful
role in the process. In the debates that shaped the original statute,
Congress settled upon the judiciary to appoint and monitor the spe
cial prosecutor because it believed that the special three-judge
panel could act as a wise and moderating influence in certain politi
cally treacherous cases. Congress had several reasons for placing
this important responsibility in the judicial branch. First, Judge
John Sirica had been a hero in Watergate and had emerged as one
figure whom the American people trusted in that unseemly mess.332
Second, the 1970s was a period of great reliance (perhaps over
reliance) upon the judiciary to resolve problems that were not being
adequately resolved by other branches of government. The abor
tion controversy,333 the fight for gender equality,334 the school bus330. See Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988).
331. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1556 (remarks of Larry D.
Thompson).
332. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 47 & 229 n.35. Sirica had won public respect be
cause his refusal to believe that the Watergate burglars were telling the whole truth - and
his questioning of the sufficiency of the Justice Department's prosecution in the original
Watergate trial - led to the unraveling of the White House cover-up. See generally JoHN
S1ruCA, To SET THE REcoRD STRAIGHT (1979).
333. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
334. See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
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sing battle,335 and other political hot potatoes of the day were
thrown onto the doorstep of the judiciary after Congress and the
executive branch punted them away. At the time the original spe
cial prosecutor legislation was fashioned, the courts appeared to be
the safest haven to locate the appointment and oversight power, in
order to avoid any possible corruption in the process.336
Unfortunately, Congress envisioned one thing, but the legisla
tion did another in practice. Congress's purpose in vesting a three
judge panel with the power to appoint and monitor the special pros
ecutor was to shift this duty away from the Justice Department
(where there existed potential conflicts), and move it down Consti
tution Avenue to the special court. After all, Watergate Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox had been fired by President Nixon be
cause he was an appointee of the executive branch, directly ac
countable to Attorney General Elliot Richardson.337 The whole
point of the new legislation was to fight off potential conflicts and
prevent incidents like the "Saturday Night Massacre" from recur
ring, by moving oversight responsibility to a neutral court.338
There is no indication that Congress intended the court to re
main invisible. Elliot Richardson, as the Attorney General over
seeing the Watergate case, had played a cautious but essential role
in interfacing with, and maintaining a check over, special prosecu
tor Cox.339 Congress certainly envisioned that a similar oversight
function would be carried out by the special court under the statute.
This was the only guarantee, layered into the statute, that the spe
cial prosecutor would not become an unaccountable fourth branch
of government.340 The "someone" to whom he or she was meant to
be answerable was the three-judge panel, in conjunction with the
335. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
336. It is noteworthy that the first major "special prosecutor" bill introduced by Senator
Birch Bayh in Congress, in the week following Archibald Cox's firing in the Saturday Night
Massacre, placed the power to appoint and oversee the special prosecutor in the federal
District Court. See S. REP. No. 93-595, at 2 (1973).
337. For an account of the legal debate over whether President Nixon had the power to
fire Cox, see GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 323, 383, 420 & 558 n.135.
338. For a discussion of the conflicts of interest that abounded in the Watergate investiga
tion prior to Cox's appointment, see id. note 3, at 257-61, 282 & 368-71.
339. The relationship between Cox and Richardson, that was essential to Cox's effective
performance as special prosecutor, is su=arized in id. at 294-99, 318-22. Professor John
:Barrett thoroughly discusses the importance of a healthy relationship between the Attorney
General and independent counsels in John Q. Barrett, All Or Nothing, Or Maybe Coopera
tion: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an In
dependent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REv. 519, 549-50 (1998).
340. For an expression of Congress's concern that the special prosecutor legislation
should not be permitted to create a "fourth branch of Government," see Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 23 (remarks of Sen. Baker).
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Attorney General whose direct control was filtered through the
special court. Unfortunately, the court has shrunk down its own
role to almost nothing. After appointing an independent counsel
and establishing his or her jurisdiction,341 the court has done little
more than rubber-stamp the special prosecutor's actions.342 In
deed, the court itself has articulated a minimalist vision of its func
tions. Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. of the Fourth Circuit, a Reagan
appointee and a member of the special court since 1988, directly
addressed the question: "Once the independent counsel has been
appointed and the order signed defining his scope, what does the
court have to do as far as the investigation?" Judge Butzner's reply
was: "Very little, and less than that."343
Judge Butzner's response may accurately sum up the approach
taken by the special court to date, but it hardly matches the model
envisioned by Congress. Although it is dangerous to allow the At
torney General to meddle too much in the work of the independent
counsel, it is even more dangerous to allow the special court to
meddle too little, such that the special prosecutor can become a
branch of government unto itself. 1\vo factors have contributed to
the special court's failure to fulfill its essential role under the stat
ute. The first is the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson.
The second is the statute itself.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Morrison v. Olson resolved
the separation of powers conundrum, inherent in the independent
counsel statute, by distancing the judiciary from any functions of
the independent counsel that were even remotely prosecutorial.
Writing for a near-unanimous Court, the Chief Justice stated:
[Although] provisions of the Act do require the court to exercise
some judgment and discretion, . . . the powers granted by these provi
sions are themselves essentially ministerial. The Act simply does not
give the Division the power to 'supervise' the independent counsel in
the exercise of his or her investigative or prosecutorial authority.344

Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that a number of functions
of the special court necessarily interfaced \vith the prosecutor's
341. 28 u.s.c. § 593 (1994).
342. See Gormley, supra note 229, at A25; Gormley, supra note 260.
343. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1541 (remarks of John D.
Butzner).
344. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988) (footnote omitted). The Special
Division itself has likewise written: "The Independent Counsel does not operate under our
supervision and his acts . . . do not bear our aegis." In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
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work.345 He also conceded that the special court's power to termi
nate an investigation under S e ction 596(b) (2) was quasi
executive.346 Yet he went on to conclude that "the functions that
the Special Division is empowered to perform are not inherently
'Executive'; indeed, they are directly analogous to functions that
federal judges perform in other contexts."347
Chief Justice Rehnquist was searching for the safest path on the
treacherous separation of powers catwalk. An independent counsel
significantly controlled by the judiciary would almost certainly en
croach upon the executive branch's traditional powers to enforce
the laws and prosecute criminals.348 Yet the Court's stern language
in Morrison has caused the special panel to become scared of its
own shadow. The purpose of the independent counsel statute was
to allow the special court to oversee the special pro·secutor (in place
of the Justice Department), but limit its involvement scrupulously.
As part of this plan, the court's oversight functions were carefully
separated from its traditonal judicial functions, so that it could not
act as both judge and prosecutor. The statute's draftsmen were
keely aware that too much involvement by the special court would
tip the statute into the realm of unconstitutionality. Yet too little
involvement would constitute an even worse sin, creating the "rov
ing Frankenstein monster" that Congress assiduously sought to
avoid exhuming.349
345. These functions included the ability of the special court to determine whether the
Attorney General had shown "good cause" for extending a preliminary investigation beyond
the time limit; deciding whether to make public the various reports of the Attorney General
and the independent counsel; and deciding whether to award attorneys fees. See Morrison,
487 U.S. at 681 n.19.
346. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994) allows the special court
to terminate the office of the independent counsel when, based upon a request from the
Attorney General or upon its own motion, it determines that an investigation is "so substan
tially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such
investigations and prosecutions."
347. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681. The examples that Chief Justice Rehnquist gave included
(a) the ability of federal judges to decide whether to allow the disclosure of matters occurring
before a grand jury pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(e); (b) the ability of federal judges to
extend a grand jury investigation pursuant to Rule 6(g); and (c) the ability of federal judges
to award attorneys fees in civil rights cases pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Morrison, 487
U.S. at 681.
348. See Tuerkeimer, supra note 143, at 251-52.
349. For a discussion of some of the specific dangers inherent in permitting the independ
ent counsel to become an unaccountable "fourth branch" of government, see Daugherty,
supra note 142, at 984-90, and Feinburg, supra note 135, at 183-84. Senator Howard Baker
also warned against creating a "virtually inviolate fourth branch of Government" that "would
substantially diminish the accountability of law-enforcement officials to the President, the
Congress, and the American people." See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, supra note 60, at 23.
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The wishy-washy language of the statute has not helped matters.
The statutory language is oddly silent as to what the special court
should do

-

if

anything - once the investigation proceeds for

ward. The statute fails to spell out even the most basic duties of the
three-judge panel. In reforming the independent counsel statute,
Congress must face and resolve this fundamental question: Is the
special court the monitor of the special prosecutor, or is no branch
of government the monitor? Does the court have a role after the
independent counsel is appointed, or none at all? If the latter, the
statute must be junked as patently unconstitutional, since no branch
is minding the store. If the former is true (as Congress seems to
have intended), Congress must lay out the court's powers and re
sponsibilities in painstaking detail, or the judiciary will continue to
bury its head in the sand.
The Supreme Court and scholars can no longer duck this un
comfortable fact: If the independent counsel statute is indeed con
stitutional (as Morrison held), the independent counsel must be
"inferior" to someone.350 That someone, like it or not, is the special
court as much as it is the Attorney General. The special court acts
as a filter, straining out potential bias or conflict that may exist
within the Department of Justice in select cases. The Attorney
General retains some role; but a number of the Justice Depart
ment's ordinary duties are shifted to the three-judge panel. The
court not only has the power to appoint,351 but it has the power to
set the written jurisdictional boundaries of the independent coun
sel;352 determine when investigations are substantially com
pleted;353 and make a host of interim decisions governing the
investigations.
For instance, as the Supreme Court itself noted in Morrison,
Congress specifically gave the special court power to determine
whether the Attorney General had demonstrated "good cause" for
extending a preliminary investigation beyond the original time limit
pursuant to Section 592(a)(3) of the statute; deciding whether to
refer "related" matters to the independent counsel under Section
594( e ); deciding whether to make public the independent counsel's
identity and his or her jurisdiction under Section 593(b)(4), as well
350. I take this to be the underlying message of Professor Tribe, in his recent dialogue
with Professor Amar. Tribe laments that the independent counsel statute as it has evolved
destroys the notion of separation of powers, since the special prosecutor is "inferior" to no
one. See Amar & Tribe, supra note 151.
351. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(l) (1994).
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(l).
353. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2).
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as various documents filed with court pursuant to Section 593(h);
deciding whether to release the independent counsel's final report
to Congress and the public and whether any protective orders
should be issued under Section 594(h) (2); and deciding whether to
award attom�ys' fees to individuals investigated but not indicted
pursuant to Section 593(f).354 It can hardly be said that Congress
envisioned that the special court would do nothing.
At the same time, Chief Justice Rehnquist was absolutely cor
rect in Morrison when he suggested that this is <;langerous constitu
tional turf. Federal judges should not be in the business of running
prosecutions, nor do they possess expertise to do so. But the stat
ute toes the line carefully. It assigns to the special court a combina
tion of traditional judicial functions and quasi-executive,
"ministerial" functions, and this is why the Supreme Court upheld
it. Congress intentionally constructed the special court using senior
and retired judges from the Courts of Appeals35S who would act as
a sort of buffer zone between the independent counsel and the Jus
tice Department, but would not decide the merits of any case in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine. As the Morri
son Court noted, there is precedent for allowing members of the
judicial branch to perform functions that intersect with those of the
executive branch to ensure the proper functioning of the criminal
justice machinery. For instance, federal judges supervise grand ju
ries, assist in their "investigative functions" by compelling the testi
mony of witnesses, participate in the issuance of search warrants,
review applications for wiretaps, and otherwise involve themselves
in criminal investigations in a limited fashion.356 Thus, when Con
gress fashioned the special court under the independent counsel
statute, it purposely built a hybrid creature. It merged traditional
judge-like functions with quasi-executive, ministerial functions, be
cause the Attorney General's ministerial role was necessarily lim
ited. It built a court, in other words, like no other court.
It is not necessary to broaden the powers of the special court to
make it work properly. Rather, its duties must be spelled out more
clearly so that it is empowered to carry out the functions that Con
gress has already given it, and the Supreme Court has already af
firmed.

Otherwise, the entire statutory scheme is a terrible

354. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680 (1988).
355. See 28 U.S.C. § 49(c) (1994).
356. These points are discussed in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n. 20. The provision of the
independent counsel statute that mandates that the special court shall not decide the merits
of a case is 28 U.S.C. § 49(f).
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constitutional hoax. A.t least three adjustments are essential to
make the special court more effective.
1.

Authorize the Special Court to Consult with the Attorney
General in Selecting an Independent Counsel

Some observers have questioned the selection process by which
independent counsels are appointed by the three-judge court.357
The inherently secret nature of the appointive process, and the
political nature of that process, are both concerns.358 The contro
versial decision by the special court to replace Robert Fiske with
Kenneth Starr - which took place after an alleged lunchtime meet
ing between presiding Judge Sentelle and conservative Republican
Senator Lauch Faircloth (R. North Carolina) - has been cited as
proof that the ugly hand of politics controls the process.359
Lloyd Cutler has responded with a proposal that would allow
the President to nominate five or ten potential independent coun
sels, to be confirmed by the Senate; from this list the special court
would be required to select its appointee.360 But such efforts to
squeeze every drop of political influence from the selection process
are impractical and produce undesirable results. The prospect of
allowing the president himself to appoint an independent counsel
defeats the whole purpose of the statute. It heightens the public
perception that the decks are being stacked from the start. Presi
dent Ford's proposal in 1976 that squarely placed such an alterna
tive in front of Congress was wisely (and definitively) rejected.361
Moreover, Lloyd Cutler's plan is extremely impractical. Few law
yers of the caliber sought for high-profile special prosecutor investi
gations will commit to being considered for such a position until
357. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 151, at Cl.
358. See id. at C2.
359. In part, criticism relating to the manner of Starr's appointment turned upon the fact
that Judge Sentelle's wife worked in Senator Faircloth's office, and reportedly arranged the
lunchtime meeting to discuss the replacement of Fiske with someone who would be more
aggressive, in order to satisfy anti-Clinton Republicans. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at
477-78; Joan Biskupic, Choosing the Independent Counsel; Power of Three-Judge Panel
Breeds Questions ofPartisanship, WASH. Posr, Apr. 13, 1997, at Al2; Sen. Robert Torricell,
It's Time to Reconsider Independent Counsel Statute's Effectiveness, RoLL CALL, Mar. 20,
1997, at Guest Observer section. For a response to these criticisms involving the controver
sial lunch, see O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-73.
360. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 477-78.
361. See Watergate Reforms, supra note 76 at 5, and discussion supra text accompanying
notes 76-78. For a similar proposal that the President appoint a special prosecutor at the
beginning of each term, to be confirmed by the Senate and operate within the Justice Depart
ment, see Victor H. Kramer & Louis P. Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals For
1983, 66 MINN. L. REv. 963 (1982).
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they know the precise circumstances, the timing, and all of the nu
ances of the case.362 The better approach is to allow the special
judicial panel to choose the independent counsel as they see fit, but
to amend Section 593(b) to specifically authorize the court to con
sult with the Attorney General in making its selection.
As drafted, Section 593(b) sets no real ground rules for the se
lection process.363 The special panel simply gathers recommenda
tions from a wide variety of sources, and makes its decision. As
Judge David Sentelle explained, the judges maintain an informal
"talent book" that is constantly updated with potential names from
a host of contacts. They then select from this pool as the need
arises.364 Such an informal process is perhaps inevitable. The stat
ute, however, should build in an ounce of prevention by specifically
authorizing the three-judge panel to obtain input from the Attorney
General before making its ultimate selection. First, this will help to
ensure that an individual perceived to be biased against the Presi
dent will not become the court's appointee. Since the penultimate
purpose of the statute is to select an independent counsel who is
perceived to be independent by all concerned, it can only enhance
that goal if the Attorney General is permitted to raise red flags with
respect to potential prosecutors who may be viewed as politically
tainted.365 Congress built the independent counsel statute so that
the special court and the Attorney General would be able to cau
tiously interact, and this was a healthy thing.366 Separation of pow
ers concerns that dominated debate over the statute were resolved,
in part, by allowing the Attorney General to retain input at appro
priate stages. The critical appointment stage should be no excep362. Before Attorney General Elliot Richardson asked Archibald Cox to serve as Water
gate Special Prosecutor, for instance, seven prominent lawyers and judges turned Richardson
down. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 233-34. Given the controversial nature of such investi
gations, few prominent attorneys will become involved rashly.
363. Tue statute provides only that the court shall seek to appoint "an individual who has
appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a
prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner," and an individual "who will serve to the
extent necessary to complete the investigation and any prosecution without undue delay." 28
u.s.c. § 593(b)(2) (1994).
364. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1537.
365. Thus, for instance, it might have been useful if Attorney General Reno had the
opportunity to inform the court that the White House perceived Kenneth Starr to be an
inappropriate selection, because he purportedly had taken steps to file an amicus brief in the
Paula Jones case taking a position against the President. See Sara Fritz, Fiske Ousted in
Whitewater Case} Move is Surprise, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al; Rovella, supra note 160,
at Al; Gary Wills, Cabal and Courtiers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 27, 1998, at A9, avail
able in ALLNEWS, 1998 W L 3619483. Instead, this anti-Starr sentiment in the White House
festered and led to an increasingly hostile relationship between the two camps.
366. See Barrett, supra note 339, at 548-51.
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tion. Ultimately, the special court must (and will) decide whom to
appoint as independent counsel, unconstrained by political
shackles. Yet this decision should be informed by the same relevant
facts that the Attorney General would have at her disposal, in seek
ing to select an unbiased appointee. Although Congress was silent
on this subject in drafting the statute in 1978, it should make the
special court's authority to consult with the Attorney General in
making appointments explicit, in renewing the statute in 1999.
2.

Give the Court Express Power to Carry Out Its Duties

A principal reason that the special court has shrunk from taking
any role in keeping the independent counsel law on course is that
the statute itself gives scant direction as to how the court is to carry
out its proper functions. Fearful of stepping over the boundary line
by interfering with the prosecutorial function, the court has instead
elected to remain passive to the point of paralysis.367 If the court is
going to perform its statutory duties in a responsible fashion, it is
essential that the three-judge panel have a means by which it can
gather information, hold limited

(if necessary closed-door) proceed

ings, and otherwise equip itself to carry out the essential role that
Congress fashioned for it.
A vivid example relates to the court's duty, pursuant to Section
596(b) (2) of the amended statute, to periodically review whether an
independent counsel should continue his or her work.368 The pres
ent version of Section 596(b )(2), added to the statute by amend
ment in 1994, requires the special court "on its own motion" to
determine every two years (and after two such cycles, every year)
whether an independent counsel's office should be terminated be
cause his or her work is "substantially completed."369 This provi
sion - quite distinct from the section that permits the Attorney
General to fire the independent counsel for "good cause" (because
of some misconduct etc.)370 - was inserted by Congress in order to
"ensure that the special court inquires on a periodic basis"371 as to
367. For a criticism of the special court's ill-defined role under the statute, see Martin &
Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 539.
368. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994).
369. Section 596(b)(2) also permits the Attorney General to request such termination.
However, the special court must automatically make such a determination every two years
(and then every year), even if the Attorney General takes no action. See U.S.C. § 596(b)(2).
Prior to the adoption of the present language in Section 596(b)(2), the original statute per
mitted the special court to terminate a special prosecutor if his work was "substantially com
pleted," but did not mandate a periodic review by the court.
370. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a).
371. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-511, at 23 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 806.
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the continued viability of the investigation. When Congress added
this section, it was well aware that the Supreme Court's decision in

Morrison v. Olson embraced a narrow view of the court's appropri
ate role when it came to terminating an independent counsel's
work.372 Yet Congress nonetheless adopted the amendment, wisely
concluding that such limited review by the court was essential to
prevent a special prosecutor from lingering beyond his or her useful
lifetime.373
Although the "periodic review" provision has been in place for
four years, and a similar "termination" provision existed even
before 1994, the special court has almost never requested a brief or
held any kind of proceeding to determine whether the work of an
independent

counsel has

been

"substantially completed."

In

Kenneth Starr's recent investigation of the Whitewater affair, Mr.
Starr's statutory deadline came and went without a whisper.
Although there was an intense national debate over whether Starr
should be permitted to press forward on the seemingly unrelated
Lewinsky case, or instead wrap up his Whitewater investigation and
pass off the Lewinsky matter to the Justice Department or a new
independent counsel, the three-judge court entered a perfunctory
one-sentence order continuing Starr's jurisdiction on the last day
before his statutory deadline, without requesting written memo
randa or holding any proceeding designed to elicit input from the
Attorney General or the independent counsel himself.374
This extreme judicial passivity debilitates the heart and soul of
the statute. When Congress provided that the special court should
periodically review the status of an independent counsel, it certainly
did not intend that the court would do so based upon gut instincts
or the most recent newspaper accounts. It obviously intended that
372. See 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988).
373. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-511, at 23, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 806.
374. See Order, In Re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Associates, Aug. 4, 1998;
Gormley, supra note 260. The special court had done the same thing two years earlier, at the
time of its first mandatory review. See Order, In Re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan
Association, Aug. 5, 1996. The only reported instance in which the special court took more
than pro forma action to determine if an investigation was "substantially completed" oc
curred towards the end of the Iran-Contra case. There, President Ronald Reagan filed a
document entitled "Suggestion that the Court Exercise its Power to Terminate the Office of
Independent Counsel," requesting that the special court terminate the special prosecutor's
office except for the "ministerial" function of completing his Fmal Report. The Court en
tered an order directing Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh to "show cause" why his
office should not be terminated in this fashion, and allowed the independent counsel to file a
response thereto. Ultimately, the special court granted the President's request. See In re
Oliver L. North, 10 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judge Butzner dissented in part, arguing that
the court should not use its termination power to exercise "control" over the independent
counsel in this fashion. See In re North, 10 F.3d at 61-63.
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the court would act as courts typically act, gathering information
from necessary parties in order to make a reasoned decision. In the
Whitewater example, the special court could have convened a pro
ceeding (closed to the public if necessary) in order to solicit input
from Attorney General Reno, Independent Counsel Starr and

others, before determining whether Starr's work was "substantially
complete" within the meaning of the statute.375 The absence of spe
cific statutory authorization to do so, and the court's general "hands
off'' approach, prevented the judiciary from carrying out its essen
tial function.
The duties of the special court may be relatively few in number.
But with respect to each specifically enumerated power delegated
to the court, from the beginning of an independent counsel investi
gation to the end, the statute should make explicit what is implicit
in Congress's scheme: that the court shall possess power to gather
information, review materials in

camera,

request written input, con

vene limited proceedings (where necessary), and otherwise exercise
those auxiliary powers that courts routinely rely upon to do their
jobs properly. Rather than violate separation of powers, this lim
ited involvement would ensure that the court has the tools to do its
job completely, and thus protect the institutional interests of all
three branches of government.376 Indeed, once the court is placed
into this hybrid role of appointing an independent counsel, estab
lishing his or her jurisdiction, and performing certain judicial and
quasi-executive functions (of a ministerial sort) until the investiga
tion is ended, anything less seems to be a gross abdication of its
responsibility.
Finally, although the federal rules of appellate procedure and
local rules do not apply to the special court, because it is not han375. This was particularly true since Starr's original charter limited him to the Whitewa
ter matter. To the extent that the Attorney General authorized the expansion of jurisdiction
into the Lewinsky case in the first place, based upon conversations with Starr about its poten
tial link to Whitewater, the court would have benefitted from hearing from both the Attor
ney General and the independent counsel in rehearsing their conversations and determining
how far the extension of jurisdiction was meant to go.
376. In other settings, the judicial branch has been given oversight functions to ensure
that criminal prosecutions are being conducted fairly and even-handedly. See supra note 356
and accompanying text. In the Third Circuit, for instance, if a grand jury subpoena is chal
lenged, the federal courts require that government prosecutors supply them with "some pre
liminary showing by affidavit that each item is at least relevant to an investigation being
conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily
for another purpose." See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d
Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Schofield v. United States, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). Such a minimal intrusion
by the judicial branch upon the prosecutorial function, in order to responsibly monitor crimi
nal cases, is deemed appropriate.
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dling appeals from the district court in the usual sense,377 it is im
perative that some sort of comprehensive rules (covering filing
practices, service of process, hearings, etc. in the special court) be
implemented if parties are to be treated uniformly and fairly in pro
ceedings before that tribunal. At present, much of the interaction
among independent counsel, the special court, and the Attorney
General seems to be based upon ad hoc, ex parte, contacts.378 Two
former attorneys for the target of a special prosecutor investigation
have written: " [I]f the litigation process before the Special Division
is to meet minimal standards of fair· practice," the creation of uni
form rules and standards "are an essential prerequisite."379
To correct this obvious gap in the statute, Congress should au
thorize the Supreme Court, pursuant to its rulemaking power,380 to
establish rules and standards for the special court such that the
ground rules for all litigants are clear and even-handed. It should
also carefully delineate between the functions of the special court
and the functions of the ordinary federal district court when it
comes to matters involving independent counsel investigations, so
that this important line is not left to guess-work.381

3.

Give the Court Power to Replace an Independent Counsel
Under Certain Circumstances

Although it is a question of obvious importance, the statute
never addresses whether the special court is empowered to replace
one independent counsel with another, subsequent to appointment.
The only putative precedent on this subject lies in the substitution
of Robert Fiske with Kenneth Starr in the Whitewater investiga
tion.382 However, Fiske was appointed by Attorney General Reno
377. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
378. For one example of an ex parte motion by Starr, that raised some concern in the
White House, see Stephen Labaton, Starr Accused ofMisleading Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1998, at A20 (discussing Starr's ex parte petition to send impeachment material to
Congress).
379. Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 546. The authors represented Theodore
Olson, an Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan Administration who was alleged to have
provided false information in congressional testimony. Olson was cleared of the charges.
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994).
381. The special court has been routinely criticized for establishing ambiguous ground
rules for litigants who are the subject of investigations. See, e.g., Martin & Zerhusen, supra
note 142, at 539. There is also much confusion as to whether certain decisions should be
made by the special court, or the federal district court. For instance, it is far from clear
whether the special court should have considered and granted Kenneth Starr's request to
release the Starr Report to Congress, pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Evidence, or
whether this decision appropriately rested with the district court.
382. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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through her inherent powers, rather than via statute, during a lull in
which the legislation had expired.383 Thus, when the court ap
pointed Starr, it was exercising its power to appoint an independent
prosecutor ab initio, rather than replacing one with another. It is
thus wise for Congress to insert a provision into Section 596, specifi
cally authorizing the court to relieve an independent counsel and
substitute a different individual in his or her place, in the unusual
event that the court concludes that the person originally appointed
for the task is no longer capable of remaining (or appearing to re
main) objective and neutraJ.384
The legislative history makes clear that the hallmark of the in
dependent counsel law was to foster public trust in the American
system of government by replacing the Attorney General with a
dispassionate outsider in certain high-profile cases.385 To the extent
that this schema is frustrated by the appointment of a prosecutor
who turns out to be biased in fact or in perception, the statute be
comes a greater burden on the system than a benefit. Although it is
undesirable to have an Attorney General who is biased and con
flicted, conducting a high-level criminal investigation, it is even
worse to have an independent counsel who is plagued with that
same defect. The Attorney General (at least) is duly appointed by
the chief executive and confirmed by the Senate, and thus operates
squarely within the confines of the constitutional ballpark. The in
dependent counsel is a hybrid creature on the fringes of the estab
lished tripartite system of government. His or her existence can be
justified only

if he

or she provides neutral expertise.

In every politically-charged investigation, there inevitably will
be impassioned and recurrent allegations that the independent
counsel is "out to get the President" or other target.386 This alone
383. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-72.
384. At least one state, Indiana, has statutorily required the courts to relieve a prosecutor
from duty and appoint a replacement prosecutor where the former exhibits "bias, prejudice"
or hostility toward the state's interest. See Hendricks v. Indiana ex rel. Northwest Ind. Crime
Commn., Inc., 196 N.E.2d 66, 67 (Ind. 1964). A court in New York has specifically author
ized the replacement of one special prosecutor with another, where the initial appointment
was deemed a poor selection for the particular case. See People v. Gallagher, 143 A.D. 2d
929, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1988).
385. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 101
(remarks of Sen. Bayh). Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D. Del.), then-Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, wrote in 1987: "There are certain extraordinary moments of crisis
when the people's faith in the integrity and independence of their elected officials is caused
to waiver . . . . To restore the utmost public confidence in the investigation of criminal
wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials, the appointment of a special prosecutor
then becomes necessary." Biden, supra note 107, at 886.
386. In Watergate, President Nixon and his advisors vehemently asserted that Cox was a
biased "Kennedyite" who was out to bring down the President. See GORMLEY, supra note 3,
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should not justify a "substitution." At the same time, in extreme
cases the court should retain the power to assess, after receiving
input from the Attorney General, whether bias or the appearance
thereof have crippled the particular independent counsel and ren
dered him or her incapable of continuing in the position. In the
Monica Lewinsky matter, for instance, evidence surfaced shortly af
ter Kenneth Starr expanded his investigation into this subject that
Mr. Starr had maintained ties to influential and wealthy Republi
cans who were actively funding the Paula Jones civil case, and
otherwise engaging in a covert battle against President Clinton.387
Given the intense and sustained national uproar over Starr's per
ceived anti-Clinton bias - particularly in connection with the Paula
Jones sexual harassment suit - the prudent course would have
been for the court to reassess whether its approval of Stai:r to head
the separate Monica Lewinsky investigation was a sensible one. To
the extent that Starr had become (or was perceived to be) incapable
of undertaking a neutral investigation in the separate Monica
Lewinsky matter,388 the simple solution would have been for the
court to gather the facts, and intelligently render a decision whether
to replace Starr with another (less controversial) appointee in that
distinct case. Thus far, however, the special court has taken the
position that the statute does not grant it that power.389
The beauty of the independent counsel law is that it enables the
judiciary to select from a pool of thousands of distinguished law
yers, from across the expanse of the United States, in order to
choose the very best person - a one hundred percent neutral indi
vidual - suited for the sensitive contours of the particular case.
Section 596 of the statute should be amended to facilitate that goal,
by allowing the court to reassess and adjust its selections along the
at 265-68. In the Iran-Contra affair, Lawrence Walsh was routinely accused of being bent on
disrupting or destroying the Reagan and Bush Administrations. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork,
Against the Independent Counsel, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 24-25; Can't Beat 'Em?' Indict
'Em!', DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 30, 1992, at 4.
387. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Starr Crosses the Line, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1997, at A19;
Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, The Man Behind the Curtain, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1998, at
32; Gene Lyons, Kenneth Starr's Clear Partisanship, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1997, at
B9; Robert Parry, Was Hillary Right? Right-Wing Conspiracies & Hardball Politics, IN THESE
TIMES, June 14, 1998, at 17.
388. See, e.g., Jane Fullerton, First Lady Sees "Conspiracy:" "Nonsense, " Starr Says As
President's Secretary Testifies, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, Jan. 28, 1998, at Al.
389. In 1994, Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.) raised questions about Starr's ability to fairly
conduct the Whitewater investigation. The special court "brushed aside" this challenge, indi
cating that the statute did not authorize it to render opinions concerning a special prosecu
tor's fitness to remain in that post, once appointed. See David Johnston, Three Judges Spurn
Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A16; see also Statement of
Senator Levin in the Congressional Record, supra note 245, at Sll,957.
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way, in the unusual event that neutrality deteriorates, or the ap
pearance of perceived bias undermines the public trust in the
process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When Archibald Cox served as Watergate Special Prosecutor, in
the troubled summer of 1973, there were enormous pressures upon
him to expand his inquiry and tum his focus on a host of disparate
allegations against President Richard M. Nixon. When charges sur
faced, for instance, that President Nixon was using the Secret Ser
vice to "bug" his own brother, Donald, there was a clamor particularly by Democrats - for the special prosecutor to investi
gate. Cox declined.390 When information was brought to Cox's at
tention suggesting that President Nixon may have funneled public
funds into his homes in San Clemente, California, and Key Bis
cayne, Florida, and failed to pay adequate taxes on the property,
Cox elected not to investigate. He met with Attorney General
Elliot Richardson, talked over his jurisdictional guidelines, and
chose not to diverge from his principal Watergate assignment.391
The special prosecutor law that was formulated between 1973
and 1978 looked upon Cox as its model. It envisioned a special
prosecutor of enormous self-restraint, who acted more as a neutral
referee - dedicated to proving the truth

or

innocence of a high

level official in order to quickly restore calm to the system of gov
ernment - than a common prosecutor of street crimes. Indeed,
the name of the statute was amended by Congress for this precise
reason, in 1982, when Congress switched the title from "special
prosecutor" to "independent counsel," in order to convey its vision
of that unique office.392 As the legislative history reports: "[T]he
name 'independent counsel' more accurately indicates that the in
vestigation is being handled outside of normal government channels

390. See Ken Gormley, Bring On the Impeachment Inquiry, Cm. TruB., Apr. 26, 1998, § 1
at 21; Interview with Archibald Cox by Phillip Heymann et al., Feb. 19, 1974, Archibald Cox
Papers, Box 24, folder 1, Harvard Law School Library, at 16.
391. See Interview with Archibald Cox, supra note 390; see also GORMLEY, supra note 3,
at 295-96; WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 195. Cox also declined to investigate
charges that General Al Haig, President Nixon's Chief of Staff, might be improperly receiv
ing two salaries, one from the military and one from the White House. See Interview with
Archibald Cox, supra note 390, at 16.
392. The statute was amended by Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-409, § 2{a){l)(A), (B), 96 Stat. 2039 {1983).
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by an impartial investigator and does not suggest, as does the name
'special prosecutor,' that an indictment has or will be brought."393
This ennobled vision of the independent counsel has proven it
self a naive failure. With the politicizing of independent counsel
investigations since Watergate, by Democrats and Republicans
alike, the temptation to use the statute as a cudgel to stun the oppo
nent and gain swift political advantage has become irresistible,394
With the vast expansion of independent counsel staffs, and the dele
gation of more power to front-line advisors who are aggressive ca
reer prosecutors by training,395 the artless vision of an independent
counsel steeped in self-restraint has become antiqued.
Yet our society cannot afford to scrap the independent counsel
statute entirely. In moments of crisis when a serious institutional
conflict arises, our system must have some failsafe device in place
that prevents a constitutional meltdown. In Watergate, absent a
special prosecutor, President Nixon's Department of Justice "might
well have taken the position that the President was not subject to
any judicial process and was not subject to the subpoena for the
tapes."396 No mechanism in the legal system would have existed to
challenge that position. It is true that the Watergate crisis resolved
itself, in the end, without a statutory independent counsel position.
But President Nixon came very close to succeeding in his effort to
extinguish the Watergate investigation entirely, through the "Sten
nis plan."397 And the constitutional stress created by the lack of a
legal mechanism to deal with such crises came close to permanently
damaging the American system of government. It is hardly worth
risking such irreversible institutional harm in future Watergates.
393. S. REP. No. 97-496, at 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3554. Profes
sor Beth Nolan called the new name "a benign-sounding title that suggests neutrality." No
lan, supra note 142, at 18. A later House report explained: "This change was made to
remove any implication that the subject of an investigation under the provisions of this stat
ute had been already determined to have committed the alleged crime." H.R. REP. No. 100316, at 10 n.2 (1987).
394. See Gormley, supra note 170.
395. For a profile of the principal prosecutors employed by Whitewater independent
counsel Kenneth Starr, see Caldwell, supra note 289, at 129-31, 146.
396. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1586 (remarks of Archibald
Cox); see also Walsh, supra note 193, at 2389 (arguing that Act will prevent another "Satur
day Night Massacre"). For an argument, however, that a special prosecutor law is not neces
sary because such crises will work themselves out politically, as they did in Watergate, see
Joseph E. DiGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad Idea, 86
GEO. L.J. 2299, 2305 (1998).
397. For a discussion of how close President Nixon came to succeeding in his plan to
abolish the special prosecutor and derailing the Watergate investigation, see GORMLEY,
supra note 3, at 371-77.
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In any event, American society has become accustomed to and
reliant upon special prosecutors. They will not disappear, no mat
ter what course Congress chooses. If the independent counsel stat
ute is allowed to expire in 1999, the system of government will
simply revert to increased ad hoc appointments of special prosecu
tors, and increased calls for Congressional appointments of special
investigators, when allegations of misconduct in the executive
branch arise.398 It is far more prudent to rely upon a solid statutory
mechanism, with an established set of ground-rules, than upon a
hit-or-miss method that relies upon the vagaries of politics to guard
against serious conflicts of interest within the executive branch.
The present statutory model, which combines limited control by the
Justice Department with ministerial oversight by a special judicial
panel, may not be perfect, but it is still preferable to any other sys
tem that we have invented.399
Yet, major reforms are necessary if the statute is to resemble
Congress's original design. The image of a special prosecutor riding
in on a white horse, restoring public trust, and riding off quickly
does not square with Washington life circa 1999. Not only have the
politics of the situation become more brutal now that both parties
have learned to manipulate the independent counsel law, following
Watergate, but the media has become a silent partner in the corrup
tion of the statute. Journalists have cast aside time honored stan
dards of professionalism, in the rush to publish startling assertions
of official misconduct (however unsubstantiated) in the impatient
world of internet news.400 In part, the statute must be rehabilitated
based upon a renewed commitment by the special court to search
out appointees willing to exercise self-restraint, even where the
temptations to become dragged into political battles and media ex
travaganzas are enormous.

In part the rehabilitation must be

brought about by the forced leadership of Congress, in overhauling
the law radically. Until the original vision of an independent coun
sel as a neutral referee is specifically injected into the words of the

398. For a discussion of ad hoc appointments, see supra discussion at notes 231-34 and
accompanying text.
399. For other scholars and commentators who have supported the preservation of the
independent counsel statute, albeit with certain reforms, see Dash, supra note 248, at 209495; Harriger, supra note 180, at 2116-17; Walsh, supra note 193, at 2381-82, 2389; Archibald
Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES Dec 12 1996, at Al.
400. See Dash, supra note 248, at 2094-95; Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress's Dirty
Work, 86 GEo. L.J. 2179, 2189-90; Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86
GEO L.J. 2267, 2269-71, 2277-79 (1998).
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statute, it will remain one of the greatest legislative failures of the
20th century.
It is better for Congress to allow the statute to lapse in

1999,

temporarily, in order to carry out this task properly, than to rush to
a deadline and create the problems of the past anew. Without dra
matic changes of the sort outlined above, few individuals worth at
tracting to public office - Presidents, Vice._Presidents, cabinet
officers, or hundreds of other public servants

-

will be willing to

endure public service in the next century.
No matter how cynical our nation may have become, in the span
of time since Watergate, such a prospect should give us great pause.

